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CHAPTER 1 
GETTING INTO THE ISSUES: SEEING AND EXPERIENCING 
 
1.0: INTRODUCTION 
Judgment – when its exercise rises to the happy status of knowledge – is clearly 
one of our chief modes of access to reality.  Accordingly, it is not a surprise that 
epistemology is among the perennial concerns of philosophers.  To the extent that access 
to reality is a good thing, it is a good thing to reach an understanding of it.  This is 
because understanding might improve our capacity for judgment, but also because it is 
worth understanding what is valuable.  Thus it is reasonable for us to inquire into the 
psychology, metaphysics, and value theory of knowing judgment.   
This dissertation, however, is focused on a distinct mode of access to reality – the 
perceptual mode of access.  The value of knowledge (and hence the value of 
understanding it) rests on the fact that it is a mode of access to reality.  Similarly, since 
perceptual modes of access to reality are modes of access to reality, it is valuable to 
understand perception. 
How, then, is it that reality is revealed to us when we cast our gaze about?  How is 
it that the region of the cosmos (and its features) around us is disclosed in our perceptual 
experiences?  Taken one way, these are scientific questions, to be determined by 
examining what happens when we see.  However, I mean these to be philosophical 
questions: I want to know what constitutes whatever the scientists discover as the 
perceptual disclosure of reality. 
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Our sensory awareness acquaints us with ever so many different aspects of reality.  
For some examples, one’s sensory awareness can constitute acquaintance with 
particulars, properties, and events.  I propose, however, to focus on the way in which 
particulars are revealed in experience.  Part of the reason for this is purely 
autobiographical: this question – what is it to see a thing – is how I began thinking about 
these issues.  Additionally, I suspect that the revelation of particulars is explanatorily 
prior to the revelation of, for example, events – though perhaps not explanatorily prior to 
the revelation of properties.   
At any rate, some reason for focusing on the revelation of particulars derives from 
its intrinsic interest.  Moreover, perception generally – and visual perception in particular 
– appears to play a crucial role in fixing the contents of our mental states.  Imagine a 
creature who is equipped with the capacity to detect features, but without the capacity to 
think about particulars.  Such a creature would probably think many true things, but 
would remain out of touch in a peculiar way.  To the extent that it matters that a creature 
is in touch with one thing rather than another, we should feel a kind of pity for it.  Our 
romantic love, for example, aspires to bear on one person – and not, for example, any one 
of that person’s possible twins.  One plausible partial answer to the question of what 
constitutes our attitudes as bearing on this or that particular is this: we must first perceive 
a thing, if our attitudes are to bear on it.  Of course, this answer needs refinement, but if 
something like it is right, then perception is the beginning of our dealings with particular 
things. 
As I will argue in Chapter 3, the fact that my experience purports to reveal, for 
example, the texture of your hair can depend on its being you I am seeing right now.  If I 
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were seeing your twin, then the content of my visual experience – that which constitutes 
its visually seeming to me things are thus-and-so – would be such that the state of your 
twin’s hair would determine whether my experience is veridical.  Thus the perceptual 
facts can make a difference to the contents of visual experience – to which particulars are 
required to possess such-and-such features, if one’s experience is to be veridical. 
How, then, is it that particular things are revealed to us when we cast our gaze 
about?  What constitutes our seeing one thing, rather than another or nothing at all (as in 
the case of hallucination)?  What constitutes an experience as a perception of, say, Fred 
rather than his mother, Zenobia?  What constitutes an experience as a hallucination, 
rather than a perception of some particular? 
Grice's thought experiments motivate the view that an initial answer to this 
question requires that a perceptual experience causally depend on its objects. (Grice 
1961) But, the Gricean dialectic continues, as cases of causal deviance show, causation is 
not enough.  In order to constitute a perception of a thing, one's experience needs to be 
caused by it in the right kind of way.  Grice leaves it open what the right kind of causal 
dependence might be.  Progress in formulating a dependence condition on perception 
consists in saying more about what the right kind of dependence is.  The hope is that we 
can tell a story about what feature every perceived particular possesses and every 
unperceived particular lacks.  This story, moreover, will be the story of what constitutes 
the revelation of things in our experience. 
 This dissertation is organized around engaging with the Gricean arguments.  Grice 
leaves it open what the right kind of causal dependence might be.  The business of 
Chapter 2 is to say more about what the right kind of causal dependence is.  In particular, 
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I favor a version of counterfactual dependence theory.  The core commitment of a 
counterfactual dependence theory of visual perception is that seeing a thing is constituted 
by its being true that one’s experience tracks the state of the thing across nearby modal 
space.  Thus, for example, if you are seeing a red ball, then were the ball blue (instead of 
red), then your experience would represent it as red.  However, counterfactual accounts 
suffer from two kinds of problem.  First, they suffer from counterexamples involving 
counterfactual interventions – interventions that do not happen, but would, were the 
actual situation different.  Second, they suffer from principled objections.  That is, it has 
been argued by Brian McLaughlin and Colin McGinn that there are reasons to doubt that 
any counterfactual account can succeed.  I address both of these problems.  First, I defend 
the counterfactual theory against the counterexamples by proposing a process-relative 
counterfactual account – were the seen thing different (in appropriate ways) and were the 
process actually eventuating in your experience operational, then your experience would 
represent those differences.  Second, I argue that we need not be convinced by 
McLaughlin and McGinn’s criticisms of counterfactual theory. 
 In his article, ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’, Grice offers two arguments for 
the claim that the seeing relation is a kind of causal-explanatory relation. (Grice 1961)  I 
call them the Argument from Veridical Hallucination and the Argument from Competing 
Objects.  Chapter 3 engages with the Gricean arguments by defending the soundness of 
these against two sources of doubt about the possibility of veridical hallucination. The 
first half of Chapter 3 defends the Gricean arguments against Matthew Soteriou’s 
argument that veridical hallucination is an impossibility.1  On his account, if you accept 
the possibility of veridical hallucination, then you must accept that an experience could 
                                                 
1 The argument is contained in his article, ‘The Particularity of Visual Perception’.  (Soteriou 2000) 
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be both veridical and non-veridical.  Since this is impossible, he concludes that veridical 
hallucination must be impossible.  I defend against Soteriou’s argument by giving an 
externalist analysis of the case he wields against the possibility of veridical hallucination.  
In particular, I argue that the perceptual facts make a proto-semantic difference to the 
contents of visual experiences.  That is, I argue that the perceptual facts are among the 
constituting determinants of the contents of visual experiences.  Whether you are the 
victim of a hallucination or not (and whether you are seeing one thing or another) can 
make a difference to what must be so if your experience is to be veridical. 
The second half of Chapter 3 is devoted to assessing the strength of John Searle’s 
anti-externalist descriptivist account of the contents of visual experiences.  According to 
Searle, visual experiences represent not only distal states of affairs – e.g. that there is a 
blue thing at location L – but also the obtaining of a causal dependence between those 
distal states of affairs and the appearance that they obtain.  (Searle 1983: 48)  Thus, he 
thinks that perception-grounding relations are represented in the contents of visual 
experiences.  If Searle’s account is correct, then the Gricean arguments must be rejected.  
However, as I argue, there is no reason to accept Searle’s account that is sufficiently 
powerful to outweigh the appearance that veridical hallucination is a possibility.  My 
treatment of Searle has two main parts.  In the first, I examine the connections between 
content and phenomenology.  It turns out they are not sufficient to defeat Searle’s 
account, but neither do they lend it strength.  Thus, they do not provide sufficient warrant 
for Searle’s account to reject the possibility of veridical hallucination.  Additionally, I 
provide an externalist argument that uses a connection between perceptual facts and 
agency to reach the conclusion that the perceptual facts are difference makers not only for 
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the contents of visual experiences, but also for the contents of intentions.  The case at the 
heart of this argument provides another opportunity for the critique of Searle.  It turns out 
that Searle cannot deploy his anti-externalist descriptivism in this case.  It looks like he 
will have to be stuck with the kind of conclusion the rejection of which motivates his 
anti-externalist descriptivism.  Thus, again, we have no reason to prefer Searle’s account 
of the contents of visual experiences over the possibility of veridical hallucination. 
 
2.0: THE STANDARD VIEW, EXTERNALISM, AND VISUAL CONTENTS 
Imagine a case of seeing a thing.  According to the standard view (herein TSV) 
seeing a thing involves several elements: the particular thing seen, the experience we 
enjoy in seeing the thing, and a dependence relation between the thing and the experience 
of the thing.  What differentiates TSV from my account lies in the relation it postulates 
between visual contents and the perceptual facts.  I affirm, while TSV denies, that the 
perceptual facts make a difference to the contents of visual experiences.2 
When we see a particular, our experience is experience of that particular, but it is 
possible that experience with the very same content/phenomenal character be of another 
thing, or nothing at all.  Imagine being enveloped in a self-luminous pink haze.  With 
your eyes open you can see the haze.  Your experience bears on the particular pink haze 
in which you are enveloped.  Now imagine being enveloped in a second, but qualitatively 
identical, haze.  This second haze would produce an experience qualitatively identical to 
the experience you enjoyed in seeing the first haze.  Moreover, it is possible that you 
                                                 
2 See (Davies 1997) and (McGinn 1989) for the ur-statements of TSV.  It is probably worth stating that the 
basic picture – according to which our experiences might possess a particular content and phenomenal 
character no matter what the perceptual facts – is quite ancient.  Descartes, for example, seems to affirm 
such a view in the Second Meditation.  
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could, perhaps being overcome by intoxicating fumes, hallucinate a self-luminous pink 
haze.  In all three cases, you enjoy experience with the same phenomenal character, but in 
each case there are differences regarding the of-ness of the experience.  In the first case, 
you see the first haze.  In the second case, you see the second haze.  In the third case, you 
see nothing at all.  You experience does not bear on any existing thing. 
  Thus, on TSV, whether or not our visual experience bears on a particular object is 
not determined by its phenomenal character.  Given, this line of thought continues, that 
the content of visual experience is a phenomenal concept, it follows that, when we 
perceive a thing by entertaining an experience, it is possible that an experience with the 
same contents could be an experience of another thing, or nothing at all.  Thus it is 
proposed that visual experiences have what might be called existentially quantified 
contents.  Such contents are perspicuously represented using devices of existential 
quantification to indicate those objects they are about.3 
 There is much that is correct about TSV.  In particular, TSV is right about the 
basic constituents of the seeing relation: seeing a particular is, as I will argue, constituted 
by its being true that a visual experience bears the right dependence relation to a 
particular.  However, as I argue in Chapter 3, it is false that the contents of a perceptual 
visual experience must be identical to the contents of its indistinguishable cousins – those 
experiences which would be just like it, but constitute perceptions of other particulars or 
nothing at all. 
 According to TSV, when we say that an experience is, for example, an experience 
of Sally, its being of her can not be supposed to be entailed by its content.  The of-ness of 
                                                 
3 More discussion of the (somewhat obscure) claim that visual experiences have existentially quantified 
contents is found in Chapter 3. 
 8
the experience is not part of its content.  The bearing of a perceptual experience on its 
objects is not part of its content.  This might be thought to be an immediate problem for 
TSV, but it is not.  The bearing of a representation on a particular need not be reflected in 
its content.  Thus, for example, you might announce to your kindergarten class that some 
dirty little boy has peed on the floor in the coat room and thereby speak about Sam, but 
that Sam is who you are speaking about is not determined by the content of your 
utterance.  After all, it is consistent with what you say that Kenny is the perpetrator of the 
crime.  That you have spoken about Sam is a matter of implicature and, to the extent your 
audience picks up on your sly accusation of Sam, it is because they possess information 
you have not asserted. 
According to TSV, when we say that an experience is, for example, an experience 
of Sally, we cannot correctly mean that its being of her is entailed by its content.  
Probably, the advocate of TSV would claim that what earns our right to describe an 
experience as of something is its being part of an episode of perception.  Thus the 
difference between me and the advocate of TSV can seem quit slim here – it is the 
difference between claiming that the of-ness of a perceptual experience is reflected in its 
content (and the fact that it is part of the content of experience is constitutively explained 
by the perceptual facts) and thinking that it is not (but that the aptness of describing a 
perceptual experience as of something is explained by the perceptual facts). 
 Indeed, but for the case for externalism that I describe in Chapter 2, I’d be an 
advocate of TSV.  Thus, while I agree that TSV has gone wrong in affirming that the 
perceptual facts make no difference to the contents of visual experiences, I also think that 
much of the criticism of TSV has been misplaced.  There are two main lines of criticism I 
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have in mind here.  First, there are worries about whether TSV captures the particular-ish 
phenomenal character of visual experience.  Second, John Campbell argues in Chapter 6 
of his book, Reference and Consciousness, that TSV cannot be right.  (Campbell 2002) 
Campbell claims that if TSV is correct, then it is mysterious how my seeing a thing 
should put me in a position to understand demonstrative reference to it. 
Let me turn to the first worry.  In a recent essay, Chalmers gives the following 
argument (though whether he endorses it with full certainty is not clear) that TSV must 
be false: 
“[A] merely existential characterization of phenomenal content does not fully 
respect the directness of an experience of an object…experience does not merely 
present that there is an object at a certain location with a certain color: it presents 
that that object is at a certain location with a certain color.” (Chalmers 2006: 109) 
  
Peacocke gives a similar argument in a footnote in Sense and Content: 
 
[If] we are to be strict, the attribution of a common existential content to [visual] 
experience is too crude.  There is a sense in which, as one incompetently says, a 
hallucination presents a particular non-existent object, and so has more than a 
general existential content. (Peacocke 1983: 9) 
 
Both of these passages try to identify a problem with the thesis that experiences have 
merely existential content.  Both are pointing to facts about the phenomenology of visual 
experience – their particular-ish phenomenal character – and taking this as reason to 
reject TSV in favor of other views.  In Chalmers’ case, he proposes to accept Burge’s 
account, according to which the content of experience “contains a demonstrative 
element.”4 (Burge 1991: 202) 
                                                 
4 Now I am not sure whether the suggestion that content of experience is demonstrative is helpful.  The 
problem is that sentences containing demonstratives need not differ in which proposition their assertive 
utterances express from sentences that do not contain demonstratives.  For example, on the standard 
semantics for demonstratives and names, the sentences ‘Fred is happy’ and ‘He is happy’ (where ‘he’ is 
used as a demonstrative pronoun) may well possess the same content.  Sadly, here is not the place to pursue 
these questions.  As we’ll see in the next paragraph, we can get an ever-so-slight traction on the issue – 
though this traction gives out almost immediately. 
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The supposition here that phenomenology determines content is problematic – as 
we’ll see in Chapter 3.  But I’d like to focus on a different worry.  Susanna Siegel has 
recently made a good statement of it: 
One way to question this would be to say that Chalmers [and company] are all 
wrong about the phenomenology – that it really is respected by a merely 
existential characterization of phenomenal content. Another way to question is to 
ask what exactly the phenomenal difference is supposed to be between the way 
Chalmers [and company] take the phenomenology to be, and the way they think 
their opponents take it to be. I find this pretty obscure. Both demonstratives and 
certain existentially quantified formula (e.g., the Russellian expansion of ‘the 
table over there’) are devices for representing particular objects. Of course there 
are modal differences, but those seem irrelevant when considering 
phenomenology. (Siegel MS) 
 
Siegel is right about this: proposals about the contents of experience – especially 
proposals designed to capture the bearing of experience on particulars – turn out, often 
enough, to be modal claims.  Thus for example, on standard semantics for 
demonstratives, if we join Burge in thinking that the bearing of experiences on their 
objects is demonstrative, presumably we mean to indicate two things: (i) that their 
bearing on them is direct and (ii) that their bearing on them is rigid.5,6 
One might think it would be a simple matter to resolve this question.  After all, 
what is at issue here is the phenomenology of experience.  Presumably, therefore, in 
order to determine the modal profile of the particular-oriented intentionality of 
                                                 
5 It is plausible that we might also mean to indicate that, in addition to possessing a content, such 
experiences possess a character. 
6 The claims that experiences are rigid and directly referential mean the following: An experience would be 
rigid with respect to, for example, Fred, if and only if its content is such that its veridicality (at possible 
worlds in which Fred exists) depends on how Fred is in that world.  An experience would be directly 
referential to, for example, Fred, if and only if, its bearing on Fred were non-descriptive.  That an 
experience’s bearing on Fred is non-descriptive means that it represents Fred and not only by representing 
the obtaining of conditions which Fred, in fact, satisfies.  Thus, we can see the point of the talk of 
directness.  If an experience is not directly referential, then its representing of Fred is mediated by its first 
representing conditions Fred satisfies.  It is sometimes suppose that if a representation is directly 
referential, then it must be rigid with respect to what it directly references.  (Soames 2002: 264) This is a 
mistake, though arguing so is beyond the scope of this dissertation.   
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experience we’d simply need to engage in an introspective project.  Look at your hand.  
Now ask of the conscious episode you thereby enjoy whether the way it presents the 
world to be would be satisfied at different situations.  If things turned out this way or that, 
would your experience be veridical?  But this procedure seems hopeless.  It doesn’t seem 
like introspection has anything to say about the modal profile of the bearing of our 
experiences on their objects. 
 Part of the problem is this: we just do not have much occasion to make fine 
discriminations between the contents of experiences.  Moreover, the aspect of content 
we’re after – its particularity – is presumably widespread.  Maybe every visual 
experience has this feature.  As a result, it is not as if we have occasion for discriminating 
among different experiences regarding their particularity.   
 The dialectical situation is different in the case of other intentional states.  In the 
case of beliefs and statements of belief, for example, philosophers are trained to make 
fine distinctions.  So we can be expected to do better in our theoretical understanding of 
belief contents.  Not only that, but we have techniques for detecting what might seem to 
be fine distinctions.  We can test proposals about the contents of belief by looking into 
the web of inferential relations into which beliefs fall.  Does this proposal about the 
contents of some class of belief get the inferential behavior of these beliefs right?  Does it 
forbid the invalid inferences and allow the valid ones?  Does it in some sense explain the 
validity of the valid ones?  Another source of data for semantic proposals comes from 
embedding the sentences that might express belief in modal contexts.  So, for example, 
Kripke argues against descriptivist proposals by showing that if they are right, some 
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sentences involving names under the scope of the necessity operator count as true, when 
they ought to be false.  
 We cannot do this in the case of experience.  Part of how we get a grip on the 
contents of beliefs by getting a grip on how sentences expressing them function.  The 
embedding tests, for example, require that we have access to the syntax of sentences.  We 
reach an understanding of the inferential properties of a content by putting together 
derivations and contemplating them.  Obviously, we cannot embed visual experiences 
under modal operators and then check to see if we get the right result. 
Thus, it seems we cannot directly check the proposal that experiences have 
demonstrative contents (supposing we understand what this means) rather than merely 
existential contents against phenomenological data.  So the advocate of TSV need not be 
moved by Chalmers and Peacocke’s worry and neither should the critic of TSV rely on it. 
Let me turn now to discussing Campbell’s criticism of TSV.  Campbell’s 
criticism is that if TSV were true, then we could not make sense of our understanding of 
demonstrative expressions.  Imagine the following dialogue: My friend says “That apple 
is a yummy looking one”.  I wonder what object she is talking about and she directs my 
gaze toward the apple in the bowl.  Having seen it, I am now in a position to agree or 
disagree or otherwise engage her in conversation about the apple.  My perception of the 
apple explains the knowledge of reference which explains my understanding of her 
speech.   
Moreover, the same kind of knowledge probably plays a role on the other side of 
the speaker/hearer divide.  Prior to my coming to understand her speech, my friend’s 
perception of the apple equipped her with the cognitive wherewithal to form the 
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appropriate communicative intentions – to bear the apple in mind in such a way that she 
could speak with knowledge of reference.  Our perception equips us with the same 
ability, an ability which gets expressed both in speech and understanding of speech.  So 
far so good. 
Campbell focuses in particular on the case of demonstratives and argues that 
conscious experience provides just the sort of window on the world we need in order to 
engage in knowing dialogue involving demonstrative terms.  Thus, perception provides 
knowledge of reference because it involves conscious experience.7  He then uses this 
connection between experience and knowledge of reference to argue against TSV and in 
favor of his own view.8 
According to TSV, when we say that an experience is, for example, an experience 
of Sally, we cannot correctly mean that its being of her is entailed by its content.  Thus, 
that I am perceiving one thing rather than another, or nothing at all, is not given in my 
conscious experience.  I can receive no guarantee, just by consulting the character of my 
experience that, for example, a particular object exists.  I can receive no guarantee that 
when I wish to direct my visual attention on something that I’ll succeed.  My attempt to 
do so can fail because there can be nothing to attend to.  My attempt can fail because I 
can attend to one thing when I wished to attend to another.  My attempt could fail 
because it is pre-empted by hallucination.  
                                                 
7 Of course, it provides such knowledge only against a background in which the necessary linguistic and 
cognitive competencies and motivations are already in place.  Thus, when Campbell speaks of a certain 
kind of mental state as insufficient for grounding an understanding of demonstrative reference, he means 
that it is insufficient, even given the necessary background.  I’ll adopt this convention as well in what 
follows, suppressing explicit reference to the necessary background.    
8 His view is discussed below in the section on pages 14 and 15. 
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Campbell argues that if consulting the character of my consciousness won’t 
guarantee these kinds of cognitive success, then we do not know what we’re talking 
about when we use demonstrative expressions.  Since knowledge of reference is crucial 
to understanding our use of demonstratives, our use of demonstratives is mysterious if 
TSV is right.  Or, put another way, since we often do know what we’re talking about 
when we engage in discourse using demonstrative expressions, TSV must be false. 
Campbell claims that if your sensory consciousness fails to settle the question of 
what you are seeing (if anything), then “perception could not provide you with 
knowledge of which particular thing you are talking about. …[No] amount of looking to 
see could provide you with knowledge of which cup is being talked about.” (Campbell 
2002: 124-25)  Therefore, if TSV is correct, our imagined dialogue is a mystery.  It 
cannot explain how we know what we’re talking about. 
Campbell seems to understand settling the question of what you’re seeing (if 
anything) as working something like this: Attend to one’s sensory consciousness and 
thereby receive a guaranteed answer.  The question-settling has to be made possible by 
something subjectively available.  (Campbell 2002: 125)  Of course, on TSV, experience 
is subjectively available, but does not possess a guaranteed bearing on a particular object.  
Despite my best efforts to perceive, I might fail to see a given individual.  Moreover, that 
I am subject to experience with the same content and phenomenal character as a 
perceptual experience is consistent with my seeing nothing at all. 
Campbell has required that whatever grounds our knowledge of reference must be 
such as to guarantee an answer to the question of what you’re seeing (if anything).  Thus, 
Campbell advocates a view according to which the perceptual facts are constitutive of 
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experiences. (Campbell 2002: Ch. 6)  Experiences consist in the tokening of acquaintance 
relations with worldly objects, their features, and their relations to the subject of 
experience.  Campbell calls this account of the metaphysics of experience the Relational 
View.  On the Relational View, if an experience is a perceptual experience, then it is 
necessarily perceptual.9 
 However, Campbell’s argument against TSV does not succeed.  He has nothing 
convincing to say about why the guarantee – that which constitutes our knowledge of the 
reference of a demonstrative – must be located in the experience rather than in the way 
the experience is embedded in the environment.  Consequently, the advocate of TSV 
might agree with Campbell that perception can provide knowledge of reference, but 
would argue that the guarantee Campbell seeks could be provided by the perceiving 
relation and not by the metaphysical constitution of the experiences involved in 
perception. 
What reason does Campbell have for thinking that the guarantee he seeks must be 
located in the constitution of conscious experience, rather than in relations between 
experiences and the environment?  Campbell is not very explicit about this claim, but its 
seems that he intends his discussion of blindsight to provide some warrant.  Campbell 
argues that a someone with blindsight cannot understand demonstrative reference with 
respect to objects in his blind spot – at least not as we do.10  (Campbell 2002: 7-9)  What 
                                                 
9 Again, there is more discussion of the Relational View (and accounts like it) in the next section. 
10 Someone with blind sight suffers from a dysfunction in his visual system the consequence of which is 
that, while it is as if he is blind with respect to some portion of his visual field, it is evident that he is 
nonetheless receiving information about objects and their features in the blind region.  People with 
blindsight can, for example, reach out and configure their hands in such a way as to grasp objects in their 
blind region.  (Milner and Goodale 1995)   
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provides our knowledge of reference of demonstrative expressions, then, is conscious 
experience of demonstrated or potentially demonstrated objects. 
 Suppose it is insufficient for understanding demonstrative expressions in the way 
that we do that one subliminally perceive an object – that one be subject to a non-
conscious experience that bears the perception-grounding relation to an object.  This is 
still not enough to establish that the guarantee given by perception must be determined by 
constitution of the conscious perceptual experience, rather than the relations it bears to 
objects insofar as it is perceptual.  Why is it important for our understanding of 
demonstrative reference to a thing that we non-subliminally – that is, consciously – see a 
thing?  An advocate of TSV might argue as follows: The reason conscious perception is 
necessary for our understanding of demonstrative reference is because only conscious 
perception makes available to the subject the guarantee that is constituted by perception-
grounding relations.  Someone who sees a thing subliminally is like a job seeker whose 
job offer – his guarantee of employment – has been mailed but not yet received.   
So just as the advocate of TSV need not be moved by Chalmers’ and Peacocke’s 
worry and neither should the critic of TSV rely on it, she might also reasonably resist 
Campbell’s argument that the Relational View is to be preferred to TSV. 
 
3.0: THE INSURGENT VIEW: DISJUNCTIVISM 
My view has some kinship with the main insurgency against TSV and the purpose 
of this section is to distinguish myself from the main body of the insurgency, 
disjunctivism.11  Disjunctivists characteristically claim that there is no common mental 
                                                 
11 (Hinton 1967) is the contemporary source for disjunctivism, followed by (Snowdon 1980/81),  (Snowdon 
1990), and (McDowell 1982).  Its current champion is Mike Martin.  (Martin 1997) (Martin 2002) (Martin 
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kind formed by even subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations.  As 
William Child puts it: 
[T]he idea of experience, neutral between vision and hallucination, is an 
abstraction from the more specific and fundamental ideas of vision and 
hallucination.  On this view, then, there is a single sort of characterization which 
can be applied to cases of vision and to cases of hallucination; in both, it looks to 
S as if something is F.  But there is no single type of state of affairs common to 
cases of vision and hallucination.  Rather, any case of its looking to S as if 
something is F will be more fundamentally, and specifically, either a case of 
something’s looking F to S [in case perception is occurring], or else a case of its 
merely being for S as if something looked F to her [in case hallucination is 
occurring].  (Child 1994:144) 
 
Thus, while it can be accurate to characterize episodes of perception and episodes of 
hallucination in the same terms, our doing so is made accurate not by one underlying 
mental reality – a visual experience – that is shared between the two but by two 
fundamentally different mental states.  This is a bit obscure, but Child provides a nice 
analogy: 
[C]onsider the two concepts ‘photograph of S’ and ‘drawing of S’, and the 
concept ‘likeness of S’.  In this case, it is clearly correct to treat the concept of 
‘likeness of S’ disjunctively.  Any particular likeness of S is fundamentally, and 
more specifically, either a photograph of S or a drawing of S; it is a likeness of S 
only derivatively – in virtue of being either a photograph or a drawing.  (Child 
1994: 145) 
 
Thus, just as it would be a mistake to suppose that the difference between a photograph 
of S and a drawing of S could be explained by a common thing (a likeness) with different 
causal histories in each case, it would be a mistake to suppose that the difference between 
a perceptual experience and a hallucinatory experience could be explained by invoking 
one thing – a visual experience – with different causal histories. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004) (Martin 2006)  Jonathon Dancy also presents disjunctivism in his article, ‘Arguments from Illusion’.  
(Dancy 1995) 
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The characteristic claim of Disjunctivism should probably be understood as a 
consequence of their characteristic metaphysics of perceptual visual experience.  Thus, 
though disjunctivism gets characterized as above, its primary commitment is to a view of 
the metaphysics of perceptual visual experience much like Campbell’s Relational View.  
Mike Martin describes the disjunctivist metaphysics as follows: 
According to [the disjunctivist metaphysics], the actual objects of perception, the 
external things such as trees, tables, and rainbows, which one can perceive, and 
the properties they manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’s 
conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience. (Martin 1997: 84) 
 
What is the meaning of this talk of constitution?  It is supposed to indicate that these 
objects and their features are essential to the identity of the experiences constituted by 
them.  Thus, the experience I am having now – assuming it is perfectly perceptual – could 
not exist in worlds in which it is not part of an episode of perception.  Were I 
hallucinating, a subjectively indiscernible, but numerically distinct, experience would 
take its place.  Since purely hallucinatory experiences have no objects, they could not be 
constituted by objects of perception and their features.  Thus, the disjunctivist 
metaphysics leads almost directly to disjunctivism’s characteristic claim.  If this 
metaphysics is correct, then episodes of perception and episodes of hallucination must 
have rather different constitutions and it is no surprise they do not form a fundamental 
common kind. 
What is the mode of constitution by which perceptual objects and their features 
constitute perceptual visual experiences?  Alston and Langsam propose what is called the 
Theory of Appearing, according to which experience consists, most fundamentally, in the 
tokening of appearing relations – construed as a relation taking a subject of experience, 
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an object, and at least one property.  (Alston 1999) (Langsam 1997) The relation of 
appearing is the relation that obtains between, for example, myself, a ball, and redness 
when a ball appears red to me.  The theory requires that perceptual experiences 
fundamentally consist in relations between subjects and worldly objects – things like 
sandwiches, people, cars, and rainbows.  That perceptual experience fundamentally 
consists in such relations means that the appearance relation is not to be constitutively 
explained by anything.  It is a primitive relation and possesses no constitutive 
explanation.  Thus, according to the Theory of Appearing, experience is not to be 
understood in terms of relations to contents.  A burrito’s appearing tubular to me is not to 
be understood (even partly) as a matter of being in some state with tubularity-involving 
propositional content – even if it should turn out that experiences have propositional 
contents.  
It is not my intention to present an assessment of disjunctivism in this dissertation.  
There are already fairly convincing critiques of the view.12  My goal is to distinguish 
myself from the disjunctivist.  Like the disjunctivist, I think that there are differences 
(philosophically interesting differences, deep differences!) between perceptual 
experiences and their counterparts.  However, I deny both the disjunctivist metaphysics 
and the characteristic claim of disjunctivism.  Until I see a good reason to think it, I’ll 
suppose that perceptual experiences and their counterparts are of the same fundamental 
kind.  When Child claims that it would be a mistake to suppose that the distinction 
between a perceptual experience and a hallucinatory experience could be explained by 
invoking one thing – a visual experience – with different causal histories in two different 
                                                 
12 See (Comesaña 2005), (Wright 2002), (Johnston 2006), and (Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2005) for some 
examples. 
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circumstances, I think the proof is in the pudding and we must see how such an 
explanation might proceed.  And, of course, this is the task partially accomplished in 
Chapter 2.  Thus, while I think the perceptual facts make a difference to the contents of 
visual experiences, I do not think that this supports the view that perceptual experiences 




PERCEPTUAL DEPENDENCE: FINDING A PLACE FOR COUNTERFACTS 
 
 
The business of this chapter is to present and advocate for my account of what 
constitutes a visual experience as a perceptual experience – what constitutes an episode 
as an episode of seeing.  I will begin by presenting my view.  I’ll do this by critiquing 
David Lewis’ counterfactual theory – the theory of which my account is an extension and 
revision.  My account is a descendant of Lewis’, but it is not the only one.  Accordingly, I 
will present and critique Bruce LeCatt’s theory, which, like mine and Lewis’, deploys the 
apparatus of counterfactual dependence to give an account of perception.  Next, I will 
present and critique arguments – arising from the work of Brian McLaughlin – against 
the thesis that perception should receive a counterfactual analysis of any sort.  After that, 
I will address one of Michael Tye’s counterexamples to a counterfactual analysis by 
invoking analogies to photographic representations.  Next I address the possible 
eliminability of reference to causation in the analysis of perception.  Finally, I wrap up 
with a discussion of objections to a process-relative counterfactual account that arise 
from my use of the notion of a process. 
I favor an analysis that follows David Lewis in including counterfactual 
dependence in a refinement of Grice’s causal dependence theory.  In particular, on my 
view, it is necessary that a perceptual experience be the outcome of a process that 
supports a suitable pattern of counterfactuals.  This differs from Lewis insofar as it 
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requires that the relevant counterfactuals hold fixed some actual process that links an 
experience and its objects.  My account also differs from Lewis’ insofar as it is an 
account of transitive seeing.  That is, I am interested in the question of what makes it the 
case that I see one thing, rather than another.  What makes it true, for example, that in 
looking out just now, I see this cup rather than the one I could see if I were to glance to 
the right?  Lewis’ theory is designed to account for intransitive seeing – what makes it 
true that I see anything, rather than nothing at all.  What makes make it true that I see?  
Full stop.  Thus my account is a refinement of Lewis’ but it is also an extension of it. 
I should add that Lewis’ division between accounts of transitive seeing and 
accounts of intransitive seeing is problematic.  The reason is this: every instance of 
intransitive seeing is also an instance of transitive seeing.  I cannot see without seeing 
something.  Thus, one would expect that the way to give an account of intransitive seeing 
would be to give an account of transitive seeing.  Whatever makes it true that I see 
something is also what makes it true that I see. 
My refinement of the counterfactual account is attractive because it avoids the 
many counterexamples that have been marshaled against the counterfactual accounts of 
perception, while preserving what is attractive about counterfactual accounts.   
 
PART 1 
COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCE AND SEEING 
 
1.1: COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCE AND SEEING 
My proposal arises from the dialectic begun with Grice, who argues that it is 
necessary that a perceptual experience (an experience that is part of an episode of seeing) 
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causally depend on what is seen.13 (Grice 1961)  His two main arguments for this view 
are the Argument from Veridical Hallucination and the Argument from Competing 
Objects.14  Moreover, Grice argues that it is sufficient for seeing a thing that one’s 
experience causally depend on it in the right kind of way.  (Grice 1961)  Thus, on Grice’s 
view, it is necessary and sufficient for seeing a thing that one’s experience be caused by 
the thing in the right kind of way. 
Grice’s motivation for specifying that perceived object must cause experiences in 
the right kind of way stems from what are now entirely familiar problems.  Mere causal 
dependence won’t do.  There are two problems here: the problem of causal deviance and 
the selection problem.   
Cases of deviant causation tell us that mere causal connection is insufficient for 
seeing a thing.  Consider the following case: 
Raven Case: A neurosurgeon is manipulating your brain while you are conscious.  
The point is to electrically stimulate your visual cortex and find out what sorts of 
experience you have.  Suddenly, a raven flies into the room and attacks the 
surgeon.  In his haste to escape the bird he accidentally stimulates your visual 
cortex in just the right way for you to have experience which is just like it would 
be if you were actually seeing the raven.   
 
In the Raven Case you do not see the raven.  Thus, even though your experience is 
caused by the raven, you do not see the raven in being subject to the experience.  A mere 
causal dependence between a visual experience and an object is therefore insufficient for 
                                                 
13 Grice himself was responding to H.H. Prices theory.  However, Price’s work belongs in the prehistory of 
this dialectic, since Price was concerned with establishing that perceptual consciousness is a form of 
inference, in particular a form of causal inference.  (Price 1932: 395)  Thus, on Price’s account, perception 
is essentially a way of coming to believe something.  Like Lewis and Grice, I understand perception to be a 
way of coming to have an experiential state.  Experiential states differ from beliefs in many ways.  For 
example, we hold people responsible for their beliefs, but not, given the direction of their gaze, for the 
character of their experience.  
14 I discuss these extensively in Chapter 3. 
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seeing a thing.  Thus, in order to achieve sufficiency for a causal condition on seeing, 
Grice adds that the experience must causally depend in the right way.   
 Let me explain the selection problem.  Suppose that Fred is Zenobia’s grandson.  
Suppose that I see Fred, but not Zenobia, who is far away in California.  But, both Fred 
and Zenobia are part of the causal chain leading to my experience.  Since I see one and 
not the other, it follows that mere causal dependence is not enough for perception. 
Mere causal dependence is too permissive: it generates the selection problem and 
the problem of causal deviance.  Thus, if a causal account of perception is going to work, 
it had better place restrictions the kinds of causal relationships that might partly constitute 
an episode as an episode of perception.  Thus, Grice claims that the causal relationship 
between an experience and perceived object must be the right kind of causal relationship.  
What, on Grice’s account, is the right kind of causal dependence?  Grice supposes that 
the best way for the theorist to proceed is to indicate, by means of examples, what kind of 
causal dependence is required.  Thus, it is sufficient for X to perceive an object that: 
it should be causally involved in the generation of some sense-impression by X in 
the kind of way in which, for example, when I look at my hand in good light, my 
hand is causally responsible for its looking to me as if there were a hand before 
me, or in which … (and so on), whatever that kind of way may be; and to be 
enlightened on that question one must have recourse to the specialist. (Grice 
1961) 
 
On Grice’s account, there is a kind of gap in our concept of perception to be filled in by 
the scientist.  The situation here is a bit like the situation of the folk with respect to 
material-stuff concepts.  Water is the kind of stuff that is made of whatever the scientific 
authorities tell us it is made of.  Likewise, Grice is urging, perception is a causal process 
the essential character of which is to be explicitly determined by the scientist. 
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Grice supposes that whatever fills this gap will also solve the problems of 
selection and causal deviance.  Of course, even if we accept that our conception of 
perception has a gap to be filled in, one might hope to use philosophical methods to say 
more about how the gap might be filled in.  We can, therefore, see Lewis as contributing 
to this project.  In his article, 'Prosthetic Vision and Veridical Hallucination', David 
Lewis proposes the following dependence condition: "If the scene before the eyes causes 
matching visual experience as part of a suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence, 
then the subject sees; if the scene before the eyes of causes matching visual experience 
without a suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence, then the subject does not see." 
(Lewis 1986a: 281) 
The kind of counterfactual dependence relation Lewis imagines here is just the 
kind that he thinks reductively grounds causal dependence.  (1986a: 166-67) (Lewis 
1986a: 284)  If some scene S and some experience E bear the right kind of counterfactual 
dependence, then two things are true: 
i) if S were to occur then E would occur; 
and 
ii) if S were not to occur then E would not occur. 
Additionally, the occurrence of E must be part of a suitable pattern of dependence.  There 
are, on Lewis’ account, two aspects to this suitability: 
 First, if things were suitably different with respect to how they look, then the 
different scene would cause suitably different visual experience.  (Lewis 1986a: 286).  
The suitability in question seems to be a matter of which differences (properties) count 
for the pattern of counterfactual dependence.  It won’t do to claim that no one sees 
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anything because, for example, were things different in invisible respects no experience 
would change.  Moreover, it won’t do to claim that no one sees anything because suitable 
changes in the environment wouldn’t cause experiences which vary in respect to, for 
example, their time of occurrence.  The idea is that suitable changes in the environment 
need to be accompanied by changes in how experiences represent the environment.  
Thus, for example, if a white wall were to differ in respect to its color (e.g. by being 
vividly orange), then that difference would be accompanied by an experience which 
represents the wall as being orange.15 
Second, if some scene S and experience E are related as part of a suitable pattern 
of dependence, then that pattern needs to pair a large enough set of suitably differing 
scenes with a large enough set of differing experiences.  That is, there must be plenty of 
alternative scenes which differ in plenty of visible respects such that, for each one, if it 
were to occur, an experience which matches it would also occur, and if it were not to 
occur that experience would also not occur.16 (Lewis 1986a: 282-83) 
Putting things together: To see is for your experience to track possible changes in 
your environment.  What determines whether or not you see in a situation is things being 
just so in modal space.  The key to Lewis's position is this: His requirement that an 
experience be linked to its objects by a suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence is a 
way of cashing out the thought that perception must be an expression of a capacity to 
discriminate by sight. (Lewis 1986a: 286) Lewis thinks of discrimination as a function 
from possible environments to experiences that truly represent those environments.  
                                                 
15 Lewis thinks that it is an empirical question which features matter here.  (Lewis 1986a: 282) 
16 Lewis denies that 'plenty' needs to be strictly defined.  It may be a vague matter whether a person counts 
as seeing in a given situation.  The uncertainty about whether a person counts as seeing in a given situation 
depends on the way in which the domain of required matching differs in its size in different contexts.  
(Lewis 1986a: 283) 
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Thus, one exercises a capacity for discrimination just in case some appropriate set of 
counterfactual relations obtains. 
How would adverting to counterfactual dependence help us solve the problems of 
selection and deviant causation?  Cases of deviant causation tell us that mere causal 
connection is insufficient for seeing a thing, but they also prompt the hypothesis that 
counterfactual dependence matters to seeing it.  This is because a theory of counterfactual 
dependence has the resources to explain why, though your experience causally depends 
on it, you do not see the raven.  The process linking you to the raven is such that, even if 
it were operational, were the raven different in relevant ways your experience wouldn’t 
track those differences.  The process, after all, has the panic of the neurosurgeon as part 
of it.  The fact that the panicked doctor stimulated your brain just as he did is chancy.  It 
just isn’t true, for example,  that if the raven were blue, the doctor’s panicked actions 
would produce experience as of a blue raven.  Consequently, the right pattern of 
counterfactual dependence does not obtain.  Counterfactual dependence provides an 
elegant explanation of the fact that you do not see in the raven case. 
Let’s turn now to the selection problem.  I want to know: given that Fred and 
Zenobia are both part of the causal history of my experience, why do I see one and not 
the other?  How shall we design a theory to select from among all the particulars playing 
a role in the causal history of an experience only the perceived ones?  Again 
counterfactual dependence provides an elegant solution: you see individuals at stages of 





1.2: THE CENSOR CASES: CONTRA LEWIS 
 Despite the appeal of a counterfactual theory of perception, there are 
counterexamples that pose a serious challenge to Lewis’ theory – i.e. censor cases.  These 
are cases where an inactive censor waits off stage, as it were, never actually acting, but 
disposed to act in such a way that Lewis's preferred patterns of counterfactual 
dependence are disrupted.  Insofar as these censor cases are cases of perception, Lewis's 
counterfactual dependence theory is threatened. If one sees in a censor case, then the 
counterfactual dependence of the sort Lewis favors cannot be a necessary condition on 
being a perceptual experience.  Consider, therefore, the following case: 
The Censor: Imagine a supernaturally powerful being – call him the censor – 
who wishes that you be subject at a particular time to experience with a particular 
intrinsic phenomenal character or predicative content.  Maybe, for example, he 
wants to be as if you were looking at a white wall.  As it happens, the censor 
remains inactive.  His desires are realized by the actual course of events.  At the 
time during which he wants for it to seem as if you were looking at a white wall, 
you are looking at a white wall and everything functions as it ought to.  
But, were visible events different, the censor would step in and produce 
the experience he wants you to have.  If you were standing in front of a blue wall, 
or a grey hippo, or whatever, he would intervene and produce in you the 
experience you actually have.  He would pre-empt the nascent causal chain 
stemming from those events and cause in you the experience he wishes you.  
Consequently, the censor makes it false that were things different with the visible 
environment your experience would be appropriately different. 17    
 
The dominant intuitive response to the story of the censor is that you see, despite the 
existence of this censor.  But, if Lewis is right about the counterfactual dependence 
condition on perception, you cannot see in the censor cases.  This is just because were 
things different in the relevant ways, your experience wouldn’t track those differences. 
                                                 
17 This kind of case shows up in Bruce LeCatt’s article, “Censored Vision”.  (LeCatt: 1980).  Interestingly, 
there is abundant reason to think that Bruce LeCatt was written by none other than David Lewis’ cat.  More 
on LeCatt’s theory below. 
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 Thus, either Lewis’ theory is mistaken, or the dominant intuitive response is 
confused.  Which is it? 
 
1.3: DO YOU SEE IN CENSOR CASES? LEWIS’ ASSAULT ON COMMON SENSE 
 
Lewis has provided some reason to doubt that seeing is going on in the censor 
cases.  According to Lewis, our disposition to judge that perception has occurred is based 
on a misunderstanding of how to compare the censor cases to exactly similar cases in 
which the censor is absent.  Since the censor remains inactive, it is tempting to think that 
the experience in these cases is perceptual, as it would be if there were no censor at all.  
Things actually proceed as they ought to.  This temptation rests on the presumption that 
the censor’s inactivity is extraneous to the explanation of the connection between the 
experience and the scene that causes it. 
Lewis argues that this presumption is a mistake. (Lewis 1986a: 286) The censor 
is, the argument goes, an essential part of the situation.  Lewis invokes the example of a 
logic circuit in order to establish that it is important that we take into account inactive, 
but potential causes when engaging in causal reasoning: "Think of a circuit built up from 
exclusive-or-gates: every output signal from such a gate is caused partly by the absences 
of a second input signal." (Lewis 1986a: 286)  In such a case, it seems pretty clear that 
the potential but non-actualized signal plays a part in the causal explanation of the 
circuit's output.  Lewis uses this to bolster the claim that the censor cases are quite 
different from ordinary cases.  On Lewis’ analysis, the presence of the censor is an 
essential feature of the censor cases and it is, of course, a feature missing in ordinary 
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cases.  So, Lewis urges, they cannot be very similar after all and we should not generalize 
from censor-free cases to censor cases. 
But the example of the logic circuit only suggests that in some contexts non-active 
(but potential causes) are relevant to the explanation of occurrences.18  Lewis has not 
established that the presence of a non-active censor is sufficient to make it illegitimate to 
apply the concept of perception in the censor cases.  The causal explanation of logic 
circuits may require taking into account non-active (but potential causes), but this is 
probably not true in the censor cases. 
It is part of the proper functioning of the circuits Lewis describes that their output 
depend not only on what signals pass through them, but also on what signals do not pass 
through them but could have.  We have designed the circuits like this and so it makes 
sense that the explanation of their activity should take into account non-active but 
potential signals.  Thus we have justification for thinking that non-actual (but potential) 
causes are part of the causal explanation of the activity of the logic circuit.  However, it is 
not obviously part of an explanation of the proper functioning of the visual system that a 
censor monitors and influences its activities.  There is a principled reason to treat cases 
like the censor in a way that differs from how we treat cases like logic circuits.  The 
reason Lewis gives for rejecting the comparison between censor cases and their censor-
free counterparts may be side-stepped.  Lewis has not succeeded in arguing that intuition 
leads us astray here.  Thus, these cases stand as un-defused challenges to Lewis’ account 
of the seeing relation. 
 
                                                 
18 It is not even clear to me that it is a case where a non-active but potential cause is an essential feature of 




1.4: DO YOU SEE IN CENSOR CASES? AN ANALOGY FROM ACTION THEORY 
 
 Lewis thinks that perception is essentially a process by which we discriminate 
among states of the environment.  This is what explains his use of counterfactual 
dependence.  But there is a deeper reason counterfactual dependence is implicated in 
perception.  Perception requires a kind of control.  The reason why you do not see the 
raven in the raven case is that it does not control your experience.  In order for you to 
perceive a thing your experience must be controlled by the thing you perceive.  
Accordingly, an account of perception invoking causation needs to be supplemented 
specifically with reference to the control relation.  
Consider two objects (Sally and Charlie): Sally controls Charlie if and only if 
there is some pattern of counterfactual dependence such that states of Charlie track states 
of Sally.  That states of Sally determine states of Charlie constitutes her control over him.  
If Sally were this way, then Charlie would be this way.  If Sally were that way, then 
Charlie would be that way, etc.  Control requires that one set of states be counterfactually 
depend on another. 
Turn now to the kind of control specifically implicated in perception.  The kind of 
control required in order to perceive is the kind of control that makes the tokening of an 
experience a form of discrimination.  Think again about the raven.  What was lacking in 
the case of the raven was a tracking relation between states of the raven and states of your 
experience, such that states of the raven would be correctly represented by your 
experience.  The raven was not in control of your experience, and, in particular, that lack 
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of control entailed that your experience was not the expression of a capacity to 
discriminate among states of the raven. 
It should not be surprising that perception requires control.  Consider the roles 
perception plays in our lives.  Among other things, it provides a basis for our cognitive 
and practical engagement with the world.  I get in the business of knowing the facts 
because I perceive things.  I successfully negotiate a complex world because I perceive 
its bits.  If control were a central feature of perception, then we could explain how 
perception plays the role it does.  It contributes to our thriving by putting at least some of 
our acting and thinking under the control of relevant bits of the world.19  So, by inference 
to the best explanation, perception requires control. 
 Given that perception requires control, we can shore up our intuitions about the 
censor case by drawing analogies between perception and action.  Perception requires 
control, but so does morally responsible action.  When I perceive a thing, my experience 
must be under the control of the seen thing.  Likewise: when we act in such as way as to 
be a candidate for praise or blame, our action must be under our control.  A loss of 
control is among the classic defeaters for claims of responsibility.  Presumably, control is 
implicated in morally responsible action because control is a requirement of intentional 
action. 
One might think, given the connection between control and counterfactual 
dependence, that if you are morally responsible for an action, there must be a 
counterfactual dependence relation between your decisions and actions.  The accounts of 
                                                 
19 Of course, perception serves goods other than cognitive and practical ones.  I want more from seeing than 
that I be informed.  We often take pleasure in simply seeing things.  Accordingly, perception plays a crucial 
role in aesthetic and, for another example, erotic pleasure.  But even here we can make sense out of 
control’s central importance to perception.   
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perception and morally responsible action will be structurally similar.20  Indeed, just as 
counterfactual accounts of perception suffer from cases like the censor, a counterfactual 
account of action would suffer from a similar case.  Consider, then, the case of the 
Neuroscientist’s Daughter: 
Neuroscientist’s Daughter: Chuck is dating Brunhilda (the daughter of Ivan, the 
neuroscientist).  Their relationship is very serious and Chuck is thinking of 
marrying Brunhilda.  Chuck is a fine fellow – handsome, smart, morally upright, 
and athletic.  In short: he is the best mate for Brunhilda.  Ivan, the neuroscientist, 
wants nothing but the best for his daughter and so is pleased to discover that 
Chuck might marry her.  However, Ivan also knows that Chuck is wavering a bit 
on the question.  Brunhilda, wonderful though she is, cusses like a sailor.  Ivan 
knows of Chuck’s wavering because he is secretly reading Chuck’s diary.  Now, 
Ivan is prepared to do whatever it takes to maneuver Chuck into marrying 
Brunhilda, but being lazy does not want to take action unless he has to – that is, 
unless Chuck decides not to marry Brunhilda.  As it happens Chuck resolves his 
doubts, proposes to Brunhilda, she accepts, and the two marry.  They live happily 
ever after. 
If Chuck had decided otherwise, then Ivan would have stepped in.  Using 
his vast knowledge of the human brain, Ivan would have made it so that Chuck 
marries Brunhilda.  He would have, maybe, erased the effects of Chuck’s decision 
and put Chuck’s brain into the state it would have been in had Chuck decided to 
marry Brunhilda.  So there is some sense in which Chuck could not have done 
otherwise and, yet, intuitively Chuck is responsible for his part of the marriage. 
 
Harry Frankfurt uses cases like this to argue against the Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities, according to which an agent is morally responsible for having performed an 
action only if he could have done otherwise.21 (Frankfurt 1969) According to Frankfurt, 
                                                 
20 Indeed, the similarities run deep.  Just as Gricean considerations motivate a causal theory of perception, 
Davidson deploys similar considerations in favor of a causal theory of intentional action. (Davidson 1980)  
Just as problems of deviance and selection arise for perception, the same kinds of problems arise for causal 
theories of action. 
21 In the right mood, the Principle of Alternative Possibilities can seem very puzzling.  It is a very weak 
requirement and moreover: why should we suppose it is true?  What explains the initial plausibility of 
supposing that being morally responsible for an action requires that one could have done otherwise?  It 
might be that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities follows from the stronger requirement that actions 
for which you are responsible track one’s decisions.  Thus, when I act responsibly, the nearby possible 
worlds at which I decide differently are also worlds where my action reflects the decision I have made.  If I 
have acted responsibly, then in some nearby world, I decide to X rather than Y, and so I do X.  Thus, in 
order to be in control of one’s actions, it must be possible to do otherwise.  There has to be some world in 
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since Chuck is responsible for having married Brunhilda, the Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities must be rejected.  That is, Frankfurt takes cases like this to be evidence that 
you can be responsible for an action, even if you couldn’t have done otherwise. 
 Is Chuck morally responsible for wedding Brunhilda?  Remember: the 
neuroscientist never lifts a finger to ensure that Chuck marries his daughter.  Chuck 
carefully and clearly deliberated about what to do.  It seems that he is responsible for 
wedding Brunhilda: his friends can praise him for making the right choice (or blame him 
as the case may be).  He and his wife can appropriately say to each other “How clever we 
have been to marry each other!”  Moreover, Chuck seems genuinely bound by the terms 
of the marriage contract, as he would not be if he were not responsible for entering into it. 
As anyone who has followed the literature on the Frankfurt cases should know, 
the answers here are pretty contentious.22  It is not entirely clear that how we should – all 
things considered – decide the matter of Chuck’s moral responsibility.  It is not clear how 
the Frankfurt cases function in the context of a debate about the compatibility of moral 
responsibility and causal determinism.  However, for my purposes I need to settle neither 
the question of Chuck’s moral responsibility (plausible as I find the claim that he is 
responsible) nor the question of the compatibility of moral responsibility and causal 
determinism. 
What matters to me is whether Chuck’s assenting to the marriage was an 
intentional action of his.  It seems clear that it is.  Moreover, I find it plausible that Chuck 
was in control of his actions.  It was his considerations that moved him to act.  They were 
the causes of his actions and determined their character.  To the extent that we judge 
                                                                                                                                                 
which I do otherwise.  Thus, we get the Principle of Alternative Possibilities from a counterfactual account 
of morally responsible action. 
22 For an overview of the debate see (Fischer 1998) and (Widerker and McKenna 2002). 
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Chuck morally responsible, we are probably doing so on the assumption that the facts 
described do not rule out his actions being intentional actions. 
 The analogies to the censor cases are clear.  We have a non-active, but possible, 
intervention.  We therefore have a failure of counterfactual dependence.  But we want to 
say that nonetheless a certain capacity has been properly expressed.  In the one case, 
despite the failure of counterfactual dependence, Chuck has acted intentionally.  In the 
other case, despite the failure of counterfactual dependence, you have seen the white 
wall. 
 
1.5: THE REVERSE CENSOR, THE RAY GUN 
In addition to censor cases, which pose a challenge to the necessity of a Lewis-
style account of perception, there are cases which pose a challenge to the sufficiency of a 
counterfactual account.  I have in mind two kinds of case – the Reverse Censor and the 
Ray Gun.  Both of these stem from Martin Davies’ discussion in ‘Function in 
Perception’: 
The Reverse Censor: My natural or prosthetic eye is not functioning, and it is by 
more or less spurious (that is, deviant) means that the scene before my eyes 
causes matching visual experience.  But if the scene were any different my visual 
experience would be correspondingly different.  For there is a ‘reverse censor’ 
standing by, ready to see to it that I have matching visual experiences whatever 
the scene might be.  So long as the scene before my eyes is the one that is 
matched by the caused experience the reverse censor does nothing. (Davies 1983: 
412-13) 
 
But for the presence of the reverse censor, this would be a clear case of veridical 
hallucination, however, the reverse censor ensures that Lewis’ counterfactual condition is 
met in this case.  Were things relevantly different in the viewer’s environment, then his 
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experience would be suitably different.  However, we want to say that no seeing has gone 
on here.  Lewis has, the argument goes, failed to give us a sufficient condition. 
 
The Ray Gun: A prisoner is made temporarily blind by being held in the path of 
a ray gun which 'jams' the transmission of visual information.  It is usual to 
hallucinate while being blinded in this way, provided that one's eyes are open.  
The prisoner has a visual experience as of a uniformly red wall five feet in front 
of the prisoner's eyes, and the presence of the wall is a causal antecedent of the 
visual experience.  The ray gun is a particularly delicate one, and if the scene 
before the prisoner's eyes were any different the ray gun would not work.  In that 
case the prisoner would be able to see normally. (Davies 1983: 413) 
 
In the case of the Ray Gun, the scene in front of the eyes causes matching experience as 
part of an appropriate – Lewis-style – pattern of counterfactual dependence.  The fragility 
of the ray gun ensures this.  But we do not want to say that perception is occurring.  If 
Lewis is right, then the prisoner sees, yet (we judge) seeing is not happening.  Lewis has, 
the argument goes, failed to give us a sufficient condition. 
 Again, either seeing is not happening, intuition is getting things right, and we 
must reject Lewis’ view or we must accept Lewis’ view and deny that intuition is giving 
the right verdict here. 
 
1.6: MY VIEW 
 
We have three counterexamples against Lewis’ view.  Perhaps Lewis’ mistake 
was to give counterfactual dependence pride of place in his account of seeing.  However, 
the wholesale rejection of counterfactual accounts would be hasty at this point.  There are 
ways around the counterexamples.  
The censor, reverse censor, and ray gun counterexamples all involve an 
interesting feature: in the nearby possible worlds, changes to the scene in front of you 
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change the processes that eventuate in your experience.  There is some process 
operational in the actual situation, but were the scene different, a different process would 
cause an experience. 
In the censor case the censor remains inactive, allowing the usual process to 
generate veridical experience.  However, his intentions are such that were the scene 
different – were the scene such as to produce in you a different experience – he would 
intervene.  The tracking relation between your experience and the world is foiled, 
because, between the actual situation and the relevant possible situations, there is a 
change in process. 
In the case of reverse censor the same thing is true.  Here the pattern of 
counterfactual dependence obtains because, were the scene different, the process actually 
operational would be replaced by a different process.  The reverse censor would step in to 
produce the desired experience – in this case, a veridical experience.  Similarly, in the 
case of the ray gun, the fragile ray gun would be broken by changes in the scene and so 
no longer interrupt the causal processes that would produce in you matching experiences.  
In the ray gun and reverse censor cases Lewis’ tracking relation obtains, but only in 
virtue of the fact that between the actual situation and the relevant alternatives there is a 
change in process. 
 Accordingly, if counterfactual dependence requires that the processes causing 
your experience remain stable, we no longer have counterexamples.  Thus, in 
determining whether perception has occurred, we should check the subset of the nearby 
possible worlds in which the process actually eventuating in your experience is operating 
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to see whether a suitable pattern of changes in the scene in front of you is matched by 
changes in your experience.  Here is my proposal:  
I see some object x by having some visual experience e iff there is some process P 
linking e to x such that for each member, F, of some suitable set of features x 
could possess (i) were x F and were some visual experience, e2, to be the output 
of P, then e2 would represent something as F (and, in so doing, increase the 
number if things that are represented as F by one); and (ii) were x not-F and were 
some experience, e3, the output of P, then e3 would not represent x as F.   
 
What I’ve done here is hold fixed the process that connects a perceptual experience and 
its objects in the counterfactual situations relevant to determining whether seeing has 
occurred.  If this maneuver works, then it will allow us to retain the good things about a 
counterfactual account, while avoiding the counterexamples.23 
                                                 
23 In an earlier draft of this chapter, I gave the following analysis (call it the First Pass Analysis) at this 
point: 
  
I see some object x by having some visual experience e iff there is some process P linking e to x 
such that for each member, F, of some suitable set of features x could possess (i) were x F and 
were some visual experience, e2, to be the output of P, then e2 would represent x as F; and (ii) 
were x not-F and were some experience, e3, the output of P, then e3 would not represent x as F. 
 
By itself, this analysis is adequate – though, as we’ll see later, it could use some further description of the 
process P.  However, when mated to the externalist thesis from Chapter 3 that the contents of experience 
depend on the perceptual facts, one might worry that clause i is problematic.  In particular, the worry is that 
if an experience’s having some object, x, as a representational target depends on the perceptual facts, then 
clause i covertly presupposes the obtaining of the seeing relation.  According to clause i, it is a partial 
constituent of its being true that one sees x that, in some counterfactual situations, one’s experience 
represents x as bearing a certain property.  But, if the externalist thesis is right, then that one’s experience 
represents a thing depends on the perceptual facts.  Thus, the worry is that the First Pass Analysis is a 
viciously circular analysis. 
The solution to this worry is to describe the representational content of e2 in a way that does not 
presuppose that it possesses a particular object as its representational target.  The way to do this is for the 
analysis to pick out x by description.  (Notice that the analysis targets x by description; not necessarily the 
experience.)  We might fail to know whether an experience is a perceptual experience and be consequently 
unsure which existing object – if any – is its representational target.  Nonetheless, we can get some handle 
on its contents.  We could know, for example, that it represents something as being blue.  We could know 
that it represents the very same thing as flat and circular.  There is, therefore, a description of its content 
that abstracts from its bearing on particular objects.  We’ll need to exploit this kind of description in 
revising the First Pass Analysis. 
 It won’t do to revise the First Pass Analysis as follows: I see some object x by having some visual 
experience e iff there is some process P linking e to x such that for each member, F, of some suitable set of 
features x could possess (i) were x F and were some visual experience, e2, to be the output of P, then e2 
would represent something as F; and (ii) were x not-F and were some experience, e3, the output of P, then 
e3 would not represent x as F.  The problem is that, for example, if ‘blue’ substitutes for ‘F’, then if there 
are other blue things in your visual field, then your seeing x would not depend on the status of x, but rather 
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1.7: BRUCE LECATT: STEPWISE DEPENDENCE 
Like me, Bruce LeCatt takes the intuitive response that you see in the censor case 
as given and tries to revise Lewis's theory. (LeCatt 1982)  His proposal is as follows: if R 
is to be a perceptual experience of P then either (i) R counterfactually depends on P or (ii) 
there is a chain of events linking P to R such that each event counterfactually depends on 
its ancestor. (LeCatt 1982: 159) In short, the addition allows that there can be a chain of 
what LeCatt calls 'step-wise counterfactual dependence' connecting P to R.   
 Thus, LeCatt claims that while R does not counterfactually depend on P in the 
censor case, R is linked to P by a chain of step-wise counterfactual dependence relations.  
R counterfactually depends on Q and Q counterfactually depends on P – even though R 
does not counterfactually depend on P.  This is what allows R to be a perceptual 
experience of P. 
But how can this be?  It is tempting to think that any situation in which two events 
fail to be counterfactually dependent is also a situation in which they cannot be related by 
a chain of step-wise dependence.  This is because it is tempting to think that 
counterfactual dependence is transitive.  If one event counterfactually depends on 
another, which in turn depends on a third, then it is tempting to suppose that the first 
event in the series depends on the last.  Suppose that S doesn't happen, since I depends on 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the status of the other blue things.  Though I will not argue for it now, this can be expected to make the 
analysis too permissive.  
What we want (in order for seeing to occur) is that, for each member of some suitable set of 
features, if the thing were to change with respect to it (but not with respect to other members of that set), 
then that difference would show up in experience in that counterfactual situation.  What we want is that 
differences in x – the thing that might be seen – be difference makers for one’s experience.  What we want 
is that were x to change from its actual case, by becoming F (when it wasn’t F before), then one’s 
experience would represent a new F.  Thus I propose the analysis that appears in the main body of the text 
above. 
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S, I would not occur and some other intervening event would.  But what would happen if 
I didn’t happen?   Since E depends on I, E would not have occurred.  So it looks to be 
true if E is step-wise dependent on S then it must also be dependent simpliciter on S.  The 
situations that make it false that E depends on S should be the same situations that make 
it false that E depends on I. 
In order to assess the correctness of LeCatt's account we've got to imagine various 
permutations of the possibilities and determine whether any of them will make the 
following true at W, the imagined actual world:24 
 
P  Q     Q  R    The Censor: 
not-P  not-Q   not-Q  not-R  No matter how 
        things are with P, 
R would occur. 
 
Each of these places restrictions on how worlds may be ordered in respect to distance 
from W.  If these are all supposed to be true, then there must be some such ordering that 
simultaneously satisfies the all the restrictions.  Of course, if such an ordering is 
impossible, then LeCatt cannot save Lewis's account by invoking step-wise 
counterfactual dependence.  
 It turns out that counterfactual dependence is intransitive.  We can imagine cases 
where two events are step-wise dependent without being dependent simpliciter.  We 
might as well turn to what LeCatt is probably thinking of for an example of how this 
might work. 
                                                 
24 'P  Q' should be read as 'if it were the case that P occurred then it would be the case that Q occurred'.  
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Consider the following picture.  It represents the ordering of possible worlds 
which would make it true that P and R are linked by a chain of step-wise dependence, but 
false that R depends on P: 
 
Actual World (P & Q & R) 
some world where (P & not-Q & not-R) 




















fig. 1 – LeCatt's Censor 
 
Here we see an ordering of worlds that makes it true that P  Q.  First, on the 
assumption that any world is closer to itself than any other, the actual world ensures that 
P  Q and Q  R are true.25  Second, there is some not-P & not-Q world which is closer 
than any not-P & Q world.  This makes it true that not-P  not-Q.  Third, there is some 
not-Q & not-R world which is closer to the actual than any not-Q & R world.  This makes 
                                                 
25 Note that it ought to be controversial to suppose that every world is closer to itself than any other world.  
Lewis thinks that if the actual world is a P & Q world then P  Q is vacuously true.  This has initial 
plausibility – especially if we think of closeness as similarity.  But it also makes it vacuously false that not-
(P  Q).  It does not seem conceptually incoherent to claim that if the relationship between P & Q is 
indeterministic, then P  Q is false.  Not only does this seem coherent, it seems true for some substitution 
instances of P & Q.  I will however assume, for this paper, that Lewis is correct about the truth conditions 
of counterfactual conditionals. 
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true that not-Q  not-R.  Finally, the picture accurately captures the ordering of worlds 
affected by the activities of the censor.  The closest P and not-P worlds are all ones where 
R occurs.  In the censor case, R is not counterfactually dependent on P, but it is R is step-
wise dependent on P.  And this, LeCatt claims, explains why it is a case of perception.   
 
1.8: THE SUPER CENSOR: CONTRA LECATT 
 LeCatt's theory looks like an improvement over Lewis.  However, the type of 
argument LeCatt employs against Lewis may be used against LeCatt as well.  LeCatt uses 
a censor cases to argue that Lewis's counterfactual dependence theory is excessively 
strict.  But LeCatt has not imagined the most powerful possible censor.  Indeed, there is a 
censor case which may be invoked to suggest that LeCatt's step-wise dependence theory 
is excessively strict.   
 Super Censor: God, the omnipotent super censor, wishes you to have experience 
with a particular character – call it 'R' again.  Next, imagine that the scene P occurs (a 
white wall with blue dots enters your field of vision), next some intervening event Q 
(some retinal event, say), and finally the experience R occurs.  Let me depict the 
imagined actual course of events like this: 
 
W @ time1 P… @ time2 Q… @ time3 R 
 
Now R is exactly the experience the super censor wants you to have and so He takes no 
steps to censor your vision.  But, again, were things different in respect to how things 
were in your field of vision, the super censor would step in and ensure that your 
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experience would be R.  If it were not the case that P occurs, then (despite P's non-
occurrence) R would occur. 
Thus, by Lewis's theory of truth for subjunctive conditionals, it is true that the 
nearest not-P world is also an R world.  Let me depict the course of events in the nearest 
not-P world like this: 
 
W2    @ time1 not-P…  @ time2 not-Q…  @ time3 R 
 
First the not-P scene occurs, next as expected not-Q occurs at time2, but at the last 
moment God steps in to ensure that R occurs at time3. 
Now, the fact that W2 is the nearest not-P world, makes it false that P and R bear 
the kind of counterfactual dependence relation Lewis requires if R is to be a perception of 
P.  To be explicit, this is because the nearest not-P world is one where R occurs.  And this 
makes it false that were P not to occur then R wouldn't occur. 
So far the story of the super censor has unfolded exactly like the censor case.  
However, unlike the censor, the super censor is so interested that R occur that he is 
willing to step in at any point in the chain of events to insure its occurrence.  That is, if 
for some reason Q were to fail to occur and so put the occurrence of R in jeopardy then 
the super censor would intervene and cause R.  Thus, the super censor makes it false that 
not-Q  not-R by making it true that not-Q  R.  With this intention and the capacity to 
fulfill it, the super censor makes it false that there is a chain of step-wise dependence 
linking R to P.  If seeing is going on in Super Censor, then LeCatt's step-wise dependence 
condition is not a necessary condition for being a perceptual experience. 
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 Is seeing going on in Super Censor?  In such recherché cases it is not clear that 
intuitive judgments can be taken to be authoritative.  However, the very same 
considerations that supported the intuitive judgment that seeing occurred in the case of 
the Censor.  Since the Super Censor remains inactive, we should think that the experience 
is perceptual, as it would be if there were no censor at all.  The Super Censor’s inactivity 
is extraneous to the explanation of the connection between the experience and the scene 






2.1: MCLAUGHLIN’S WORRIES 
Brian McLaughlin describes counterfactual theories of perception as “deplorable” 
and urges that they be replaced by an alternative that does not advert to counterfactual 
dependence. (McLaughlin 1996) The goal of this part is to resist McLaughlin’s worries.  
McLaughlin attributes two views to Lewis: (i) that the exercise of a capacity is 
constituted by counterfacts, and (ii) that to perceive is to have an experience as the upshot 
of the exercise of a capacity for visual discrimination.  McLaughlin argues that it is a 
mistake to think that occurring as part of a suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence 
is constitutive of exercising an ability to perceive.  But he affirms – in agreement with 
Lewis – that to perceive is to exercise a capacity for visual discrimination.   
McLaughlin agrees that counterfacts of the sort to which Lewis adverts are 
properly associated with the exercise of a capacity for visual discrimination. (McLaughlin 
1996: 205) This explains their attraction to the theorist.  Normally, when the capacity is 
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exercised the counterfacts obtain.  However, McLaughlin continues, they do not always 
hold (as the counterexamples show) and are thus not constitutive of it. 
Accordingly, on McLaughlin’s account, we should explain what constitutes an 
experience as a perceptual experience as follows: 
If a subject has visual experience and in having it exercises the capacity to 
discriminate a suitable range of scenes, then the subject sees; 
   
if it is not the case that a subject has a visual experience such that in having it the 
subject exercises the capacity to discriminate a suitable range of scenes, …then 
the subject does not see. (McLaughlin 1996: 224) 
 
McLaughlin retains what he takes to be the kernel of truth in Lewis, while rejecting the 
talk of counterfactuals. 
Part of the license for McLaughlin’s view comes from the counterexamples, 
which we have already discussed.  If my treatment of them is good, then he cannot 
receive any support for his account from them.  In addition to the counterexamples, 
McLaughlin’s position rests on a general opposition to the use of counterfactuals in 
giving constitutive accounts of the exercise of capacities.  I’ll discuss two lines of 
argument that converge on the denial that the exercise of capacities is constituted by 
counterfacts: (i) the Metaphysical Objection, and (ii)  the Objection from Success. 
Let me turn to Colin McGinn for a statement of the Metaphysical Objection.  
McGinn writes: 
[I]t is unsatisfactory to employ counterfactuals in a primitive way in one's 
analysis of categorical propositions; they have dependent truth value. We can 
always legitimately ask what makes a given counterfactual true and expect to be 
presented with a suitable categorical fact. Now it seems to be that this general 
thesis imposes a constraint upon philosophical analyses, to the effect that we 
should be able to say what categorical propositions ground the counterfactuals we 
employ in the analysis....if non-circular categorical grounds can be produced it 
seems that the counterfactuals are in principle dispensable in the analysis; they 
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serve merely as an eliminable intermediate or interim step to the real analysis, 
which is categorical in form. (McGinn 1999: 16) 
 
The point is something like this: Since counterfacts are grounded in categorical facts, that 
the relevant counterfactual dependence obtains may be explained by reference to the 
relevant categorical facts.  Since the counterfacts can be so explained, their presence in 
the analysis is eliminable.  Why is this?  The explicability of the counterfacts by 
categorical facts makes it reasonable to suppose that the exercise of a capacity ought to 
be identified with the categorical facts that ground the counterfactuals that typically 
obtain as a result of its exercise.  The counterfacts are explanatorily eliminable because 
exercising a capacity is identical to the occurrence of events which ground the 
counterfacts that typically obtain.  Thus we get McLaughlin’s position: seeing requires 
the exercise of a capacity for visual discrimination, but the exercise of this capacity 
should not be given a counterfactual account. 
A similar line of argument proceeds by considering the explanatory relations 
between capacities and our successes.  Consider: If I know how to do something, then I 
possess a kind of capacity – the capacity for succeeding in some kind of endeavor.  
Consequently, associated with my knowing how, for example, to drive a car is some 
pattern of counterfactual dependence between my endeavors to drive and my success in 
so doing.  Suppose that I were an expert driver of cars and were called upon to drive a car 
in a snowstorm.  Were I to succeed that success would be part of a pattern of 
counterfactual dependence – the pattern one that might be supposed to constitute 
knowing how.  But, presumably, were I to succeed what would explain my success is that 
I employed my considerable know how.  My knowing how to drive a car explains cases 
of success rather than vice-versa. 
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Likewise, McLaughlin urges, when I succeed in having experience that correctly 
represent the facts, we should explain this by reference to my having exercised a capacity 
for visual discrimination.  This seems entirely correct.  Now: why does this fact cause 
trouble for the acceptability of a counterfactual account of the exercise of the perceptual 
capacity?   
Since your exercise of the relevant capacity explains cases of success (both 
merely possible and actual), cases of success cannot constitute your exercise of the 
capacity.  That is: that you succeed in visual discrimination in nearby worlds cannot 
constitute your exercise of a capacity.  Consequently, one’s exercise of the capacity to see 
cannot be constituted by a pattern of counterfactual dependence.  Successes are doing 
double duty here: both explaining and being explained by the exercise of capacities. 
Thus we have two arguments for the claim that if seeing is constituted by the 
exercise of a capacity for visual discrimination, then it should be denied that seeing is 
constituted by the obtaining of counterfacts. 
 
2.2: ASSESSING THE MCLAUGHLIN-STYLE OBJECTIONS  
 
Before I assess the two objections, I’d like to argue that we may accept their 
general conclusions, but resist their application to the case of perceptual capacities.  Even 
if we grant McLaughlin’s denial that capacities should receive a counterfactual account, 
it is still plausible that a Lewis-style account is correct.  The reason is this: even if 
capacities do not receive a counterfactual account, certain capacities are capacities to do 
things that consist partly in counterfacts. 
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 Let me explain.  Consider, for example, a machine’s capacity to correctly 
represent the temperature.  Just insofar as this is a capacity and we have agreed that 
capacities are not constituted by counterfacts, we have no reason to think that the exercise 
of this capacity involves the obtaining of counterfacts. 
To succeed in correctly representing the temperature, it is enough if (in the actual 
course of events) the machine represents the temperature as 90 degrees when it is 90 
degrees.  However the capacity for visual discrimination looks different.  A capacity for 
visual discrimination is plausibly counterfactual-involving insofar as discrimination is 
plausibly counterfactual-involving.  In this respect, the capacity for visual discrimination 
differs from the capacity for correctly representing.  These capacities differ because the 
kinds of success they underwrite are different.   
Discrimination consists, roughly, in treating different things differently.  
However, one can succeed in one-off discriminations.  For example, one can imagine a 
creature that is built to discriminate between red things and blue things.  However, due to 
an impoverished environment, the creature only exercises its capacity once.  One happy 
day, it encounters a red thing and, in virtue of its capacity for discrimination, responds to 
it correctly as red-and-not-blue.  It has discriminated, but it has not actually treated the 
different relevant things differently.  That is: it has not actually treated some red things as 
red-and-not-blue and some blue things as blue-and-not-red.  Its one-off discrimination 
involved treating only one thing one way.  What then might its success in discrimination 
consist in?  If actual encounters cannot do the work of making it true that, roughly 
speaking, the creature treats different things differently, then perhaps merely possible 
encounters will do.  You might think, therefore, that when the creature successfully 
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exercises its capacity to discriminate, it succeeds in discriminating, which is to say it 
succeeds in treating different things differently in non-actual situations.  The fact that 
one-off discriminations are possible suggests that a counterfactual account of 
discrimination is warranted. 
If a counterfactual account of discrimination is warranted, then, while capacities 
as such might not implicate counterfacts, capacities for discrimination may well do so.  
Lewis is not clear on the relation between his counterfactual theory of perception and the 
claim that perception involves the exercise of a capacity for discrimination.  Did he mean 
his analysis to follow from a general reduction of capacities to counterfacts or did he 
mean his analysis to apply as a result of the kind of capacity perception involves?  I am 
not sure.  At any rate, we can protect a Lewis-style account against a general denial of the 
reducibility of capacities to counterfacts by adverting to the kind of thing discrimination 
is. 
I have been assuming that capacities do not reduce to counterfacts, but is this 
assumption warranted?  What are we to say about the Metaphysical Objection and the 
Objection from Success? 
The Metaphysical Objection proceeds from the claim that counterfacts are 
grounded in categorical facts to the claim that counterfacts might be eliminated from an 
analysis in favor of their categorical grounds.  I am sympathetic to the premise of this 
objection – i.e. that counterfacts are grounded in categorical facts.  However, it is not 
clear to me that this establishes either that the exercise of capacity to see ought to be 
identified with the grounds of the associated counterfacts or that the counterfacts form an 
eliminable part of the analysis.  
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Everyone in this debate agrees that counterfacts are associated with the exercise 
of capacities for visual discrimination.  Presumably the associated counterfacts have 
categorical grounds.  However, it is further presumable that the categorical grounds for 
these counterfacts are wildly disjunctive.  In this respect, the relation between 
counterfacts and their grounds is like the relation between mental states and the physical 
states on which they supervene.  What grounds the counterfacts associated with the 
exercise of my perceptual capacities can be expected to differ from what grounds those 
associated with the exercise of, say, an alien’s perceptual capacities.  In other words, 
counterfacts are multiply groundable.  In one case, the counterfacts are grounded in this 
way.  In another case, the counterfacts are grounded in that way.   
Thus, though it might be possible in particular cases to explain things without 
reference to the relevant counterfacts, such explanations will have to proceed piecemeal 
and so fail to unify phenomena that would otherwise be unified.  Suppose, for example, 
you think that a certain kind of epistemic value is constituted by a belief’s being caused 
by an episode of seeing.  You might wonder, regarding a particular belief, why does it 
count as possessing this kind of epistemic value?  If counterfacts are eliminated from the 
account in favor of their categorical grounds, then the explanation will take the following 
form: this belief was the upshot of such-and-such causal pathway.  But such an account 
can be expected to leave out, given the fact that counterfacts are multiply groundable, 
what such-and-such causal pathway has in common with the other causal pathways that 
constitute the epistemic value. 
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Thus elimination of counterfacts in favor of their categorical grounds can be 
expected to fail to unify phenomena that could otherwise be unified.  For this reason we 
should reject the Metaphysical Objection. 
What about the Objection from Success?  This argument involved a kind of slight 
of hand.  The basic worry was something like this: on counterfactual accounts of the 
exercise of a capacity, explanations of success are circular explanations.  Circular 
explanations are problematic, of course.  For example, it would be a problem if the causal 
explanation for P invoked Q – where Q is supposed to be causally explained in turn by P.  
We’d have a kind of circular account of how P happened.   
However, the explanations at issue in the Objection from Success are different 
kinds of explanations.  We might causally explain someone’s success in a venture by 
citing their capacities, but, according to counterfactual accounts, cases of counterfactual 
success constitute the exercise of the capacity.  Thus, we constitutively explain an 
occurrence as the exercise of a capacity by noting the counterfacts.  Such-and-such is 
constituted as the exercise of a capacity because it occurs as part of a pattern of success.  
We do not thereby causally explain that occurrence.   
It is perfectly compatible with this kind of constitutive explanation that the 
possible successes that constitute an occurrence as the exercise of a capacity are 
themselves causally explicable by that capacity.  There are fairly non-controversial cases 
in which effects of a cause constitute that cause as such-and-such.  For example: Imagine 
that pushing a button causes a war.  You push the button and so start the war.  The fact 
that the war resulted from your pushing of the button constitutes your button-pushing as, 
also, a war-starting.  (Though not necessarily an intentional war-starting.)  In this case, 
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we constitutively explain something in virtue of its effects.  I see no reason not to do the 
same in the case of capacities. 
 The metaphysical objection and the objection from success are both unsuccessful 
justifications for denying that counterfacts might constitute something as the exercise of a 
capacity for visual discrimination.  
 Suppose that McLaughlin is correct and that the exercise of a capacity for visual 
discrimination is not constituted by counterfacts: what room is there for counterfacts in 
an account of seeing?  At this point it is helpful to remember that McLaughlin is giving 
an account of intransitive seeing.  I am interested in transitive seeing.  Thus our concerns 
are to a certain extent distinct.   
Even if McLaughlin is correct and the exercise of a capacity for visual 
discrimination is not constituted by counterfacts there might still be room for counterfacts 
in an account of transitive seeing.  The reason is this: That an experience is the upshot of 
the exercise of a capacity for visual discrimination does not yet tell us what its objects are 
– since a seeing of one thing might not be a seeing of another, even as both are seeings. 
 The selection problem and the problem of causal deviance remain as motivations 
for accepting a counterfactual account of transitive seeing.  What could McLaughlin’s 
account say about them?  It should be obvious that McLaughlin’s theory of intransitive 
seeing provides no hints about how it might be extended to solve the selection problem.  
You might suspect, however, that McLaughlin’s account provides a solution to the 
problem of causal deviance.  It would go something like this: what makes a causal chain 
ending in an experience deviant – and so insufficient for seeing a thing – is that causal 
chain fails to add up to an exercise of a capacity for visual discrimination. 
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This would be a mistake.  Often enough deviance comes from interventions in the 
functioning of the eyes or the brain.  This kind of deviance might be ruled out as a case of 
seeing because such causal chains do not add up to the exercise of a capacity for visual 
experience.  In the raven case, the scientist’s panic is a source of deviance only because it 
alters the normal functioning of the visual system.  Maybe the reason you don’t see the 
raven, despite having experience caused by it is that your raven-y experience is not the 
expression of a capacity for visual discrimination.  Adverting to the exercise of capacities 
seems like it could account for the raven case. 
 However, we can imagine cases of cornea-external deviance – i.e. cases in which 
the causal chain leading from the eyes inward is in order, but in which the causal chain 
leading from the surfaces of objects to your cornea is deviant.  Consider the case of the 
Censorious Window: 
In the future, windows will be designed to allow through only such light as would 
protect our privacy.  Should someone inside a building be visible through such a 
window, the window would bend the offending light passing through it to 
transmit an image portraying some random scene.  Now it happens you are 
walking by a house and glance into a censorious window.  There is a family 
eating dinner inside and so the censorious window bends light to portray some 
random scene.  Accidentally, the scene portrayed is qualitatively identical to the 
scene inside the house.  It appears as if there is a family eating dinner just so.  
And indeed there is a family eating dinner just so. 
 
The family has caused your experience, but nonetheless you do not see them.  Why?  
There was no interruption to your retina or brain.  Your visual system works as it should.  
It seems to me that there is no reason at all to think that the experience you have as you 
peer into the window is not the upshot of an exercise of a capacity for visual 
discrimination.  Thus, while we might hope to use McLaughlin’s position to eliminate 
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cases of causal deviance, we shall have to advert to something else.  How about 
counterfactual dependence? 
What I have done in this part of the chapter is justify and defend a refinement and 
extension of Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of intransitive seeing.  I have diffused some 
of McLaughlin’s general grounds for doubt about the applicability of counterfactuals in 
the analysis of visual perception. 
 
PART 3: PHOTOGRAPHS AND ROBOTS 
 
3.1: THE CASE OF TIM AND TOM 
In his article, “A Causal Analysis of Seeing”, Michael Tye provides a 
counterexample that sheds doubt on the claim that counterfactual dependence is sufficient 
for perceiving a particular.26  Like me, Tye accepts a counterfactual account, but thinks it 
needs to be supplemented.  However, his purported counterexample is not in fact a 
counterexample.  As I’ll argue, we can look to photographic representation to see how 
Tye has gone wrong.  Since we can see a thing by seeing a photograph of it, Tye’s 
counterexample does not succeed.   
Tye argues that counterfactual dependence is insufficient for seeing a thing.  I 
paraphrase Tye’s counterexample as follows: 
Tim and Tom: There are two robots, Tim and Tom.  The robots have been 
designed such that Tim controls Tom by remote control.  Anything motion Tim 
makes Tom makes.  Tom is located right in front of you in a well-lit room.  Tim is 
located in an identical room not far away. (Tye 1982: 320-21)   
                                                 
26 Tye does not present his analysis as a refinement of a counterfactual theory, speaking instead in terms of 
systematic variation.  However, if there are differences between a tracking relationship and systematic 
variation, they do not matter here.  Accordingly, I will construe Tye’s proposal as a proposal about a 
counterfactual theory of perception. 
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The problem is that in this case your experience counterfactually depends on both Tim 
and Tom.  Changes in each determine changes in your experience.  Moreover, the 
dependence is robust: we may suppose that the connection between Tim and Tom is not 
fragile and so, in all nearby possible worlds, your experience witnesses a tracking relation 
with both Tim and Tom.  However, it is plausible that while you see Tom, you do not see 
Tim.  Thus, Tye urges, a counterfactual dependence analysis needs supplementation.   
 
3.2: A CONCESSIVE RESPONSE: TYE’S PROPOSAL  
 
Why, according to Tye do you see Tom, but not Tim?  Let me present an 
extended quotation to represent Tye’s reasoning: 
Originally, Tim’s role in producing my experience is merely one of causing Tom 
to take up his position in front of the mirror. But as Tim's M-properties are 
systematically varied, Tim's causal role becomes much more complicated in 
virtue of his relationship to Tom taking on the new programmed connections 
which transmit changes in M-properties from the former robot to the latter. Now 
clearly if we were to hold fixed the various programmed factors which are 
responsible for Tim's changing his causal relationship to Tom in this way (while 
leaving other factors alone), the spatial properties of my robotlike sensum would 
not systematically vary as Tim's M-properties are varied. … But I do see Tom, 
since the manner in which Tom brings about my visual experience remains 
substantially the same whether or not his M-properties are varied. (Tye 1982: 
322) 
 
[T]he M-properties of a material object x are those spatial properties of x which 
have counterparts in the spatial properties of the experienced visual sensum. So, 
for example, in the case of the man viewing a distant star, shape is not one of the 
star's M-properties. (Tye 1982: 319) 
 
On Tye’s account, you don’t see Tim because situations in which the features of Tim that 
might be perceived are varied are also situations in which his causal role in producing 
your experience varies significantly.  You see Tom because in situations in which his 
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perceivable features are varied, Tom’s role in producing your experience stays 
substantially the same.   
Tye’s account is like mine in requiring that states of experience track changes in 
the seen object, holding fixed the process connecting one’s experience and the object of 
perception.  However, it is only in some cases, according to Tye, that we should hold 
fixed the process connecting one’s experience to the object of perception.  If (as with 
Tim) the nature of the actual process would change substantially, were the perceptible 
features of a candidate object of perception to change, then we should hold the actual 
process fixed and ask whether the tracking relation obtains.  By contrast, if (as with Tom) 
the nature of the actual process would not change substantially and were the perceptible 
features of a candidate object to change, then we should allow the process to vary and ask 
whether the tracking relation obtains. 
On Tye’s account, then, were Tim’s position were different, his role in producing 
an experience would be substantially different, and so we must hold the process linking 
him to Tom fixed and ask whether a tracking relation obtains between states of Tim and 
your experience.  Since the actual causal path is such that states of Tim only affect your 
experience by affecting states of Tom, Tye concludes that holding the actual process 
fixed would not allow for the obtaining of a perception-grounding tracking relation.  As 
Tye puts it: 
[C]learly if we were to hold fixed the various programmed factors which are 
responsible for Tim's changing his causal relationship to Tom in this way (while 
leaving other factors alone), the spatial properties of my robotlike sensum would 
not systematically vary as Tim's M-properties are varied.  (Tye 1982: 322) 
 
Held fixed, according to Tye, the process linking Tim to Tom is such that it fails to 
change Tom to reflect Tim’s states.  Tye seems to be thinking of holding processes fixed 
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as holding fixed the causal chain emitting from Tim and terminating in Tom’s bodily 
position.  This would prevent changes in Tim from being mirrored in Tom – and 
consequently your experience.   
I am suspicious, however.  It is true that changes in Tim’s position would bring 
about changes in the causal role he plays in producing your experiences.  Are these 
substantial changes?  I am not sure.  So long as the mechanisms in virtue of which Tim 
generates and transmits information about his position to Tom are doing what they ought 
to, then it seems to me that the process connecting Tim and Tom’s positions is intact and 
Tim’s causal role is not significantly different. 
Indeed, it seems to me that even if we accept that the relevant counterfacts are one 
in which we are to hold the process linking Tim and Tom fixed, we’ll reach the 
conclusion that a tracking relation obtains between your experience and Tim.  Holding 
fixed the process would require, for example, allowing the sensors in Tim’s body to 
transmit their representations of Tim’s body to that part of Tim that generates commands 
for Tom based on them.  By contrast, Tye must be supposing that holding the process 
fixed means holding fixed the content of the signals passing from Tim to Tom such that 
even when Tim is in a position that differs from his actual position he still transmits the 
same signal as in the actual case. 
So I do not think Tye’s treatment of the case of Tim and Tom is successful.  
However, if you are persuaded that you cannot see Tim, it might be possible to advert to 
the details of the information channel that connects your experience and states of Tim to 
explain why you cannot see Tim.  Maybe, for example, you would reason as follows: The 
organism-external channel in virtue of which the tracking relation obtains must transmit 
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information via light.  Since the information reaching you about Tim’s states is not 
transmitted entirely via light, you do not see Tim. 
The fact that it is a scientific discovery that visual information is transmitted by 
light does not rule out this possibility.  However, I think it is possible to see, even when 
the organism-external information is not carried by light.  Consider the movie Daredevil.  
In this movie, a man who has lost the use of his eyes develops amazingly acute hearing, 
such that he is able to rely on his hearing to gather much of the same spatial information 
ordinary perceivers gather by the use of their eyes.  The movie represents his subjective 
state by the use of monochromatic images.  The suggestion of the movie, then, is that his 
visual cortex has become connected to his ears in such a way that information coming 
from his ears generates visual experiences.  Thus, while it is as if he is blind (since his 
eyes are nonfunctioning), it is also as if he can see (since he is subject to visual 
experiences that track changes in his environment).  He can see via information carried 
by sound.  I think one can imagine many other variations on this case.  Perhaps, for 
example, a very large creature could see in virtue of being endowed with organs that 
detect changes in the amplitude and wavelength of gravitational radiation.  It would be a 
mistake, therefore, to require that seeing exploit only information carried by light. 
 
3.3: PHOTOGRAPHIC REALISM AND SEEING TIM 
 
While it is initially plausible that we do not see Tim, I have come to the view that 
we can see Tim.  Thus we need not supplement our counterfactual theory with 
restrictions designed to rule out seeing Tim.  One reason for this view would be that Tim 
satisfies the conditions on an object of perception laid out in a true theory of the 
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perceiving relation.  Of course, in this context this reason is insufficient.  That you see 
Tim is made rational both by the independent strength of the counterfactual theory of 
perception and by considering the analogies between Tom and a photograph. 
Ken Walton has argued persuasively that you can see a thing by seeing a 
photograph of it.  As it turns out, the relationship between Tom and Tim is like the 
relationship between a photograph and what it pictures.  Thus, if you can see the object of 
a photograph by seeing a photograph, then you should be able to see Tim by seeing Tom.  
In this section, I will present Walton’s view and use it argue that Tye’s attempted 
counterexample is not actually a threat to the counterfactual theory. 
 
3.4: PHOTOGRAPHIC REALISM 
Ken Walton argues that in looking at a photograph it is possible to see what it is a 
photograph of. (Walton 1984) Walton’s claim is justified as part of an inference to the 
best explanation for the judgment that photographs are somehow more realistic than even 
the most realistic paintings or drawings.27   
 The superior realism of photography, whatever it should turn out to be, shows up 
in many of our practices.  As Walton puts it:  
Photographs of a crime are more likely to be admitted as evidence in court than 
paintings or drawings are. Some courts allow reporters to sketch their proceedings 
but not to photograph them. Photographs are more useful for extortion; a sketch of 
Mr. X in bed with Mrs. Y – even a full color oil painting – would cause little 
consternation. Photographic pornography is more potent than the painted variety. 
Published photographs of disaster victims or the private lives of public figures 
understandably provoke charges of invasion of privacy; similar complaints 
against the publication of drawings or paintings have less credibility. I expect that 
most of us will acknowledge that, in general, photographs and paintings (and 
comparable non-photographic pictures) affect us very differently. (Walton 1984: 
246-47) 
                                                 
27 In what follows, I’ll use paintings as representative non-photographic pictorial representations. 
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We might understand the truth of the claim that photographic pictures are supremely 
realistic to simply consist in these kinds of facts about our treatment of photographs.  
What, then, would explain and rationalize the differences in our treatment of photographs 
and paintings? 
Walton argues that the explanation cannot be that photos are invariably more 
informative representations of their objects.  Some paintings – the so-called photorealistic 
ones – are indistinguishable from photographs taken of the scenes they picture.  Some 
photographs – those that are, for some examples, produced using distorting lenses, digital 
manipulation, or dark-room tricks – are less truthful than a painting of the same scene 
might have been. 
On Walton’s account, what explains the thought that photographic representation 
is the sine qua non of pictorial realism is the fact that one can see the object of a 
photographic representation by looking at it, while one cannot see the object of a painting 
by looking at it.  Just as seeing a thing might be less informative than having it described 
– if one’s glimpse of it is, for example, quick and partial, photographs needn’t be 
particularly informative to receive the special treatment we reserve for them: “We can't 
expect to acquire any particularly important information by looking at photographs [of  
departed loved ones] which we have studied many times before. But we can see our loved 
ones again, and that is important to us.” (Walton 1984: 253) 
What would explain why you can see the object of a photograph by looking at the 
photograph, while you cannot see the object of a painting by looking at it?  Walton 
argues that the crucial difference between photographs and paintings lies in their history.  
In particular, a photographic representation is mechanical in a way that a painting is not.  
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Unlike a photograph, a painting’s representation of a scene is mediated by its creator’s 
belief-like attitudes.  Or, at any rate, since photographs don’t take themselves, the role 
belief-like attitudes play in creating photos differs from the role they play in creating 
paintings.  Walton cashes out the difference in counterfactual terms:   
Photographs are counterfactually dependent on the photographed scene even if the 
beliefs (and other intentional attitudes) of the photographer are held fixed.  
Paintings which have a counterfactual dependence on the scene portrayed lose it 
when the beliefs (and other intentional attitudes) of the painter are held fixed. 
(Walton 1984: 264) 
 
Thus, that a picture is a candidate for supporting perception of the pictured thing depends 
on the counterfactual dependence between the contents of the picture and the states of the 
pictured scene.  At its core, Walton’s account of the fact that one sees what is 
photographed by seeing a photograph of it depends on the historical similarity between a 
perceptual experience and a photograph.  Since a perceptual experience counterfactually 
depends on its objects, and since a photograph counterfactually depends on its objects, 
one can see a thing by seeing a photograph of it.   
However, according to Walton, in order that this dependence support perception, 
it is necessary that the scene-depiction dependence not be wholly dependent on 
propositional attitudes.  That is, it cannot be strongly mediated by propositional attitudes.  
In the case of paintings, the attitudes of the creator make all the difference, while in the 
case of photographs they make no difference to whether a tracking relation obtains.   
Walton justifies the claim that strong mediation by propositional attitudes rules 
out perception by invoking the case of Helen’s benevolent neuroscientist: The 
neuroscientist wishes that Helen – who has lost her eyesight, but gained a prosthetic 
experience-producer – enjoy experiences that match the scene.  He manipulates the 
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prosthetic experience-producer to generate experiences in Helen that match the scene he 
thinks he would see were he in her position.  Suppose that he is both very good at this and 
extremely dedicated.  Thus, in virtue of the neuroscientist’s benevolent interventions, a 
robust counterfactual tracking relation obtains between Helen’s experience and the scenes 
in front of her.  Walton claims that while it seems to Helen as if she sees, she does not.  
(Walton 1984: 265) 
Now, as to why strong mediation by propositional attitudes might make the 
difference between seeing and not seeing, Walton does not explain.  This is a pressing 
question because in the case of Helen and the benevolent neuroscientist we have reason 
to doubt either the sufficiency of a counterfactual theory of perception or the judgment 
that Helen does not see.  Additionally, we have reason to believe that the beliefs of a 
perceiver make some difference to the features represented in experience.  So one might 
expect that even in typical cases of human perception a world-experience match might be 
weakly mediated by propositional attitudes.  Zenon Pylyshyn argues that while early 
visual processing proceeds independently of our belief-like attitudes (except for attention-
focusing effects), higher levels of visual processing do not.  (Pylyshyn 2003: Ch 2)  In 
particular, seeing as – the process that (for example) distinguishes the duckish experience 
from the rabbitish experience of a duck-rabbit image – is sensitive to our beliefs.28  Thus, 
for example, if I display the duck-rabbit to you and say “check out this duck”, you’re 
likely to be subject to duckish experience.29  Thus, unless we are supposed to be quite 
                                                 
28 It is important to realize that seeing as and seeing that are different kinds of mental states.  In particular, 
seeing that is a species of judgment, while I have just argued that seeing as is not.  As far as I can tell, when 
we say that someone can see that p, what we mean is that they judge that p on the immediate basis of their 
perceptual state.  Moreover, seeing that p is probably a species of knowledgeable judgment.  If you can see 
that p, then you know that p. 
29 It is an open possibility of the defender of the hypothesis that seeing cannot be mediated by belief-like 
attitudes to deny that seeing as is strictly speaking a form of seeing.  However, this seems like gratuitous 
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generally blind, then we cannot suppose that simple mediation by belief is a barrier to 
seeing.   
So why would strong mediation be a barrier to perception.  Luckily we need not 
settle this question.  The reason is this: I am suspicious about our judgments in cases like 
the case of Helen and the neuroscientist.  In order that the neuroscientist’s intervention 
might support a robust pattern of counterfactual dependence, we must suppose that the 
neuroscientist is very good at determining what kind of experience Helen should have 
and monomaniacally dedicated to bringing it about that she has this experience.  It might 
be that in imagining the case of Helen and the neuroscientist we are unable to suspend 
our default assumption that the neuroscientist, like other agents, has an open future.  That 
is, insofar as we suppose that the neuroscientist is a person, we suppose that his 
interventions are a matter of decision.  When he thinks some experience would be 
appropriate for Helen, it is a matter of decision whether to make it true that Helen is 
subject to that experience.  Thus, in nearby possible worlds, there are some in which he 
provides her with the experience and others in which he doesn’t.  Thus, insofar as we 
tacitly suppose he is an agent, we’ll find it hard to genuinely suppose that the 
neuroscientist’s interventions are sufficient for grounding the right counterfactuals. 
Thus volitional attitudes cause trouble for seeing via paintings or neuroscientists.  
We conceive of volitional attitudes as indeterministic and so, if a representation is 
mediated by them, we cannot suppose that a tracking relation obtains between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
linguistic stipulation to me.  For example, while seeing as might be sensitive to our beliefs, it is 
phenomenologically more like seeing than judgment.  I do not feel as if I am concluding that that is a duck.  
If it were a judgment I was making as I gazed at the duck, I would expect that my experience would be 
partly constituted by an inwardly asserted sentence – something like “that’s a duck.”  The difference 
between my duckish experience and my rabbitish experience is not a difference in the words I say to 
myself.  It comes on with apparent automaticity.  It feels like a specifically visual difference – even if it is a 
difference that can be influenced by belief-like states.  Since the phenomenology of seeing-as is vision-like, 
it seems gratuitously strict to eliminate seeing-as from the category of genuine seeing. 
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representation and states of represented scene.  If our conception is true, then in actuality 
no one could see by a process that is strongly mediated by volitional attitudes.   
 My hunch is that Walton has made a mistake in supposing that photographic and 
painted pictorial representations must differ with respect to whether one can see what 
they picture.  He is, however, probably correct that in our world they differ.  So long as 
the benevolent neuroscientist truly is able to make the relevant counterfacts obtain, then 
Helen sees.  But no actual human neuroscientist can do this.  Likewise, if a painting 
depended on the states of what it pictures as a photograph does, then it would enable 
indirect seeing.  However, no actual painting is likely to be like this – given the 
involvement of agency in determining the content of a painting. 
 
3.5: SEEING TIM 
 
But now note: the relationship a time slice of Tom bears to Tim is analogous to 
the relationship a photograph bears to what it is a photograph of.  Even better, the relation 
Tom bears to Tim is analogous to the relationship a video image bears to what it pictures.  
Thus, if we see a thing by seeing a photograph of it, we can see Tim by seeing Tom. 
If we see Tim, we see him indirectly.  Thus we see Tim by seeing Tom in the 
same way we see a person by seeing part of him.  Our readiness to say that we have seen 
a thing, when we have seen it indirectly, is sensitive to context.  Indeed the context 
dependence is such that people will easily swing back and forth between affirming and 
denying that an indirectly seen thing has been seen.  The swings depend on what kind of 
importance is placed on certain features present in ordinary cases of perception, but 
lacking in cases of indirect perception.  Thus, for example, when I see a thing by seeing 
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part of it, I might be in no position to gather relevant information about it.  Emphasize 
this aspect of things and folks conclude that the indirectly seen thing was actually unseen.   
The barrier to saying that we see Tim is that Tim is in a different room and so 
occluded by walls and so forth.  Thus Tim differs from ordinarily seen things.  Of course, 
if you can see a thing by seeing, for example, a video of it, then occlusion is not 
invariably an obstacle to perception.  A security guard might keep watch on the grounds 
of a factory by viewing live video of it.  The objects revealed to him might be occluded 
by walls and, indeed, by the video screen at which he gazes, but nonetheless he sees 
them.  Since Tim is like the photographed thing, I think we should say that we see him.  
Occlusion matters to perception only contingently. 
 Perhaps it would be helpful to imagine that instead of discovering photography, 
our civilization had developed transparent boxes containing a malleable substance that 
could be formed by automatic processes into accurately colored, small-scale models of 
mid-sized dry goods.  Call these fmodels.  Imagine that the correspondence between the 
fmodels and their representational targets typically is (or can be) very good.  That is, 
suppose that there typically is a tracking relation between fmodels and their 
representation targets that corresponds to the tracking relation between photographs and 
their objects.   
With sufficient technological development, these boxes could function like 
televisions, providing moving tableaux.  So, instead of watching televised animal 
documentaries, for example, you’d watch fmodels of exotic animals doing interesting 
things.  Instead of surveying the grounds using video, a security guard would watch for 
suspicious changes in his territory, by looking at the evolution of his fmodels.  You might 
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collect still fmodels – or the computer files that could construct such fmodels – of 
important people and events in your life.  Instead of comparing paintings and 
photographs, Walton would have compared fmodels and statues, advocating for the 
transparency of fmodels.  These practices would not be irrational.  That is, since fmodels 
are like photographs, the practice of treating them as such would make sense.  Now what 
is Tom, but a fmodel of Tim? 
 
PART 4 
THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY OF ELIMINATING REFERENCE TO 
CAUSATION 
 
The theory I have given is a version of a causal theory.  That is, it invokes 
causation as part of its account of the seeing relation, even as it supplements causal 
dependence with counterfactual dependence.  However, it is possible that seeing doesn’t 
require causal dependence and that we need only advert to counterfactual dependence.  
The possibility I have in mind comes from Malebranche via Dummett: “If someone 
believes, with Malebranche, that the presence of the object and my experience of it are 
joint effects of some further cause, his belief does not violate the concept of perception, 
so long as he allows that my perception supplies a reason for taking the object to be 
there.” (Dummett 1979: 35-36)  There are two suggestions here.  First, it is essential to 
perception that to perceive is to have a reason for taking an object to exist hereabouts.  
Second, it is not essential that to perceive there must be a causal relation between one’s 
experience and the objects of the episode of perception of which it is a part. 
 It is not clear that perception is essentially a reason-provider and so it is not clear 
that Dummett has any reason for accepting the second suggestion.  However, even if we 
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think that perception need not be a reason-provider, we can imagine cases in which an 
experience counterfactually depends on an object, but without causally depending on it.  I 
have in mind, of course, cases in which states of experience and states of the candidate 
object of perception do not causally interact, but are both effects of a common cause (e.g. 
ideas in the mind of God).  To the extent we see in such cases, we’ll have overriding 
reason to eliminate reference to causation in our analysis.  Now, since I am most 
interested to defend the counterfactual account, I have no great anxiety about whether, in 
the end, reference to causation is eliminable. 
 There is one reason that reference to causation might be implicit in my account.  It 
is epistemically possible that it is necessarily the case that a process takes place if and 
only if causation occurs.  If this epistemic possibility is actual, then insofar as my account 
makes reference to processes, it is implicitly committed to the claim that any case of 
perception is also a case of causation.  As we will see below, a process is a puzzling thing 
and it is not clear how we should decide this question.  Presumably, answering it will 
involve some philosophical trench warfare in which we think about sequences of events 
about which we will have to simultaneously decide whether causation is occurring and 
whether such sequences constitute the realization of a process.  These cases will have to 
be fairly recherché since every sequence of actual events that I can think of that clearly 
constitutes the realization of a process is also a sequence of causally-related events.    
However, I do not need to decide it in this section.  It might be that any 
counterfactual account that, like mine, invokes processes is implicitly committed to the 
claim that if perception is occurring, then causation is involved.  It suffices to return our 
attention to the Malebranche case to see how the role causation would be playing in such 
 68
an account differs quite a bit from the role it plays in causal theories of perception.  
Causal theories of perception characteristically claim that there is some causal 
relationship between objects of perception and experiences in virtue of which those 
objects are objects of perception.  A counterfactual account that accommodates intuitions 
about Malebranche cases and also includes reference to processes might be implicitly 
committed to the claim that perception is causation-involving, but notice that the 
causation it posts will not necessarily flow from the objects of perception to experiences.  
The Malebranche cases are cases of counterfactual dependence secured by the joint and 
branching cause of states of an object and states of experience.  Thus, a counterfactual 
account that accommodates the Malebranche cases might still assert that perception is 
causation-involving (insofar as processes are supposed to be causation-involving), but not 
assert that the process (and so the causal sequence) that grounds the counterfactual 




THE GENERAL GENERALITY PROBLEM AND ME 
 
It is arguable that if seeing requires that actual processes be held fixed, then we 
see nothing.  The problem is that, on a certain construal of what it would be to hold actual 
processes fixed, a tracking relation will not obtain between experiences and states of the 
environment.  Suppose that holding the actual process fixed entailed not allowing any 
variation of any intrinsic feature of the causal chain actually connecting one’s experience 
to object in the environment.  For example, suppose that in the actual case, an object 
 69
reflects light of a certain wavelength and intensity – let’s say the wavelength is such as to 
make it appear blue.  This makes it true that you are subject to an experience that 
represents a blue thing with such-and-such extension located at such-and-such location.  
Now if holding fixed the actual process rules out allowing any variation of any feature of 
the actual causal chain, then in nearby worlds in which the object would reflect a 
different wavelength – one such as to make it appear red – the process would still 
eventuate in an experience that represents it as blue.  Likewise, other variations in its 
color, location, or extent would not be matched by the resulting experience.  My theory, 
the worry goes, has the consequence that we see nothing.  This would, I concede, be a 
dire problem for my theory. 
 The problem here is similar to the generality problem raised by Conee and 
Feldman for reliabilist theories of epistemic warrant.  (Feldman 1995) (Conee & Feldman 
1998)  Consider a case of belief that p.  According to a process reliabilist, this belief that 
p is warranted iff it is the issuance of a belief-forming process that reliably produces true 
beliefs.  The generality problem arises because the token process that produced my belief 
that p will always be an instance of many types, for example those characterized by the 
following principles: 
- Believe p, given e (where e is some evidence that you have). 
- Believe p, if you are having visual experiences of with content c. 
- Believe p, if you are in Ann Arbor. 
- Believe p, if p. 
The problem is that these types vary greatly in their reliability.  A good case, one that 
ought to count as warranted belief, might be counted as unreliable (and so unwarranted) 
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on some ways of understanding the process that generated it.  A bad case, one that ought 
to count as a case of unwarranted belief, might be counted as reliable (and so warranted) 
on other ways of understanding the process that generated it.  Until we have a principled 
way of picking out ‘the’ process that formed my belief, we have no principled way of 
evaluating its warrant.  The reliabilist owes us an account of what settles this question – 
an account of what makes it the case that one process, and not the others, is the relevant 
process to evaluate in evaluating the epistemic quality of my belief.  The problem 
constitutes an objection to reliabilist theories of epistemic warrant, once one becomes 
suspicious that no solution is in the offing.30 
 Similarly in the case of perception, some ways of understanding which process 
generated an experience will yield the incorrect results – the result that something in fact 
seen was unseen, the result that something in fact unseen was seen.  So, in requiring that 
the actual process be held fixed in evaluating whether a tracking relation obtains, what 
am I requiring?  It is not my intention here to give a complete answer to this question, 
since I do not have one.  Instead, I have the more modest, and more attainable, goal of 
pointing the way toward an answer, delineating some constraints on what an answer 
might be.   
It is also worth noting that the problem here is not mine alone – nor is it shared 
only with reliabilists about epistemic warrant.  Ralph Wedgwood and Juan Comesaña 
have recently, and persuasively, argued that every reasonable epistemology – whether 
externalist or internalist about the possession of epistemic value – will ultimately have to 
                                                 
30 It would be nice to see a principled argument that there could be no solution.  As it stands, the pressure 
on the theorist who makes reference to processes is merely the pressure to be completist.  I like a complete 
account as much as the next guy, though I have yet to see one and it seems unfair to require one.  
 71
resolve the generality problem.  (Wedgwood 2002: 287) (Comesaña 2006)  My theory is, 
therefore, in good company. 
  A process is a puzzling thing.  A process can be both a sequence of events (and 
so concrete or located at a time) and something like a recipe (which is abstract and 
repeatable).  The problem here stems from the fact that a process is something the 
occurrence of which can be referenced in answering a kind of ‘how’-question.  (How did 
you come to live in Idaho?  How did you bake that cake?  How did the fundamental 
particle end up over there?)  We can answer this kind of question by indicating the 
sequence of events at the end of which lies the target of our inquiry.31  However, until we 
know how a sequence of events constitutes a unity, it seems that we do not yet know 
what we wanted to know in wondering how something happened.  This suggests that we 
should think that a process is a sequence of events constituted as a unity.   
Moreover, the specific unity constituted by an actual sequence of events can be 
constituted by rather different sequences of events.  Suppose I demonstrate to you how to 
bake a cake.  Having finished baking the cake, I tell you, “Now do the same thing.”  I 
have commanded you to try and replicate the process by which I baked the cake.  
However, it is compatible with your satisfying my command that the sequence of events 
leading up (hopefully) to your cake differs in many interesting ways from the sequence of 
events that led up to my cake.32  For example, in measuring the flour I might have used 
my right hand to manipulate the scale and you might have used your left hand.  It could 
be that your sequence of events nevertheless instantiates the same process as my 
sequence.  Or, perhaps, sensing a difference in the level of humidity in the air, you added 
                                                 
31 By ‘event’ I do not mean to refer to property instantiation.  Rather, I mean to refer to time slices. 
32 And not just with respect to its being you who were involved with the sequence. 
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less milk to your batter.  There is a rather different sequence here, but the same process. 
Consider, for another example, two sequences that realize the process of using a radar 
gun to determine the speed of a vehicle.  Presumably, in both cases the same fundamental 
physical laws are instantiated between pairs of events, but the events will instantiate these 
laws in different ways.  However, in each case, the pattern of radio waves will differ with 
respect to their frequency and amplitude along different dimensions.  And yet one might 
truly say that both sequences realize the same process – the process of determining the 
speed of a vehicle with a radar gun.  
A given sequences of events might be truly described in ever so many ways and 
this is the root of the generality problem.  An actual sequence satisfies a great many 
descriptions – to make thinking about this easier just consider three descriptions: D1, D2, 
D3.  In one set of nearby worlds there are sequences that satisfy D1.  In another, there are 
sequences that satisfy D2.  In another, there are sequences that satisfy D3.  The critic 
wants to know which of these worlds are worlds in which the actual process occurs.  Or, 
assuming that the critic has some intuitive grasp on what kinds of changes to the actual 
situation constitute a change in process, the critic wants an explicit account of what we’re 
doing when we hold the process fixed. 
It is evident that in holding fixed the actual process it is insufficient to require 
merely that the relevant sequences satisfy at least one description that is also satisfied by 
the actual sequence of events.  Not every such description will correctly identify the 
process – that is, not every such description will identify the relevant way in which the 
actual sequence of events is constituted as a unity.  For example, that a sequence that 
realizes the process of baking a cake occurs on Tuesday, is presumably not a fact that has 
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anything to do with the way(s) in which it is constituted as a unity.  Thus, if we want to 
know what would happen if that process were repeated, we would be gratuitously strict to 
consider only sequences that occur on Tuesdays.  Moreover, and for the same reason, it 
would be a mistake to require that such sequences satisfy every description satisfied by 
the actual sequence.  
What the critic demands is an account that tells us which of the descriptions the 
actual sequence satisfies need be satisfied as we hold the process fixed.  Now some 
descriptions of a sequence of events are such that any sequence of events that satisfies 
that description constitutes the same kind of unity as the actual sequence.  What the critic 
wants is an account that puts some conditions on these descriptions, some account that 
picks out the relevant descriptions. 
It is one constraint, I claim, that these descriptions pick out natural process-kinds.  
At each world (among the worlds that provide the truth conditions for the relevant 
counterfactuals), the process-realizing sequence of events must instantiate the same 
natural process-kind.33  Recall, for example, one of the principles in my list of principles 
according to which one might type the process by which I came to believe that p: Believe 
that p, given that you are in Ann Arbor.  The sequence of events that eventuated in my 
believing that Lormand is amazingly smart is one that occurred in Ann Arbor and a 
description in those terms picks out the sequence.  But, intuitively, that it occurred in Ann 
Arbor is an inessential feature of the process.  The same process could have been spread 
                                                 
33 Alston tries to use this kind requirement to solve the generality problem for reliabilist theories of 
epistemic warrant.  (Alston 1995)  Notice also that this proposal makes our judgments about whether 
perception has occurred ultimately hostage to science.  We have some intuitive grasp on what kinds of 
things are not natural kinds – we can usually identify gerrymandered kinds as such.  But if we are wrong 
about which sequences belong to which natural process-kinds, then we will be wrong sometimes about 
what the counterfactual effect of holding the process fixed would be.  We are hostage to science, because it 
is an empirical matter what the natural kinds are.  
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out between Ann Arbor and Bangalore – thanks to telecommunications technology.  This 
would explain why identifying a cognitive process as believe that p in Ann Arbor is 
problematic.  It would be safe to assume that cognitive processes are not to be 
individuated by whether they occur in Ann Arbor or not.  If we wish to cut nature at its 
joints, this will not do.  Thus, if we want to evaluate the reliability of the process by 
which I came to believe that Lormand is amazingly smart, it would be a mistake to 
require that the sequence of events eventuating in my belief occur in Ann Arbor. 
Now this might be enough to respond to the problem that started this part of the 
chapter.  The worry, remember, was that a process-relative counterfactual theory of 
perception has the consequence that we see nothing.  If holding fixed the actual process 
fixed requires holding fixed the microphysical description of the actual sequence of 
events, then in no case will changes to the object be tracked.  The proper response to this 
might be as follows: this does not constitute holding the process fixed, since the 
microphysical description of the sequence that actually eventuated in your experience 
does not pick out a natural kind.  At best, it picks out an arbitrary subset of a natural 
process-kind. 
However, even if we can dissolve the puzzle with which I began, restricting the 
descriptions that pick out the relevant sequences to descriptions that pick out natural 
kinds, it is not enough to solve the larger problem toward which the puzzle gestured.  
Two sequences might instantiate the same natural process-kind, but intuitively differ with 
respect to which process they instantiate.  Imagine that you are a scientist who works on 
the differences between the digestive systems of birds.  Presumably, digestion is a natural 
process-kind.  The subjects of your study (finches and penguins) are all digesters and so 
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the sequences of events in their events that you study instantiate the same natural kind, 
but you argue that the process by which a finch digests differs from the process by which 
a penguin digests.  It could be, for a fictional example, that while finches (like cows) 
have an extra stomach that in which ingested food is fermented by micro-organisms, 
penguins do not.    
 Natural process-kinds may bear the determinate-determinable relation to each 
other.  The processes by which the finch and penguin might digest differ from one 
another like a cerulean blue thing differs from a Prussian blue thing.  They are both ways 
of digesting.   
 What about visual mechanisms?  Does the same thing arise there as well?  
Consider the case of the Delicately Opaque Object:   
The delicately opaque object is opaque and colored blue, but were it differently 
located or shaped it would cease to be opaque and become perfectly transparent.  
Moreover, blue is the only color it could possess.  Any change that would make it 
non-blue, would make it perfectly transparent.  As it happens, the conditions are 
optimal for viewing it and you give it a good look.34 
 
It is plausible that you see the delicately opaque object.  But does your experience of it 
track possible changes in it, holding fixed the actual process?  Maybe we have a 
counterexample to process-relative counterfactual theories of perception.  I agree that it is 
plausible to describe this as a case of seeing.  If we held fixed merely that the sequence is 
one in which, for example, you open your eyes and receive information transmitted by 
light, then the tracking relation wouldn’t obtain and we should have to conclude either 
that counterfactual accounts should be rejected or you don’t see in the case of the 
Delicately Opaque Object. 
                                                 
34 Thanks are due to Richard Grandy for suggesting this kind of case. 
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But this case is not, in fact, a counterexample.  The circumstances in which the 
object becomes perfectly transparent are circumstances in which the process leading from 
the object to your experience is different.  The difference is this: in the actual case, the 
object reflects light, while in the cases where the object is perfectly transparent, it 
transmits it.  Holding fixed the process evidently involves holding fixed that the sequence 
is one in which reflection occurs (rather than transmission).  That the light reaching your 
eyes from the location of the object is transmitted by the object rather than reflected by it 
makes a difference to which process has occurred.  If we held fixed the fact that the 
process leading to experience is one in which reflection occurs, then, were the object 
differently colored, its different color would be matched.35  Thus, we have a case in 
which holding the actual process fixed means holding fixed a determination of a 
determinable natural process-kind.36  
 Maybe the case of the Delicately Opaque Object shows us that at each world 
(among the worlds that provide the truth conditions for the relevant counterfactuals), the 
process-realizing sequence of events must instantiate the same determination of a 
determinable natural process-kind.37  However, this will not be enough.  Determinables 
admit a hierarchy of determinations.  Thus, while blue is a determination of colored, and 
cerulean blue is a determination of blue, there are shades of blue that are determinations 
of cerulean blue.  Consequently, we should expect the same of the natural process-kinds 
an actual sequence of events might realize.  As a result, we can expect some 
                                                 
35 Notice that we’ll be considering what would happen in worlds in which the delicate opacity of the object 
is not witnessed.  It appears that, as Lewis thinks, the truth of counterfactuals can depend on worlds in 
which small miracles occur.  Thus we needn’t suppose that the nearby worlds – the truth-makers for 
counterfactual conditionals – need be physically possible. 
36 Notice also the role empirical knowledge is playing in the judgment that a change from reflection to 
perfect transmission is a change in process.  It is only in virtue of my modest knowledge of optics and 
vision science that I am in a position to make this judgment. 
37 Provided, of course, that the determination is itself a natural process-kind. 
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philosophical puzzlement about whether two possible sequences realize the same process.  
One fix here would be to require that at each world (among the worlds that provide the 
truth conditions for the relevant counterfactuals), the process-realizing sequence of events 
must instantiate the same super-determination of a determinable natural process-kind that 
is also a natural-process kind.  That is, the sequences must instantiate a natural process-
kind that is a determination of a determinable natural process-kind that is not itself further 
determinable by a natural process-kind. 
 However, this fix won’t work.  Evidently, whatever description picks out the 
process will have to be one that picks out the right natural process-kind determination of 
a natural process-kind determinable.  To see why this fix won’t work we need to get a 
little clearer about the way in which processes are built from sub-processes. 
A sequence might possess local unities.  There are, therefore, sub-processes.  
However, holding fixed the actual process cannot simply be a matter of requiring that 
relevant possible sequences satisfy a description that picks out one among the many sub-
processes realized by the actual sequence.  For example, some part of the sequence of 
events that constitutes my making lasagna is constituted as a unity truly describable as my 
boiling the pasta.  One might truly describe such a sequence as the process in which I 
boiled some pasta.  This means that one cannot necessarily identify a process by truly 
describing some locally constituted unity.  Making lasagna and making spaghetti are 
different processes, even if they both involve sequences that have regions that are unified 
insofar as they are pasta-boilings.   
Not only would such a procedure misclassify processes, but it would leave my 
account open to a kind of censor case.  If holding fixed the actual process is to prevent 
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censor cases from being cases in which nothing is seen, we shall have to understand 
holding the actual process fixed as requiring more than that the relevant sequences satisfy 
a description that is true of some less-than-maximal region of the actual sequence.  To see 
why this is so, consider the case of the Almost Last Minute Censor: 
Imagine that the last part of the computation that eventuates in one’s experience 
as one gazes at a white wall is the transmission of a signal, the content of which is 
something like there is a white surface of such-and-such extent in such-and-such 
region.  Now imagine, as in the other censor cases, there is a censor who wishes 
that you be subject to whatever experience eventuates from such a signal.  In 
worlds where the wall is different or nonexistent, the censor intervenes and 
produces the experience he wants you to have.  The censor’s intervention is late, 
but not last minute.  What I mean is this: instead of directly producing in you the 
experience you might have as a result of looking at a white wall, he causes the 
transmission of the same signal that was transmitted in the actual case.38 
 
This would be a counterexample to a Lewis-style counterfactual theory – one which is 
not, like mine, process-relative.  Is it also a counterexample to a process-relative theory?  
Is it the process in the situation in which the censor intervenes the same process as the 
process in the actual situation? 
 I think it is not a counterexample.  The reason is this: it supposes that it is 
sufficient for holding the actual process fixed that we hold fixed only the last sub-
process.  That is, it supposes that the relevant sequences are ones that satisfy whatever 
description picks out the last region of the actual sequence.  Some of these are sequences 
that realize the same process as the actual sequence (consider the sequences that are 
identical in every respect); others – for example, the sequences in which the censor 
intervenes – are not.   
 The problem here is not that description ‘transmits a signal the content of which is 
something like there is a white surface of such-and-such extent in such-and-such region’ 
                                                 
38 Thanks are due to Eric Lormand for providing this example in conversation. 
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fails to pick out a natural process-kind of the relevant level of determination.  We can 
suppose that this is as determinate and natural as process-kinds get.  The problem is that 
it identifies the process by one of its sub-processes.  Thus, holding the actual process 
fixed requires holding fixed the entire extent of the process.  In line with the proposal that 
holding a process fixed (in assessing whether seeing has occurred) requires holding fixed 
a sequence’s membership in a super-determinate natural process-kind we might propose 
the following:  Each relevant sequence is such that, for each region of the actual sequence 
that realizes a super-determinate natural process-kind, there is a corresponding region that 
realizes the same super-determinate natural process kind.39   
 There is something right about the requirement that each relevant sequence is 
such that, for each region of the actual sequence that realizes determinate natural process-
kind, there is a corresponding region that realizes the same determinate natural process-
kind.  Sequences might belong to what I’ll call maximal natural process-kinds.  Two 
sequences belong to a maximal natural process-kind, iff each of their corresponding 
regions belong to the same natural process-kind and both possess such unity as a whole 
as to belong to the same natural process-kind.  I think that it is just about right to say that 
in holding the process fixed, we’re requiring that the relevant sequences belong to the 
same maximal natural process-kind. 
The problem comes from requiring that they realize the same super-determinate 
natural process-kind.  There are possible creatures for whom the kind of variations an 
experience must track – it is to be a perceptual experience – activate different super-
determinations of a determinable perceptual process.  I’m thinking of cases in which a 
                                                 
39 The correspondence relation between a region of the actual sequence and a region of a possible sequence 
consists in their both being in the same temporal order relative to other regions of the sequences of which 
they are a part. 
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creature has a perceptual process that is radically decomposable.  That is, in different 
situations (were the ball blue instead of red, for example), functionally and 
physiologically isolated sub-processes kick in.  Thus, if, in holding the process fixed, we 
require that the relevant sequences realize the same super-determinations of determinable 
natural process-kinds, we’ll have to suppose that such a creature is blind. 
 So what we want – if we want to give an explicit account of holding a process 
fixed – is a way of picking out natural process-kinds (both for sub-regions of the actual 
sequence and for the sequence as a whole) at the right level in the determinable-
determination hierarchy.  It looks like something like the following constitutes the seeing 
relation: 
I see some object x by having some visual experience e iff there is any suitably 
determinate maximal natural process-kind, K, realized by the actual sequence of 
events that eventuates in e, such that for each member, f, of some suitable set of 
features x could possess (i) were x f and were some visual experience, e2, to be 
the output of a sequence of events that realizes K, then e2 would represent 
something as F (and, in so doing, increase the number if things that are represented as F 
by one); and (ii) were x not-f and were some experience, e3, the output of a 
sequence of events that realizes K, then e3 would not represent x as f. 
 
What we need, if we are to satisfy the critic’s desire for a more explicit account, would be 
an account of what constitutes a maximal natural process-kind as suitably determinate.  
Sadly, I do not have a proposal in hand that would accomplish this task.  But I think we 




It is sometimes supposed that a counterfactual account of perception has no hope.   
However, the burden of this chapter has been to show how a counterfactual account 
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might be possible.  It must accommodate the challenges posed by the counterexamples to 
David Lewis’ account.  It must survive McLaughlin and McGinn’s principled objections.  
It would be nice if its advocate had something useful to say about the issues raised by the 
generality problem.  I have accomplished all of these goals. 
 The main business of the next chapter is a defense of the Gricean arguments; 
however, as part of my defense of Grice, I argue that the contents of some visual 
experiences are fixed by perceptual relations.  Thus, if the arguments of Chapter 3 are 
correct, then the theory presented in this chapter, is part of proto-semantic theory – it tells 
us what facts constitute our visual experiences as bearing this or that content. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POSSIBILITY OF VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION 
 
0.1: INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Arguments for the claim that episodes of visual perception (episodes of seeing x) 
are constituted by – and thus analyzable in terms of – experiences that causally depend on 
x in the right way make heavy use of the notion of veridical hallucination.  That is, they 
express the supposition that it is possible for there to be a match between one’s 
experience and unseen objects.  For example, Grice argues for the causal theory of 
perception by adverting to the possibility of veridical hallucination.  (Grice 1961) 
In this chapter, I’ll raise and address doubts about whether veridical hallucination 
is possible.  This chapter has two main parts.  In his article, “The Particularity of Visual 
Perception”, Matthew Soteriou argues that admitting the possibility of veridical 
hallucination has unacceptable consequences.  (Soteriou 2000)  In the first part of the 
chapter, I defend the possibility of veridical hallucination against Soteriou’s argument.  In 
the second part of chapter, I address worries about the possibility of veridical 
hallucination that center on Searle’s account of the content of visual experiences.  In 
neither case will we find reason to reject the possibility of veridical hallucination.  
Additionally, in the first part of this chapter I find reason to accept an externalist thesis, 
according to which the perceptual facts make a difference to the contents of visual 





0.2: THE ARGUMENT FROM VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION 
Consider the Argument from Veridical Hallucination.  This argument is 
equivalent to an argument Grice gives in “The Causal Theory of Perception”. (Grice 
1961)  This argument is designed to undermine the claim that it is sufficient for seeing a 
thing that one’s experience match it perfectly and to prompt the causal theory.  Imagine 
standing in a room with plaid walls.  For His own mysterious reasons a powerful being 
has determined – without regard to the actual pattern of color on the walls – that you be 
subject to experience of a sort that you would have were you actually seeing the plaid 
walls of the room.  There you are in the room and having the kind of experience you 
would have were you actually seeing the plaid walls of the room.  Do you see the plaid 
walls of the room?  Plausibly not.  Why not?  Because your experience was not caused in 
the right way by the plaid walls you do not see them. 
 
Let me formalize this a bit: 
 
(1)  There is a possible situation, s, in which: 
(1.1) you are subject to some experience, e, with match-
determining character, M. 
   (1.2)  There is an object, a. 
(1.3)  a and M are such that there is a perfect match between e 
and a.  
(1.4)  a does not causally explain the truth of 1.3 
    (1.5)  In s, you do not see a. 
 
So   (2)  The truth of 1.3 is insufficient to make it true that you see a. 
 
Moreover (3) The truth of 1.5 is probably constitutionally explained by the  
truth of 1.4. 
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In s, you were veridically hallucinating – that is: (i) since you were not seeing a, even 
though it was as if you were seeing such a thing, you were hallucinating; and (ii) you 
were veridically hallucinating because there was a perfect match between e and a.  Since, 
the notion of a match is going to be the locus of our worries, let me say a little about 
matching. 
What is it for an experience to match a thing?  We should probably understand 
matching as follows: If how things are and how they visually seem to be are the same, 
then the visual experience that constitutes things visually seeming such-and-such matches 
the way things are.  This is because how things appear to be is a function of some feature 
of one’s experience – I have called it the match-determining character of experience. 
It is natural to understand the match determining character of experience in 
representational terms.  Thus, the match-determining character of experience is 
determined by the contents of one’s experience.40  If we understand the match-
determining character of experience in terms of contents, then for an experience to match 
an object is for it to correctly – that is, truly – represent that object.  A perfect match 
would consist in representing some and only things that are true of that object.  A 
veridical hallucination consists in being subject to sensory experience that represents 
some and only things that are true of an object (hence veridicality) and yet not seeing that 
object (hence hallucination).41 
                                                 
40 There are, of course, difference possible views about what determines the contents of one’s experiences.  
Thus, for example, sense-data theorists like Jackson and Robinson take the contents of one’s experience to 
be determined by patterns of resemblance between sense-data, awareness of which constitutes one’s 
experience, and worldly objects.  (Jackson 1977) (Robinson 1994) 
41 When I speak without qualification of an experience being veridical, I mean that it is entirely veridical.  
That is to say, it is not to any extent non-veridical. 
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 If veridical hallucination is impossible, then the Argument from Veridical 






1.1: FROM VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION TO VERIDICAL MISPERCEPTION 
In his article, “The Particularity of Visual Perception”, Matthew Soteriou argues 
that admitting the possibility of veridical of hallucination has unacceptable consequences.  
Soteriou argues that if you accept the possibility of veridical hallucination, then you must 
accept the possibility of veridical misperception.  Soteriou argues that since the concept 
of veridical misperception is incoherent, we should reject the possibility of veridical 
hallucination. (Soteriou 2000) 
What I will do in this part is argue that the intended inference from the possibility 
of veridical hallucination to the possibility of veridical misperception is invalid.  First, I’ll 
present Soteriou’s argument that veridical hallucination is impossible.  Next, I’ll address 
Soteriou’s argument by describing a theory of the content of visual experiences that is 
consistent with the data Soteriou invokes, but allows for the possibility of veridical 
hallucination.  Finally, I’ll show how this response causes trouble for a second Gricean 
argument – one that supposes that it is possible for an experience to match two objects, 
one of which is seen and one of which is unseen.  If arguments based on the possibility of 
veridical hallucination succeed, then arguments based on the possibility that an 
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experience might match two objects, one seen and the other unseen, fail.  We will save 
one Gricean argument, but lose another. 
The structure of Soteriou’s argument is perspicuously laid out in the following 
two passages: 
 
A If an account of the content of experience allows for the possibility of veridical 
hallucination, then that account allows that the question of the veridicality of an 
experience can be settled independently of whether an object is being perceived. 
(Soteriou 2000:177) 
 
B If we allow that the question of the veridicality of a subject’s experience can be 
settled independently of the question of whether there is an object being 
perceived, we thereby allow that the question of the veridicality of an experience 
can be settled independently of which particular object is being perceived.  And if 
we allow that the question of the veridicality of an experience can be settled 
independently of the question of which object is being perceived, we thereby 
allow for the possibility of veridical misperception. (Soteriou 2000:179) 
 
That veridical misperception is an incoherent notion can be easily seen (provided we 
make some plausible assumptions).  Veridicality is a property that an experience 
possesses just in case it is accurate – where accuracy can be understood as truth.  Thus an 
experience is veridical if the way it represents things to be is the way they are.  To 
misperceive is to see a thing, but in seeing it, be subject to experience that represents it 
falsely.  Thus a veridical misperception would be an experience that is, impossibly, both 
veridical and non-veridical.  
Since this is impossible, anything that would entail veridical misperception must 
be rejected.  Thus, according to Soteriou’s argument, since the possibility of veridical 
hallucination lies at the head of this chain of entailments, it is ruled out by the 
incoherence of veridical misperception. 
 87
Let’s start at the end.  Soteriou claims that if veridical hallucination is possible, 
then so is veridical misperception.  Since veridical misperception is clearly impossible, so 
is veridical hallucination.  Actually, this talk of veridical misperception is a bit confusing.  
In essence, the argument is this: there are cases advocates of the possibility of veridical 
hallucination must count as veridical, but persuasive intuitive considerations would count 
as non-veridical.   
Since the middle terms of Soteriou’s argument (the propositions regarding settling 
questions about veridicality) can be a bit obscure, I shall begin by constructing an 
argument from the possibility of veridical hallucination to the possibility of veridical 
misperception.  This argument will tell us what would be needed to get from the 
possibility of veridical hallucination to the possibility of veridical misperception. 
Consider the Case of the Many Blue Dots (call it MBD1): there is a white wall 
and on it is a horizontal series of qualitatively identical blue dots.  They are all the same 
size and color and equidistant.  You are positioned not far from it and peering into a 
binocular device – maybe it looks like the kind of thing ophthalmologists might use to 
administer a test of visual acuity.  It is as if you see four blue dots.  As it happens, the 
device contains special lenses.  The lenses can, at the push of a button, be either retracted 
or dropped into position.  The position of lenses makes a difference to which of the many 
dots on the wall you see.  If the lenses are retracted, you see the portion of the series of 
blue dots that is right in front of you in your normal field of vision.  If the lenses are in 
place, then you see a different set of dots – those a foot to the right.  However, whether 
the lenses are in position or not makes no difference to how things look.  The spacing of 
the dots and the shift produced by the lenses are such that whether the lenses are position 
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makes no difference to how things look.  Thus, if the lenses were retracted, it would also 
be as if you see four blue dots.  Suppose that as you peer at the wall through the device, 
the lenses are in position – they are shifting light.  Is your experience veridical or not? 
A strong intuitive case can be made that your experience in this case is non-
veridical.  Consider a situation differing from MBD1 such that, instead of a series of blue 
dots, there is only one blue dot.  Now, as you look through the device, lenses in place, 
you see the blue dot, but due to the distorting effect of the lenses the dot appears to be a 
foot to the right.  It seems clear that your experience in this case is non-veridical.  The dot 
appears to be somewhere it isn’t.  Thus, at least some part of how things appear to be is 
not how things really are. 
But notice that dot-by-dot the same thing is true in the case in which there are 
many dots on the wall.  Considered alone, the relation you bear to each dot is such that 
were it the one dot on the wall you would misperceive its location.  Each one appears to 
be somewhere it isn’t.  Each dot that appears before you appears to be a foot to the right 
of its actual location.  Since this is so, it seems we should conclude that as you peer 
through the device, lenses in place, the experience you have is non-veridical.  Your 
experience in MBD1 is not veridical.  
However, according to Soteriou anyone who accepts the possibility of veridical 
hallucination must think your experience in MBD1 is veridical.  What view of the content 
of experience would make it true that your experience in MBD1 is veridical?  Such a 
view would have to require that, in this case, the veridicality of your experience does not 
depend on the perceptual facts.  What I mean is this: our reason for thinking that your 
experience was non-veridical depended on thinking that the veridicality of your 
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experience depended on the states of some dots and not others.  The experience 
misrepresented because the dots you saw were not where they were represented to be.   
This means that if a theory is to count your experience in MBD1 as veridical, that 
theory must require that the veridicality of your experience in MBD1 not depend on the 
locations of seen dots in MBD1.  If MBD1 is veridical, its veridicality would have to 
depend on the state of unseen objects. 
Let’s back up a moment and see whether the possibility of veridical hallucination 
implies such a theory.  If it is possible to suffer from a veridical hallucination, then it is 
possible that an experience be such that it is hallucinatory and yet veridical at the same 
time.  Just as your experience in MBD1 could not depend for its veridicality on the 
location of seen objects (if it were to be veridical), so the experience you might have a 
result of hallucination could not depend on the features of seen objects (if it is to be 
veridical).  This is because it is a hallucinatory experience in which nothing is seen.  So 
the content of a veridical hallucination and the content of an experience that could be 
veridical in MBD1 would both determine veridicality conditions that do not depend on 
the features of seen objects.  They would depend on the states of objects – whether they 
are seen or not. 
If accepting the possibility of veridical hallucination is to commit one to accepting 
that veridical misperception is possible, then it must do so via some principle that 
generalizes from the case of veridical hallucination to cover at least cases like MBD1.  
That is, there must be some principle that allows one to generalize from the claim that the 
experiences that are parts of veridical hallucinations do not depend for their veridicality 
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on the states of seen objects to the claim in cases like MBD1 experiences do not depend 
for their veridicality on the states of seen objects, but rather on unseen objects. 
Suppose (as is plausible) that the experience you have in MBD1 could have been 
part of an episode of veridical hallucination.  If its contents would have been the same 
were it an episode of veridical hallucination, then just as a veridical hallucination has 
contents in virtue of which its veridicality does not depend on the states of seen objects so 
would the experience you have in MBD1.   
But why suppose that the experience you had in MBD1 and its veridical 
hallucinatory counterpart share exactly similar contents?  A principle that answers this 
question would get us from accepting the possibility of veridical hallucination to 
accepting the possibility of veridical misperception.   
At this point, it is worth adverting to Martin Davies.  According to Davies, “[the 
notion of] the perceptual content of experience is a phenomenological notion.” (Davies 
1997: 314)  The root idea is this: the theoretical function of postulating contents for 
visual experiences is to account for phenomenological similarities and differences among 
possible visual experiences. 
Phenomenally indiscriminable things “give rise to the same perceptual contents”.  
(McGinn 1989: 66)  As Davies puts it, “where there is no phenomenological difference 
for the subject, there is no difference in content.”  (Davies 1997: 314)  If two possible 
experiences are phenomenological twins, then they have the same content.  Similarly, 
presumably, if two possible experiences are not phenomenological twins, they have 
different contents.  Call the conjunction of these two views the Phenomenological 
Content Thesis. 
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 It is plausible that the perceptual facts do not by themselves make a 
phenomenological difference because you can readily imagine that the experience to 
which you are subject right now differing with respect to the perceptual facts, but 
remaining phenomenologically identical.  Though I now see this desk, I could have been 
viewing a qualitatively identical but numerically distinct desk.  I could have been the 
victim of total hallucination.  In each case, my experience would be phenomenologically 
the same.  This is because in imagining that this experience has a different perceptual 
status, I hold fixed the phenomenal character of the experience.  This is what makes the 
imagined scenarios – scenarios in which the perceptual facts are different – scenarios in 
which this experience exists.  Accordingly, by the Phenomenological Thesis, in each case 
the contents of my experience would be the same.  Thus, the perceptual facts do not make 
a difference to content.  Generally, if an experience were different with respect to its 
perceptual status, then, were the phenomenal character of the experience held fixed, its 
content would remain the same.42 
 Therefore, given that the experience you have in MBD1 could have been a 
phenomenologically identical veridical hallucination, it must share exactly similar 
contents with that veridical hallucination.  Given that the veridical hallucination didn’t 
depend for its veridicality on the status of seen objects, the same will be true of your 
experience in MBD1.  Thus the only obstacle to your experience being veridical in 
                                                 
42 Actually, this is a little weaker than would be implied by the Phenomenological Thesis.  But that is both 
acceptable and a good thing.  It is acceptable because it doesn’t need to be any stronger to warrant the 
generalization from cases of veridical hallucination to MBD1.  It is a good thing because rampant 
externalism about what features a mental state represents would falsify the Phenomenological Content 
Thesis, if it were interpreted to apply to possible twins from distant possible worlds (e.g. experiences on 
Earth and Twin Earth).  Luckily, this claim has a plausibility independently of the Phenomenological 
Thesis. 
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MBD1 is removed and, if we accept the possibility of veridical hallucination, we must 
accept the veridicality of your experience in MBD1. 
 Thus Soteriou places the advocate of the possibility of veridical hallucination in a 
cognitive bind – the advocate must live with inconsistency, reject the possibility of 
veridical hallucination, reject the extremely persuasive intuitive verdict that your 
experience in MBD1 is non-veridical, or reject the reasoning that leads from the 
possibility of veridical hallucination to the possibility of veridical misperception.  I 
propose the last path. 
 
1.2: ASSESSING SOTERIOU’S ARGUMENT 
The argument contained in passages A and B is invalid.  Soteriou claims that the 
possibility of veridical hallucination entails that (1) “the question of the veridicality of an 
experience can be settled independently of whether an object is being perceived.” 
(Soteriou 2000:177)  The claim that the question of the veridicality of an experience can 
be settled independently of whether an object is being perceived is susceptible to at least 
two readings.  On one it makes only a weak claim – that there some experiences are such 
that their veridicality at a situation does not depend on whether an object is being 
perceived in that situation.  On another it makes a much stronger claim – that every 
experience is such that its veridicality at a situation does not depend on whether an object 
is being perceived in that situation.  Charity would recommend the weak reading of (1) 
since it is implied by the possibility of veridical hallucination.  But unless we give (1) a 
strong reading it won’t entail the possibility of veridical misperception.  Sadly, however, 
the strong reading is not entailed by the possibility of veridical hallucination. 
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 B contains the claim that (2) “the question of the veridicality of an experience can 
be settled independently of which particular object is being perceived.” (Soteriou 2000: 
179)  Like (1), (2) admits a strong and weak reading.  On the weak reading (2) requires 
that some experiences are such that their veridicality at a situation does not depend on 
which object is being perceived in that situation.  On the strong reading  (2) requires that 
there every experience is such that its veridicality at a situation does not depend on which 
object is being perceived in that situation.   
B contains the claim that (2) follows from (1).  It is plausible that the weak 
reading of (2) follows from both readings of (1).  However, the strong reading of (2) does 
not follow from the weak reading of (1).  It could be true that some experiences are such 
that their veridicality is independent of whether something is being perceived but false 
that every experience is such that its veridicality is independent of which objects are 
perceived in the perceptual episode of which it is a part.   
We need a strong reading of (2) in order that (2) might entail the possibility of 
veridical misperception.  If every experience is such that its veridicality at a situation 
does not depend on which object is being perceived in that situation, then in cases like 
MBD1 we must count the experience you have as veridical.  But persuasive intuitive 
considerations support the claim that the experience you have in MBD1 is non-veridical.  
Thus, a strong reading of (2) would place us in a cognitive bind.  The weak reading of (2) 
won’t do the trick, since if only some experiences are such that their veridicality is 
independent of which object is perceived, then there is a possibility that the experience 
you have in MBD1 is not among those experiences the veridicality of which is 
independent of which objects are perceived. 
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 Unfortunately for Soteriou, while it is plausible that the strong reading of (2) 
follows from the strong reading of (1), it is not plausible that the strong reading of (1) 
follows from the possibility of veridical hallucination.  All the possibility of veridical 
hallucination requires is that some experiences – namely those that are parts of episodes 
of veridical hallucination – are such that their veridicality is independent of whether 
anything is being perceived. 
 Accordingly, Soteriou has failed to establish that the possibility of veridical 
hallucination entails the possibility of veridical misperception.  However, as we saw 
before in my analysis of MBD1, if the accepting possibility of veridical hallucination is 
to commit you to the possibility of veridical misperception, you must also accept some 
kind of generalization principle – a principle that gets you from some to all (or at least 
from some cases to cases like MBD1).   
 Whatever generalization principles one chooses will come under suspicion from 
its implication (together with the possibility of veridical hallucination) that your 
experience in MBD1 is veridical.  The dialectical situation seems to me to be this: 
veridical hallucination seems possible, persuasive considerations establish that in MBD1 
your experience is non-veridical, therefore we have reason to reject whatever principles 
get us an entailment that your experience in MBD1 is veridical.  Thus, it seems that we 
ought to accept the possibility of veridical hallucination and reject the generalization 
principles, whatever they are. 
 It is surprising that Soteriou supposes that the possibility of veridical hallucination 
must be given up, since all the pieces are in place in his article for a view that would 
accept the possibility of veridical hallucination, while denying the veridicality of your 
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experience in MBD1.  The view I have in mind is one that denies the claim that if an 
experience were different with respect to its perceptual status, then, were the phenomenal 
character of the experience held fixed, its content would remain the same, while 
accounting for the evident fact that the veridicality of your experience in MBD1 depends 
on the perceptual facts.  I’ll present this view by showing how it diagnoses a failed 
argument that your experience in MBD1 is veridical. 
A failed argument: Consider looking through the device when the lenses are 
retracted.  In this case, call it MBD2, how things are and how things look are the same (if 
they ever are).  There is a way things look, and it is the same as the way things are.  There 
appears to be a white wall with some blue dots arrayed on it thus-and-so and there is a 
white wall with some blue dots arrayed on it thus-and-so.  The experience you would 
have in this case is therefore veridical.  Since things look the same whether the lenses are 
in place or not, the same facts obtain in MBD1.  So, since there appears to be a white wall 
with blue dots arrayed on it thus-and-so and there is, the experience you have in MBD1 
must also be veridical. 
This argument supposed that the contents of one’s experience are determined by 
the things-looking-X-state one is in being subject to that experience.  It is in virtue of 
being in such-and-such experiential state that things look as they do.  Moreover, it is 
plausible that the facts about how things look mirror the contents of the experiences 
involved in things looking the way they do.  Think of the mirroring relation here as 
follows: an experience possesses only those contents necessary to capture how things 
look in being subject to it. 
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The differences that exist between MBD1 and MBD2 are not sufficient to make a 
difference to how things look.  Whether the lenses are in place or not makes no difference 
to how things look.  If the contents of experiences mirror how things look, then the 
position of the lenses do not matter to whether your experiences in MBD1 or MBD2 are 
veridical.  Accordingly, if your experience in MBD2 is veridical, so is your experience in 
MBD1. 
I suspect that part of what explains the persuasive force of the argument that one’s 
experience in MBD1 is veridical is a kind of sloppiness in our notion of things looking 
thus-and-so.  In particular, I said that whether the lenses are in position or not would 
make no difference to how things look.  This is true.   
You might think: if, in two situations, things look the same to someone, then the 
contents of his visual experience in those two situations must be the same.  However, this 
thought expresses an invalid inference.  The perceptual facts (which objects, if any, 
someone is seeing) might make no difference to how things look, but they might make a 
difference to which things look thus-and-so.   
If I ask you how things look, my question does not necessarily target the identities 
of seen objects, but rather the features they appear to have.  It is an unspecific question.  
You wouldn’t answer an inquiry into how things look with an utterance of “Fred”.  
Instead, you might say “blue”, “blurry”, “as if Sally finally had it with Charles”, “as if 
there were a ghost standing behind that tree”, “as if something purple and hairy were 
located inches from my face”, etc.  The question of how things look can be answered 
with radically varying degrees of specificity about which objects one bears perceptual 
relations to.   
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The intuitive considerations in favor of the conclusion that in MBD1 your 
experience is non-veridical rest on the idea that the perceptual facts make a difference to 
which things look-thus-and-so.  Your experience in MBD1 is non-veridical because the 
objects you see (the objects providing answers to the question “which objects do you 
see?”) are not as they appear to be.  Had you been aware of different objects (as in 
MBD2) the veridicality of your experience would have depended on those objects 
instead.  Thus, as Soteriou puts it, “We need to determine which particular objects in the 
subject’s environment are being perceived if we are to determine whether the subject’s 
environment really is as it seems to be”. (Soteriou 2000: 180)  A proper understanding of 
MBD1 and MBD2 indicates that at least sometimes it matters to what the contents of 
one’s visual experience are not just how things look, but which things look how, as it 
were.43 
We need not reject the claim that there is a mirroring relation between looks-
states and the contents of experience.  These considerations allow that there might be 
such a relation.  Instead, they suggest that we should reject the claim that the relevant 
looks-states are states of things-looking-X.  Rather the mirroring relation would obtain 
between the contents of experiences and states in which particular things look X. 
Since the perceptual facts make a difference to the contents your experience it is 
false that if an experience were different with respect to its perceptual status, then, were 
the phenomenal character of the experience held fixed, its content would remain the 
same.  The perceptual facts play a role in fixing the contents of visual experiences.  The 
contents of the experiences you have in MBD1 and MBD2 differ because the experiences 
                                                 
43 The inference to this sentence from the previous one is a substantial one and depends on rejecting 
Searle’s theory of the contents of visual experiences.  However, I’d like to table a discussion of Searle for 
the time being.  If you cannot wait, please consult Part 2 of this chapter for much more. 
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possess different perceptual statuses.  In MBD1, the experience is part of an episode of 
perceiving one set of blue dots.  In MBD2, the experience is part of an episode of 
perceiving another set of blue dots.  Accordingly, the veridicality of the two experiences 
depends on the states of different objects. 
Properly understood to be non-veridical, cases like MBD1 warrant the conclusion 
that when you are seeing something, the content of your experience requires that the seen 
thing possess such-and-such features if your experience is to be veridical.  Consequently, 
they warrant the conclusion visual experiences have different contents in different 
perceptual circumstances.44  In particular, they warrant the conclusion that two different 
perceptual experiences might differ in their contents, only because they are embedded in 
different perceptual relations. 
But what should we think about hallucinatory experiences?  Once we have 
allowed that the contents of an experience might vary with changes in perceptual status 
we open the possibility that hallucinatory experiences might typically have contents that 
differ from the contents of their perceptual counterparts.  All we need to allow for the 
possibility of veridical hallucination is that a hallucinatory experience can depend for its 
veridicality on the states of unseen objects.  This does not tell us very much about the 
behavior of contents of hallucinatory experiences. 
One hypothesis that is consistent with current constraints is this: hallucinatory 
experiences have contents that satisfy the Variety Condition.  An experience satisfies the 
Variety Condition if and only it can be made true, its content held fixed, by a variety of 
possible objects.  For example, suppose that your experience, as you look at Fred, 
satisfies the Variety Condition.  It follows that while the state of Fred might make your 
                                                 
44 Again, the implication here depends on the falsehood of Searle’s view. 
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experience veridical, the state of Fred’s qualitative twin could also have made that 
experience veridical.  Such contents prescind from the synchronic identities.45 
 On this account, hallucinatory experiences possess only the kind of contents 
McGinn and Davies think all visual experiences possess.  In doing so they affirm what is 
sometimes called the Generality Thesis.  McGinn claims that “the content of experience 
is not to be specified by using any terms that refer to the object of experience.” (McGinn 
1982: 51) This claim is sometimes explicated by invoking the idea of quantification: 
“…we can take the content of perceptual experience to be existentially quantified 
content.  A visual experience may present the world as containing an object of a certain 
size and shape, in a certain direction, at a certain distance from the subject” (Davies 
1992: 26)   
His acceptance of the claim that every experience satisfies the Variety Condition 
explains McGinn’s talk of existential quantification.  Sentences containing existential 
quantification bear on particulars in a way that is analogous to the way an experience 
satisfying the Variety Condition bears on its objects.  Consider, for example, the 
sentence: 
 
(S1) The red-haired girl mowed the lawn.   
 
On Russell’s analysis, S1 has the same meaning as: 
 
  (S2) There is exactly one relevant red-haired girl and she mowed the lawn.   
 
Now given that it is contingent which among all the possible things is a relevant red-
headed girl, S1 and S2 could be made true by ever so many things.  Even if you hold 
                                                 
45 Experience can prescind from synchronic identities while not prescinding from diachronic identities. 
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fixed the contents of sentences like S1 and S2, their being about one thing rather than 
another is contingent.46  Suppose that in the actual world there is exactly one relevant red-
headed girl, Sally, and she mowed the lawn.  Suppose that in another world there is 
exactly one relevant red-headed girl, Frieda, and she mowed the lawn.  What I would 
have said by an actual utterance of S2 would be true at the actual world and at the 
possible world in which Frieda mowed the lawn.  Now we can see the point of claiming 
that visual experiences have quantificational contents.  Just as S1 and S2 can be made 
true by Frieda, they can also be made true by Sally.  That this is so is explained by the 
semantic function performed by existential quantification.  Likewise, since the contents 
of visual experiences satisfying the Variety Condition can be made true by a variety of 
possible objects it is not surprising that people use talk of existential quantification to 
express the Generality Thesis. 
 So while I doubt that all the contents of every experience satisfy the Variety 
Condition – in particular, I doubt that perceptual experiences satisfy the Variety 
Condition – it is possible that hallucinatory experiences possess contents that do.  Thus it 
is possible that hallucinatory experiences have contents in virtue of which veridical 
hallucination is possible.  Your experience as of a plaid wall, when hallucinatory, might 




                                                 
46 Whether the same is true of sentences containing rigidified descriptions in their quantificational phrases 
would require looking into the difference between counterpart theory and theories according to which there 
is a primitive relation of transworld identity. 
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1.3: THE DEFENSE OF VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION AND THE ARGUMENT 
FROM COMPETING OBJECTS 
 
My solution to the problem posed by Soteriou’s Argument raises trouble for the 
second chief Gricean argument, the Argument from Competing Objects.  Like the 
Argument from Veridical Hallucination, the Argument from Competing Objects is both 
destructive and constructive.  Grice invokes cases in which one’s experience matches two 
objects – only one of which is seen.  These cases are supposed to establish that 
experience-object matches are insufficient for seeing a thing and warrant the hypothesis 
that causal dependence is a partial constituent of the seeing relation. 
The prima facie problem is this: what allowed for the possibility of veridical 
hallucination was the possibility that hallucinatory experiences possess contents that can 
be made true by a variety of possible objects.  Cases like MBD1 suggest that the same is 
not true of perceptual experiences.  That is, cases like MBD1 suggest that perceptual 
experiences are not such that a variety of possible objects could make them true.  The 
worry here is that the Argument from Competing Objects is unsound.  It supposes that 
something impossible is possible.  
As it will turn out, what attitude we should take about the Argument from 
Competing Objects depends on the relationship between the contents of hallucinatory 
experiences and the contents of perceptual experiences. 
Let’s look in some detail at the Argument from Competing Objects.  I’ll start with 
Grice’s statement of it: 
 
…it might be that it looked to me as if there were a certain sort of pillar in a 
certain direction at a certain distance, and there might actually be such a pillar in 
that place; but if, unknown to me, there were a mirror interposed between me and 
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the pillar, which reflected a numerically different though similar pillar, it would 
certainly be incorrect to say that I saw the first pillar, and correct to say that I saw 
the second. (Grice 1961: ) 
 
Formalizing a bit (and changing from ‘I’ to ‘you’) we get: 
 
(1)  There is a possible situation, s, in which: 
(1.1) you are subject to some experience, e, with match-
determining character, M. 
   (1.2)  There are two objects, a and b. 
(1.3)  a and M are such that there is a perfect match between e 
and a. 
(1.4)  a does not causally explain the truth of 1.3. 
(1.5) b and M are such that there is a perfect match between e 
and b. 
(1.6)  b does causally explain the truth of 1.5. 
    (1.7)  In s, you do not see a, but you do see b. 
 
So   (2)  The truth of 1.3 is insufficient to make it true that you see a. 
 
Moreover (3) The truth of 1.7 is probably constitutionally explained by the  
truth of 1.4 and 1.6. 
 
Thus, Grice argues that it is insufficient for seeing a thing that your experience match it.  
What you need, in order that you might see a thing, is that your experience causally 
depend on it.  Thus we get the causal theory of perception. 
 The worry here is that 1.5 and 1.7 are not genuinely co-possible.  If so, 1 is false 
and the Argument from Competing Objects is unsound.  Remember, we’re understanding 
matching in terms of veridicality and veridicality in terms of truth.  Thus the Argument 
from Competing Objects depends on the supposition that it is possible for a perceptual 
experience to be made true by two distinct objects, one of which is seen and one of which 
is unseen.  The denial that 1.3 and 1.5 are co-possible is the denial that it is possible for a 
perceptual experience to be made true by two distinct objects, one of which is seen and 
one of which is unseen. 
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 What grounds are there for thinking that a perceptual experience could not be 
made true by two distinct objects, one of which is seen and one of which is unseen?  The 
argument here is simple.  Consideration of MBD1 suggests that perceptual experiences 
have contents that do not satisfy the Variety Condition.  Moreover, MBD1 suggests that 
whether a perceptual experience is veridical depends on what features the objects of the 
perceptual episode of which it is a part possess.  Now, suppose that perceptual 
experiences have only contents that do not satisfy the Variety Condition and suppose that 
these contents do not bear on unseen objects.47  If so, it will be impossible for an 
experience to be made true by two distinct objects, one of which is seen and one of which 
is unseen. 
 It might be helpful to consider a linguistic analogy here.  Consider the following 
sentence: 
 
 (S4) Claudius is status-conscious. 
 
 
Whether S4 is true depends on the state of Claudius.  Whether it is true at a world 
depends on Claudius’ state at that world.  He is the truth-maker for S4.  Now what about 
Fred?  Suppose Fred is also status-conscious.  Does S4 match Fred?  Holding the content 
of S4 fixed, Fred’s status-consciousness has no direct bearing on the truth of S4.  Since 
S4’s content does not satisfy the linguistic analog to the Variety Condition, it cannot be 
made true by Fred.  The worry about the Argument from Competing Objects stems from 
the thought that the contents of perceptual experiences are like the content of S4.  They 
cannot be made true by a variety of possible objects. 
                                                 
47 Ignoring, for the time being, the bearing a visual experience might have on the unperceived perceiving 
subject. 
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 The problem with the Argument from Competing Objects is that if b is seen and a 
is not, then there cannot be a match between a and e.  Giving this a representational gloss, 
a cannot make e true.  1.3 is false if 1.7 is true.  We therefore have reason to think the 
Argument from Competing Objects is unsound.   
 
1.4: SHIFTING CONTENTS: REPLACEMENT AND ADDITION 
Before I evaluate the objection to the Argument from Competing Objects, I’d like 
to return for a moment to my defense of the Argument from Veridical Hallucination.  The 
move I made there was to raise the possibility that, while the contents of perceptual 
experiences do not satisfy the Variety Condition, the contents of at least some 
hallucinatory experiences do.  Such hallucinatory experiences would then be apt to match 
a variety of possible objects (thereby allowing for the possibility of Veridical 
Hallucination).  The contents of an experience shift as its perceptual status shifts.  
 But I have yet to say much about what this shift consists in.  In particular, the shift 
could consist either in replacement or in addition.  The shift in contents consists in an 
addition if all experiences possess contents that satisfy the variety condition (and thus, 
given these contents could be veridical hallucinations), but perceptual experiences also 
possess some contents that do not satisfy the Variety Condition.  The shift in contents 
consists in replacement if only hallucinatory experiences possess contents satisfying the 
Variety Condition, while their perceptual counterparts possess contents that do not satisfy 
the Variety Condition.  Whether shifting is effected by replacement or addition, there is 
trouble for the Argument from Competing Objects. 
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 If the shift consists in replacement, then the problem with the Argument from 
Competing Objects is acute.  If the shift consists in replacement, then no perceptual 
experience that is part of an episode of seeing one thing could be veridical at all with 
respect to another, unseen thing.  That is, no perceptual experience of x could be made 
even in part true by y – where y is in fact unseen.   
If the shift consists in addition, then no perceptual experience that is part of an 
episode of seeing one thing could veridical without qualification with respect to another, 
unseen thing.  That is, no perceptual experience of x could be made entirely true by y – 
where y is in fact unseen.  Some of the contents of the perceptual experience of x could 
be made true by y – those contents satisfying the Variety Condition.  However, other 
contents cannot be made true by y – those contents that, in virtue of the perceptual facts, 
can only be made true by x.  Thus, if the shift consists in replacement, then not every 
content of a perceptual experience could be made true by unseen objects.  Of course, for 
all this, the view that shifting consists in addition, allows that some of the contents of a 
perceptual visual experience might be made true by unseen objects.  
 Now, given the argument of the previous two paragraphs, it ought to be surprising 
that we can imagine what is, apparently, impossible – that a perceptual experience might 
match two objects equally.  If this is not really possible, then what are we imagining? 
One might hold out hope that there is room to maneuver if shifting is addition.  
We can, I think, conceive of an experience without regard to whether or which object is 
perceived in the episode of which it is a part.  When we do so, we can have some grip on 
its contents – we can conceive of it as possessing such contents as satisfy the Variety 
Condition.  That we can do this suggests that the view that shifting is addition is correct.  
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There is some subset of the contents of a perceptual experience that can be held fixed – 
and assessed for veridicality relative to multiple objects – even as we suspend judgment 
about which perceptual facts obtain.  Thus, while an experience might not be such that all 
its contents are made true by a variety of possible objects, perhaps when we contemplate 
the possibility envisioned in the Argument from Competing Objects we pick out the 
contents of a visual experience that can be made true by a variety of possible objects – 
namely, those contents that are shared with the hallucinatory counterparts of these 
perceptual experiences. 
Perhaps, then, we can imagine an experience that matches two objects equally, 
while also imagining that the experience is a perception of one but not the other (though 
remaining in temporary suspense about which object is perceived).  Presumably this 
imaginative project determines a possibility of some sort – the possibility that an 
experience might possess some contents in virtue of which two objects match it, only one 
of which is seen.  However, this possibility is of no use to Grice.  It doesn’t establish that 
matching is insufficient for seeing, at best it establishes that a partial match is insufficient 
for seeing.  If the case for the insufficiency of matching accounts of seeing rested entirely 
on the Argument from Competing Object, then it would not succeed.   
 
1.5: THE POSSIBILITY THAT INVOKING CAUSAL DEPENDENCE IS 
GRATUITOUS 
 
The response I gave to the Soteriou’s argument that veridical hallucination is 
impossible, might lead one to think that invoking causal dependence – or some close 
cousin of it – is gratuitous.  If our theoretical goal in giving an account of the perceiving 
relation is to discover some feature that distinguishes perceptions from hallucinations or 
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perceptions of one thing from perceptions of another, then, given how I suggest the 
perceptual facts relate to facts about the contents of experience, we can find success 
immediately.  In honor of Boris Kment, who first suggested such a view to me in 
conversation, I’ll call this Kment’s Suggestion.48 
If there is some kind of content that all and only perceptual experiences – that is, 
experiences that are parts of episodes of seeing – possess, then it is possible to give an 
extensionally adequate account of the distinction between seeing and hallucinating.  
Episodes of seeing could be distinguished from episodes of hallucination by their 
possession of this kind of content.     
 While hallucinatory experiences have only contents that satisfy the Variety 
Condition, perceptual experiences have contents that do not satisfy the Variety Condition.  
As it stands, such an account would distinguish cases of seeing from cases of 
hallucination, though it wouldn’t distinguish cases of seeing one thing from cases of 
seeing another thing.  It might, however, be readily extended to distinguish such cases.  
Seeing x is distinguishable from seeing a distinct thing, y, insofar as x is the relevant 
truth-maker for the experience that is part of seeing x, while y is the relevant truth-maker 
for the experience that is part of seeing y.  Episodes of seeing x could be distinguished 
from episodes of seeing y by the contents of the experiences involved in each. 
 There are two problems for this line of thought.  First, it is not clear that 
hallucinatory experiences must possess only contents satisfying the Variety Condition.  
Hallucinatory experiences of the sort invoked in cases of veridical hallucination are not 
hallucinations of particular objects (even if, to their victims, they seem to be perceptions 
                                                 
48 Of course, he gave no indication of believing that Kment’s Suggestion represented his actual view of the 
matter. 
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of particular objects).  An external observer (someone who is not subject to the 
hallucination) would not give a de re report of the experience – he would not say “Sally 
[or something the external observer takes to be a denizen of the actual world] is such that 
Fred [the victim of the hallucination] experiences her to be brown-haired”.  Such 
hallucinatory experiences have objects only in the sense in which the fountain of youth 
was the object of Ponce De Leon’s quest.   
However, if I had to guess, actual hallucinations frequently have particular things 
as their objects.  Someone can, for example, hallucinate his own mother.49  In describing 
this person’s predicament, one might say “Fred’s mom is such that Fred experiences her 
to be brown-haired.”  It is plausible that such hallucinations involve experiences that 
depend for their veridicality on the states of the existing hallucinated object.  Some 
support for this comes from the possibility that someone might mis-hallucinate his own 
mother – in being subject to experience that represents her as brown-haired when really 
she is red-headed.  It is plausible that this is what is going on when someone reports a 
dream by saying things like “I dreamt my mother was there… only it wasn’t my mother 
(because the woman I dreamed about had brown hair).”  That someone might mis-
hallucinate his mother suggests that it is possible to have hallucinatory experiences that 
depend for their veridicality on the state of particular things.50  This line of thought 
                                                 
49 Mark Johnston adverts to this fact, in a different dialectical context, in his article, “The Obscure Object 
of Hallucination”.  (Johnston 2004: 129) 
50 A philosopher might hold that it is not, strictly speaking, the content of the hallucinatory experience of 
one’s mother that entails that it is one’s mother that is the object of a hallucination.  Perhaps, for example, 
all that is given in the content of the experience is that there is some woman who is such-and-such and the 
subject takes that woman to be his mother.  What constitutes the episode as a hallucination of the mother is 
an intellectual act – the act of judging that the thing that is such-and-such (as given in experience) is the 
mother.  In other words, the of-ness of a hallucination is not the of-ness of the contents of the experience 
that is part of it.  On this line of thought, the phenomenon I’ve called ‘mis-hallucination’ would have to be 
understood as a hybrid state.  That is it consists of a hallucinatory experience the content of which, like the 
contents of veridical hallucinatory experiences, satisfies the Variety Condition, together with a judgment 
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supports the claim that we cannot generally distinguish hallucinatory experiences from 
non-hallucinatory experiences by their contents.  It is not a necessary condition on being 
a hallucinatory experience that it possess only contents satisfying the Variety Condition. 
Suppose we set aside this first doubt about Kment’s Suggestion.  Even then, there 
is a problem.  The goal is not just to pick some feature that all and only perceptual 
experiences of some particular posses, it is also to discover what constitutes an episode as 
an episode of perceiving some particular.  If the arguments of Chapter 2 are correct, then 
among the features all and only episodes of perception possess is the feature of involving 
an experience that counterfactually depends on states of objects.  If the line of resistance 
to Soteriou’s argument is correct, then among the features all and only episodes of 
perceiving x possess, is a content that depends for its veridicality on x.  At the very least, 
if we follow Kment’s Suggestion, we’ll have an incomplete theory of perception.   
However, I’d like to argue for a stronger conclusion: the fact that experiences 
possess the kinds of contents I’ve described in this section, is a mere consequence of the 
perceptual facts, rather than a constituting determinant of the perceptual facts.  The 
problem with supposing, as Kment’s Suggestion suggests, that facts about the contents of 
experience are constitutive determinants of the perceptual facts is that it rules out certain 
kinds of permissible explanation.  It is an interesting question: why does this experience 
have this kind of content – why does its veridicality depend on Elizabeth rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the thing apparently perceived is the mother.  The misrepresentation of the mother occurs not in 
experience but in judgment – in judging (based on the experience) that the mother is brown-haired. 
 The possibility of radical mis-hallucination lowers the odds that the view described in this 
footnote is correct.  One might mis-hallucinate one’s mother and in doing so misrepresent her almost 
entirely.  One might have a dream in which one’s mother was a fragile vase that required transport through 
crowded streets.  Now, according to the hybrid account of mis-hallucination, this would have to be a case in 
which one judged, based on one’s experience, that the vase was one’s mother.  However, since this 
judgment would be deeply crazy (if the experience did not already purport to reveal your mother), it is 
preferable to reject the hybrid view and claim that it was the content of your experience that was crazy and 
not your faculty of judgment. 
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Elaine?  It is permissible to answer the question by adverting to the perceptual facts.  But 
if the fact that the veridicality of an experience depends on Elizabeth rather than Elaine 
constituted an experience as part of an episode of perceiving Elizabeth, then this 
explanation would be impermissible.  It would purport to explain something by covertly 
invoking that very fact. 
 
1.6: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In defending the possibility of veridical hallucination from Soteriou’s argument I 
suggested that the perceptual facts play a role in determining the veridicality conditions 
of experiences.  That an experience is hallucinatory allows that it might have contents 
that satisfy the Variety Condition.  That an experience is part of an episode of seeing 
something makes it true that its veridicality depends on the states of the seen thing – 
rather than the states of unseen things.  I have argued that the perceptual facts play a 
proto-semantic role – that is, they are among the constitutive determinants of the contents 
of visual experiences.  This allowed us to resist Soteriou’s push from accepting the 
possibility of veridical hallucination to accepting the possibility of veridical 
misperception. 
 It has the consequence that whatever principles would get one from accepting the 
possibility of veridical hallucination to accepting the possibility of misperception must be 
rejected.  Interestingly, this means that insofar as we accept the view I’ve presented in 
Part 1 we have reason to reject even fairly weak versions of the thought that the content 
of visual experience is a phenomenological matter.  For example, we have reason to 
reject the idea that if an experience were different with respect to its perceptual status, 
 111
then, were the phenomenal character of the experience held fixed, its content would 
remain the same.  Thus, contrary to what McGinn and Davies hold, the contents of visual 
experiences are not simply postulates in the attempt to account for the phenomenology of 
visual experience.  The idea of a visual content serves other functions. 
 I have suggested a strategy for accounting for intuitions about the veridicality of 
your experience in MBD1, while allowing for the possibility of veridical hallucination.  
This strategy gives a partial account of the proto-semantics of visual experiences.  That 
is, it gives us some information about what constitutes an experience as possessing 
contents of a certain sort.  This is an externalist theory.  Externalists about some feature, 
F, characteristically claim that whether a creature possesses F depends on facts about how 
the creature is related to its environment.  Your experience in MBD1 depends for its 
veridicality on the states of the four objects to which you bear the seeing relation.  It 
depends for its veridicality on the states of those objects because the content it possesses 
depends on the perceptual facts.  Since whether you bear the seeing relation to an object 
depends on your relation to the environment external to you, it follows that externalism 
about the contents of visual experience is true.  The contents of your experience depend 




SEARLE AND VERIDICAL HALLUCINATION: ARE SEEING RELATIONS 
REPRESENTED IN THE CONTENTS OF VISUAL EXPERIENCES? 
 
In Part 1 I suggested a partial account of the proto-semantics of visual experiences 
according to which the veridicality of an experience can depend on the perceptual facts 
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because the contents of an experience depend on the perceptual facts.  Searle would reject 
this claim and the inferences that support it.  On his view, the veridicality of an 
experience depends on the perceptual facts because the contents of experiences represent 
the obtaining of those perceptual facts.  This means that instead of giving a proto-
semantic account of the data, Searle gives a semantic account of the data.  Accordingly, 
on Searle’s view, veridical hallucination is an impossibility.  Thus, Searle is committed to 
thinking that the Argument from Veridical Hallucination is unsound.  The goal of this 
section is to present and evaluate Searle’s challenge to the possibility of veridical 
hallucination. 
 
2.1: SEARLE’S ACCOUNT 
Searle accepts a version of the Generality Thesis that implies (correctly) that your 
experience in MBD1 is non-veridical, but rules out the possibility of veridical 
hallucination.  Additionally, Searle’s view has the attractive feature of allowing us to give 
into the temptation to suppose that if an experience were different with respect to its 
perceptual status, then, were the phenomenal character of the experience held fixed, its 
content would remain the same.   
Searle represents the content of the experience you might have as you look at a 
yellow station wagon as follows: 
 
Vis Exp (There is a yellow station wagon there and the fact that there is a yellow 
station wagon there is causing this visual experience). (Searle 1983: 48) 
 
 
Thus, on Searle’s view, visual experiences represent not only distal conditions (how 
things are with the environment), but also perception-grounding relations between 
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themselves and these distal conditions.  Contrast Searle with the externalist, who might 
represent the same experience as follows: 
 
Vis Exp (That, there, is a yellow station wagon). 
 
 
On this externalist picture, experience represents only what might be called ‘distal 
conditions’.  In answering the question of whether the requisite distal conditions obtain 
we need only ask questions like the following: Is the car yellow?  Is it a car?  Is it shaped 
in such-and-such a way?  Does it relate to its surroundings in such-and-such a way?  Is it 
such-and-such a distance from you?  Etc. 
The best way to understand Searle’s theory is to see what analysis of MBD1 it 
would provide.  On a theory of visual content according to which experience represents 
perception-grounding conditions, the experience you have is non-veridical because the 
perception-grounding conditions it represents as being fulfilled aren’t fulfilled. 
Such content would probably work something like this:  Experience represents, 
first of all, an environment populated with objects at various locations around the viewer.  
Second, picking out an object by location, it represents itself as causally depending on 
that object.  There appearing to be an object at that location is represented as being 
causally dependent (in the right way) on that object.  Finally, it represents these objects as 
possessing some sensible features.  Thus, visual experiences represent themselves as 
being caused in the right way by objects located in the environment. 
Your experience in MBD1 requires two things in order to be veridical.  First, it 
requires that there be blue dots at some locations – call them L1, L2, L3, and L4.  
Second, it requires that the appearance of there being a blue dot at L1 causally depend on 
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a blue dot at L1, the appearance of there being a blue dot at L2 causally depend on the 
blue dot at L2, and so on.  Thus, experiences represent both distal conditions and 
relations between themselves and those distal conditions. 
Searle’s account, like the externalist account (according to which the contents of 
an experience can depend on the perceptual facts) rules out the possibility of veridical 
misperception.  It correctly predicts that your experience in MBD1 is non-veridical – and 
so is consistent with the judgments of common sense.  Your experience turns out to be 
non-veridical in MBD1 because it requires – for example – that some blue dot at L2 be 
causally responsible (in the right way) for its own requirement that there be a blue dot at 
L2.  However, since the distorting lenses are in place, the dot at L2 is not responsible for 
the appearance of there being a dot at L2.  Rather, some other dot – e.g. the one at L1 – is 
causally responsible for the appearance.  Your experience is non-veridical because it 
misrepresents the relationship between your experience and the dots.   
 How does Searle’s account rule out the possibility of veridical hallucination?  
First, Searle’s account is supposed to be entirely general, that is every visual experience 
is such that it requires for its veridicality that such-and-such distal facts obtain and that 
perception-grounding relations connect the obtaining of those facts and the appearance 
that those distal facts obtain.  This means that every hallucination misrepresents the facts.  
Since an episode of hallucination is an episode in which the perception-grounding 
relations do not connect one’s experience and the facts, every hallucinatory experience 
must be non-veridical.  Consequently, any argument that depends on the possibility of 
veridicality of veridical hallucination must be unsound. 
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Searle’s account also has the consequence that the Argument from Competing 
Objects is unsound.  If it is to be sound, the Argument from Competing Objects requires 
that an unseen distal object could be a truth-maker for an experience.  However, so long 
as the obtaining of perception-grounding relations to distal objects is among the 
veridicality conditions of an experience, no unseen distal object could make an 
experience veridical.  An unseen object is such that the perception-grounding relations do 
not obtain between it and an experience.  Thus, if (as Searle requires) a veridical 
experience bears the perception-grounding relations to its objects, then no experience can 
be made veridical by a distal object which is also unseen.  Consequently, Searle cannot 
accept the Argument from Competing Objects. 
 
2.2: ASSESSING SEARLE 
In this context, whether it is reasonable to accept the possibility of veridical 
hallucination (and whether, therefore, the possibility of veridical hallucination is to 
function as a constraint on our account of the contents of visual experiences) depends on 
the comparative acceptability of my externalist proposal and Searle’s account of the 
content of visual experiences.  What reason is there to prefer Searle’s account?  Is there 
reason to dis-prefer it? 
 Searle’s main explicit reasons for accepting his theory are its obviousness (once 
entertained), its utility in solving what Searle takes to be outstanding philosophical 
problems, and its roots in the Gricean arguments.  (Searle 1983: 48-50)  Appeals to 
obviousness are of limited epistemic force and, at any rate,  it is not clear that Searle’s 
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account is obvious – given the controversy it has sparked.51  Let us, then, evaluate 
Searle’s account in light of more substantial considerations. 
It is a bit surprising that Searle references the Gricean arguments, since we have 
just seen that if Searle’s account is correct, then neither the Argument from Veridical 
Hallucination nor the Argument from Competing Objects can be sound.  Thus, an ad 
hominem case can be made against Searle.  His own view is self-undermining in the sense 
that its acceptance is inconsistent with accepting some of the arguments he cites as its 
sources.  Since Searle gives an explicit presentation of neither the Argument from 
Veridical Hallucination nor the Argument from Competing Objects, it is possible that his 
citation of them is an oversight on his part.  At any rate, while it is arguable that Searle’s 
citation of the Gricean arguments is inconsistent with his account (and so irrational for 
him), it is possible (for all we’ve seen so far) that his account is all-things-considered the 
best account to take nonetheless. 
Searle claims that his account of the contents of visual experiences may be 
justified by its utility in solving outstanding philosophical problems.  Evaluating the 
details of the use to which Searle puts his account would require going too far afield.  
Luckily, the primary ‘outstanding philosophical problem’ Searle thinks can be solved by 
the use of his account of visual content is the challenge posed to internalist accounts of 
mental contents by advocates of content externalism. (Searle 1983: Ch. 8) Thus we need 
not evaluate the details of the use to which he puts his account of visual experience, if we 
can find reasons that undermine either his internalism or the motivations for his 
internalism.  
                                                 
51 See the essays in (Lepore & Van Gulick 1991) for a selection of the skepticism Searle’s account has 
provoked. 
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In the context of a discussion of externalism about belief, Searle indicates the 
central role internalism is playing in his thought: 
…discussions like this can tend to degenerate into a kind of fussy scholasticism 
which conceals the basic ‘metaphysical’ assumptions at issue… Some form of 
internalism must be right because there isn’t anything else to do the job.  The 
brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves and 
everything we can use must be inside the brain. Each of our beliefs must be 
possible for a being who is a brain in a vat because each of us is precisely a brain 
in a vat; the vat is a skull and the `messages' coming in are coming in by way of 
impacts on the nervous system. (Searle 1983: 229-30) 
 
It is clear from context that Searle intends this claim to generalize over all of our content-
bearing mental states.  In particular, it is clear from context that Searle means that for any 
of our content-bearing mental states, it is possible to be in that very state – with the same 
content – were we brains in vats.  Thus, for example, Searle intends that each of our 
desires must be possible for a brain in a vat.  If each of my desires are possible for a brain 
in a vat, then, were I hallucinating, rather than seeing, I should be subject to the same 
desires.  Thus, on Searle’s line of thought, it counts in favor of his theory that according 
to it mental states are such that their contents would remain the same even if tokened in a 
hallucinating subject. 
 Indeed, the possibility of thinking thoughts with a given content – whether one is 
a victim of hallucination or not – is among the chief motivations of Searle’s 
descriptivism.   On Searle’s account, reference to particulars (other than ourselves and 
our own mental states) is secured by a particular’s satisfaction of by conditions the 
obtaining of which is part of the content of our mental states.  (Searle 1983: 17)  This has 
the advantage of allowing us to make sense of cases of reference failure without either 
postulating Meinongian entities to serve as the subjects of our thoughts or concluding that 
thoughts in which there is reference failure differ in their contents from thoughts in which 
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there is no reference failure.  Such thoughts (thoughts in which there is reference failure) 
are just false; or, if the thought is desire-like, unsatisfied.  (Searle 1983: 17)  What 
preserves their content, despite the failure of reference, is that reference to particulars is 
effected descriptively.52  Two thoughts that differ from one another insofar as in one case, 
but not the other, there is reference failure can have the same contents because the 
content of the thoughts is not reference-dependent, but rather reference-determining. 
 My assessment of Searle has two parts.  First, I examine phenomenological 
considerations that might count for or against Searle’s account.  Second, I present an 
argument in favor of my externalist account and show how it poses a challenge to 
Searle’s internalism.  It turns out that Searle’s descriptivist strategy for dealing with cases 
of reference failure cannot be applied in certain contexts. 
 
2.2.1: ASSESSING SEARLE: CONTENTS, COUNTERPARTS, AND 
PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Phenomenology is both a potential ally to the advocate of Searle’s account and a 
potential enemy.  Though Searle does not advert to this, it is an apparent virtue of his 
account that it affirms that counterparts possess identical contents.  That is, I find it prima 
facie plausible that one cost of accepting the externalist view is that, according to it, 
counterparts differ in their contents.  And so, it is prima facie a mark in favor of the 
comparative rationality of Searle’s account that it holds that counterparts share contents.  
On the other hand, critics of Searle have argued that his account suffers from its 
postulation of contents that are not phenomenologically warranted.  In this section, I will 
present and evaluate these two lines of thought.   
                                                 
52 The argument here is, of course, a reflection of Russell’s from “On Denoting”. (Russell 1905) 
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My evaluation of these lines of thought will depend on two connected ideas, 
intentionalism and the transparency of experience.  An intentionalist characteristically 
claims that there is a tight connection between the content of a mental state and its 
phenomenal character.  If visual experience is transparent, then introspecting visual 
experience reveals only features of the scene apparently revealed by visual experience.  
The claims I will be arguing for in this section are the following: The safest form of 
intentionalism is of little use to Searle.  The strongest consideration in favor of 
intentionalism does not support the thesis that counterparts share contents.  If experience 
were transparent then that might support a form of intentionalism, but not one that would 
make it reasonable to suppose that counterparts share contents.  However, even if 
experience were transparent and this gave reason to suppose that counterparts must share 
contents, it is not clear that Searle’s position is rendered all-things-considered reasonable 
by this.  The reason is this: transparency can be wielded against Searle.  However, since 
this line of attack against Searle is one that would also cause trouble for the externalist it 
does not make a difference to the comparative rationality of the positions. 
One attractive feature of Searle’s account is that it affirms, while the externalist 
theory denies, that counterparts of an experience share contents – and it does so while 
counting your experience in MBD1 as non-veridical.  Remember that counterparts are 
experiences (inhabiting nearby possible worlds) that differ from one another with respect 
to their perceptual status, but do not differ with respect to their phenomenological 
character.  The claim that counterparts share contents is sufficiently attractive that 
McGinn and Davies rely without argumentation on its truth in giving their theories of 
visual contents.  But we must do better and seek the origins of the attractiveness of this 
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claim.  If you join Davies in thinking that the notion of the content of experience is a 
phenomenological notion, then you’ll have reason to accept that counterparts share 
contents – and thus reason to find Searle’s view attractive.   
 Davies is committed to the principle that the counterparts of a perceptual 
experience share contents with it.  This claim reflects his confidence that the theoretical 
raison d’etre of a content of visual experience is to account for phenomenal differences 
and similarities among visual experiences.  In the previous part of this chapter, I argued 
that cases like MBD1 cast doubt on the thought that visual content is a phenomenological 
matter.  Indeed, they do – provided we set aside Searle’s account.  As argued previously, 
Searle’s theory does not run into trouble with veridical misperception.  It properly counts 
your experience in MBD1 as veridical.  Consequently, Searle’s account might preserve 
Davies’ claim that visual content is a phenomenological matter by allowing that 
counterparts share contents. 
What might someone mean in claiming that visual content is a phenomenological 
matter?  One thing we might mean to signal by such a claim is the acceptance of a kind of 
reductionism about phenomenal character according to which the phenomenal character 
of an experience is constituted by its contents.  Obviously, this thesis will have to be 
qualified somewhat.  In general, it is unlikely that the phenomenology of a mental state 
can be entirely constituted by its content.  This is because functionally different states 
might share contents, but differ in their phenomenology.  So, for example, a conscious 
weak desire to eat a sandwich and a conscious strong desire to eat a sandwich plausibly 
share the same content, but differ in their phenomenology.  For a more far-fetched 
example, suppose it were possible to form a judgment with the same content as a visual 
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experience.  Probably the phenomenology of these states would differ: the judgment, for 
example, would have a word-y phenomenology, while the experience would not.  
Consider, moreover, the possibility of non-conscious experiences.  While such 
experiences may well share contents with their conscious counterparts, they’ll clearly 
differ in their phenomenal character.  Part of the phenomenology of a mental state is 
determined not by its content, but by the kind of state it is – i.e. whether it is conscious, 
what sensory modality it embodies, what attitude it tokens, etc.  Thus, the claim that the 
phenomenology of an experience is constituted by its content is presumably restricted.  
That is, it should be understood to apply only to those aspects of the phenomenology of 
experience that would not already be captured by a true theory of what makes a state a 
conscious visual experience. 
 Slightly more weakly, one might affirm that contents supervene on phenomenal 
character.  This would mean, if true, that if two experiences are identical with respect to 
phenomenal character, then they are identical with respect to their contents.  If we accept 
either the claim that phenomenal character is constituted by content or the claim that 
content supervenes on phenomenal character (call them the Reductionist Theses), then 
we’re committed to thinking that counterpart experiences share contents.53  Thus, to the 
extent these claims have warrant, we have reason to accept Searle’s account. 
  The pressure here to accept that counterparts share contents derives from an 
acceptance of the thought that the contents of an experience are determined by its 
phenomenology together with the thought that counterparts are phenomenologically 
identical.  Thus, one possibility for resisting the allure of Searle’s account would be to 
                                                 
53 A much weaker claim in this neighborhood is that phenomenology provides evidence about the contents 
of visual experiences. 
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deny that counterparts need be phenomenologically identical.  Thus, one might accept not 
only externalism about the contents of visual experiences, but also externalism about 
their phenomenology; and, in so doing, diminish the appeal of Searle’s account.54 
 However, the prospects for this line of defense seem dim.  In what follows, I’ll 
use the experiences you have in MBD1 and MBD2 as representative examples.  Call the 
experience you’d have in MBD1 E1 and the experience you’d have in MBD2 E2.  The 
thought that the phenomenal characters of the two counterpart experiences, E1 and E2, 
are the same borrows some plausibility from two sources, each of which might be 
vulnerable.  The first source of the thought that E1 and E2 share phenomenal characters is 
the thesis that the phenomenal character of mental states supervenes on the internal 
physical states of the subjects of those mental states.  Except for what must be irrelevant 
differences, the states of your nervous system as you are subject to E1 and E2 are the 
same.  So if we accept the supervenience thesis, then we ought to accept that E1 and E2 
have the same phenomenal character.  However, although this is a plausible view, I have 
yet to see a good argument for the supervenience thesis, I therefore propose to set this 
consideration aside.55 
The second source of plausibility for the thesis that the phenomenal characters of 
E1 and E2 are the same lies in the indistinguishability of E1 and E2.  It is probably true 
that E1 and E2 are indistinguishable by introspection.  This (along with the claim that 
indistinguishable mental states must possess the same phenomenal character) yields the 
                                                 
54 Mike Martin’s disjunctivism, which I discussed in Chapter 1, is a form of externalism about phenomenal 
character. 
55 At any rate, the supervenience of phenomenology on internal physical states probably derives whatever 
warrant it possesses from considerations of indistinguishability, which I consider next.  So an evaluation of 
this claim should give way to an evaluation of the role of indistinguishability in determining phenomenal 
character. 
 123
conclusion that E1 and E2 must have identical phenomenal characters.  Thus, since there 
is reason to believe that E1 and E2 share phenomenal characters, there is reason to think 
that they must have identical veridicality conditions (if we accept the Reductionist 
Theses).  Suppose, however, it were true that two states might be indistinguishable and 
yet differ with respect to their phenomenal character.  If this were true, then we could 
defuse resistance to the thesis that E1 and E2 possess different veridicality conditions.  
We could accept that E1 and E2 are indistinguishable and we could accept the 
identification of phenomenal character and content, but could resist the conclusion that 
E1 and E2 must differ in their veridicality conditions. 
However, this line of reasoning is problematic.  The notion of phenomenal 
character is a philosophical invention and the claim that indistinguishable experiences 
might differ in their phenomenal character departs too far from the uses to which 
phenomenal character has been put.  A bare denial that indistinguishable experiences 
share phenomenal characters cannot stand by itself.  What I mean is this: if you would 
like to affirm the sentence “experiences might be indistinguishable but not share 
phenomenal characters”, you should replace the reference to phenomenal character with 
reference to whatever it is that you really care about (and what might normally be 
associated with phenomenal character).  The position of someone who denies that 
indistinguishable experiences need be phenomenologically identical, is a bit like that of 
someone who denies that God is perfectly good.  Since perfect goodness is criterial for 
being God, such a person should probably instead assert that the supremely-powerful 
world-creator is at least a little bit bad.56   
                                                 
56 Using indistinguishability as a criteria of type-identity for phenomenal characters is not philosophically 
unproblematic.  In particular, doubts have been raised that distinguishability is transitive.  If it is not 
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I’d rather not leave this as a bare terminological stipulation.  Luckily, we can get 
some very minimal traction on the issue here.  E1 and E2 are indistinguishable.  
Consequently, the way E1 seems and the way E2 seems are the same.  If these states 
seem the same, then what it is like to be in them must be the same.  If what it is like to be 
in E1 and what it is like to be in E2 are the same, then E1 and E2 are the same with 
respect to their phenomenal character.57  Unless you are willing to abandon the idea that 
the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by what it is like to be subject 
to that experience, then you must accept that E1 and E2 possess the same phenomenal 
character. 
It is highly probable that E1 and E2 share phenomenal characters and so now, if 
we want to resist those attractions of Searle’s account that derive from its drawing a tight 
connection between phenomenology and content, we must look elsewhere.  Of course, if 
the Reductionist Theses are false, then the advocate of Searle’s account can find no 
support in them.  Indeed, the Reductionist Theses are widely doubted.58  The primary 
obstacle to accepting the Reductionist Theses comes from the conjunction of thorough-
going externalism about the contents of mental states with internalism about phenomenal 
character.  The content of an experience cannot supervene on its phenomenal character if 
the content does not supervene on internal states while the phenomenal character does.  
(Davies 1997: 323) 
                                                                                                                                                 
transitive, then it cannot be criterial for identity, since the identity relation is transitive.  However, see Delia 
Graff’s article, “Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites” for a review and resolution of these doubts.  (Graff 
2001) 
57 Eric Lormand’s article, The Explanatory Stopgap, provides one way of making sense of the connection 
between the way a mental state seems and what it is like.  (Lormand 2005) 
58 Andy Egan and James John’s manuscript, “A Puzzle About Perception”, provides a nice summary of the 
chief complaints against the identification of phenomenal character and representational content. 
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Given Davies’ acceptance of the thesis that visual content is a phenomenological 
matter, he has some explaining to do.  His solution to the problem is to suppose that the 
kind of supervenience postulated between content and phenomenal character and the kind 
of supervenience at issue in debates about content externalism are different.59  In 
particular, they differ with respect to their modal strength.  The supervenience at issue in 
debates about content externalism is what could be called across-worlds supervenience – 
which requires that necessarily “[if] x has …property F in possible world w1, and y is a 
duplicate in w2 of x (in w1), then y has F in w2.” (Davies 1997: 313) The supervenience 
required for making good on the idea that visual content is a phenomenological matter 
could be called within-a-world supervenience for which it is necessary and sufficient that 
necessarily “[if] x has …property F in possible world w, and y is a duplicate in w of x, 
then y has F in w.” (Davies 1997: 312) (Davies 1997: 323)  Thus, on Davies account, 
even if content does not supervene across-worlds on internal states of creatures, the 
standard counterexamples (twin earths, inversions, and the like) do not establish that it 
doesn’t supervene within-a-world.   
Within-a-world supervenience of F on G, does not require that every possible 
thing that is identical with respect to being G be identical with respect to being F.  It only 
requires that world-mates that are twins with respect to G be twins with respect to F.  
When Davies claims that within-a-world supervenience is sufficient for making it true 
that visual content is a phenomenal matter, he is surely overstating things a bit (which is 
lucky for the advocate of Searle’s view because within-a-world supervenience is too 
attenuated to imply that counterparts share contents).  At the very least, if visual content 
                                                 
59 Davies borrows this strategy from McFetridge, who deploys it in defense of moral realism.  (McFetridge 
1985) 
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is a phenomenal matter, phenomenal twins in nearby possible worlds would be twins with 
respect to their contents.  Whatever makes it true that F within-a-world supervenes on G 
should surely make it true that in nearby possible worlds G-twins would be F-twins.  
Consequently, we should expect that within-a-world supervenience is accompanied by a 
restricted version of across-worlds supervenience – according to which in some restricted 
domain of possible worlds (the nearby ones) F-twins are G-twins.  Presumably, whatever 
substantive theory of the relation between content and phenomenal character (the theory 
that determines which contents supervene on which phenomenal characters) would 
determine which worlds count as nearby.60, 61 
The state of play, then, is this: the safest form of intentionalism is probably not 
committed to much more than the claim that counterparts share contents.  Thus, it is not 
clear how it could serve as an independent motivation for the claim that counterparts 
share contents.  In light of this, perhaps it would be best to proceed by seeking and 
evaluating the evidential roots of intentionalism.  Why are the Reductionist Theses 
attractive – whether they are true or false – and can the roots of their attractiveness make 
it reasonable to accept Searle’s account of the contents of visual experiences? 
Intentionalism may be motivated by engaging in an imaginative project in which 
one imagines changes to the introspected character of visual experiences and the 
                                                 
60 Interestingly, Ludlow has argued (in effect) that the contents of propositional attitudes do not even 
within-a-world supervene on our internal states.  (Ludlow 1995)  Ludlow argues that changes in linguistic 
community – which can be a simple matter of switching from discourse with speakers of American English 
to discourse with speakers of British English  – determine changes in the contents of our propositional 
attitudes.  His arguments, however, cannot be naturally extended to cover the contents of visual 
experiences. 
61 To be honest, I am not confident that it could ever make sense to postulate within-a-world supervenience 
without also being prepared to postulate at least some kind of across-worlds supervenience.  What 
considerations would make it reasonable to suppose that world-mate twins that are the same with respect to 
G must be the same with respect to F, but not suppose that, at least for some range of possible worlds, 
cross-world twins that are the same with respect to G must be the same with respect to F?  The only cases I 
can think of where it is reasonable to do this involve world-bound properties – e.g. being a denizen of w – 
and in these cases the obtaining of the within-a-world supervenience relation is trivial. 
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accompanying changes to their contents and vice-versa.62  Join me in fixing your 
attention on your current experience.  I am looking at a round thing and my experience 
has a certain phenomenal character to it.  Now I cannot imagine this very experience 
appearing to reveal a square thing rather than a round thing – while remaining the same 
with respect to its phenomenal character.  If I try to imagine an experience that differs 
with respect to the shape of the thing I seem to see, I imagine an experience with a 
different feel to it.  I imagine that were my experience representing different features, my 
subjectivity would be differently configured.  And vice-versa: in imagining my visual 
subjectivity differently configured, I imagine things appearing to have different features.  
This exercise in imagination seems to make it reasonable to think that there is a tight 
connection – perhaps identity – between the phenomenal character of experience and its 
contents.  Of course, by itself it does not succeed in establishing the truth any strong kind 
of reductionism.  For example, we might have independent reason to think reductionism 
is false.  For another, it is not entirely implausible that our powers of imagination are up 
to the task of capturing the kinds of cases that cast doubt on reductionisms.  
However, suppose we set aside our doubts.  Could the imaginative project above 
provide comfort to the friend of Searle’s theory who wishes to find support for Searle’s 
account in the fact that it predicts that counterparts share contents?  I think not.  We can 
accept considerations like the one above and yet affirm only that phenomenal character is 
constituted by the predicative content of visual experience.  That is: if two visual 
                                                 
62 Another motivation is derived from the thought that the Reductionist Theses provide the “last best hope” 
for materialism about consciousness.  However, as Speaks argues, there is little warrant for the 
Reductionist Theses to be found here.  (Speaks 2007: 14)  If phenomenal character and content are 
supposed the to be identical, then content cannot be any more materialistically tractable than phenomenal 
character.  One cannot, therefore, hope to get traction phenomenal character by reducing it to content.  
McGinn makes a similar argument in his article, “Consciousness and Content”.  (McGinn 1988)  It is 
arguable that McGinn and Speaks commit the intensional fallacy here. 
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experiences are identical with respect to what properties they represent things as having, 
then they are identical with respect to their phenomenal character.  Similarly, if two 
visual experiences are identical with respect to their phenomenal character, then they are 
identical with respect to their predicative content.  However, even if this were true, it 
doesn’t follow that phenomenally identical visual experiences are identical with respect 
to which particular objects they represent as bearing this or that feature.  Hence, for all 
we’ve seen so far, we might accept a kind of intentionalism, while resisting the claim that 
the phenomenal type-identity of E1 an E2 commits us to their sharing the same 
veridicality conditions.  They share the same predicative content (and this explains the 
appeal of supposing they share contents), but since they bear on different particulars, 
their contents differ.  Put another way, we do not need Searle’s account of the contents of 
experiences to account for the phenomenological similarities between E1 and E2 and so it 
cannot borrow any warrant from their phenomenological similarities. 
The dialectic of the previous two paragraphs could be reproduced by considering 
another source of plausibility for the claim that visual phenomenology determines 
contents.  Consider learning to taste a particular wine.  How does one do this?  I discover 
the content of my gustatory experience by attending to what it is like to taste the wine.  
That is, I can discover the content of my gustatory experience by engaging in the kind of 
introspective project which is supposed to bring the phenomenal character of experience 
to attention.  I try to focus on various elements of the taste and thereby focus on various 
apparent elements of the wine – it’s particular fruitiness (is it a little bit foxy?), it’s 
acidity, it’s spiciness, it’s body, it’s tannins, it’s level of alcohol, it’s butteriness, etc.  I 
can discover how my gustatory experience represents the wine by attending to what it is 
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like to taste the wine.63  So, it might seem, there must be a determination relation between 
the phenomenology of the gustatory experience and its contents.  However, this line of 
thought would establish at best only a limited kind of intentionalism – one according to 
which phenomenology is determined by some of the predicative contents of experiences. 
One way in which phenomenology is both a friend and an enemy to Searle is that 
the transparency of experience is both a friend and an enemy to Searle.  Let me first 
explain the use to which an advocate of Searle’s position might hope to put transparency.  
If visual experience is transparent, then introspecting visual experience reveals only 
features of the scene apparently revealed by visual experience.  Transparency has been 
used to support the thesis that the phenomenology of experience is constituted by its 
content, which in turn would provide warrant for the claim that counterparts share 
contents.64  This would provide just the support for Searle that I’ve been seeking in this 
section. 
Earlier I argued that indistinguishable experiences share phenomenal characters.  
The rationale for this conclusion was that such experiences are the same with respect to 
what it is like to be subject to them.  What it is like to be subject to an experience is 
determined by the face an experience reveals to introspection.  Thus, it is plausible that 
the connection between indistinguishability and phenomenal character is grounded in the 
connection between phenomenal character and introspection.   
                                                 
63 Of course, in so doing, I hope to discover two things: the objective features of the wine and the pleasures 
attainable in experiencing those objective features.  Thus in learning to taste a wine, I am intrinsically 
interested in neither the contents of my gustatory experience nor its phenomenology.  Attending to these 
things is instrumental. 
64 See Michael Tye’s article, “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience”, for a recent 
application of the argument from transparency to the thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by 
content.  (Tye 2002)  Harman’s article, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, is the contemporary source 
of this line of thought.  (Harman 1990) 
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If what is revealed by introspection determines phenomenal character and 
introspection reveals content-involving facts, then content-involving facts determine 
phenomenal character.  Suppose that visual experiences were transparent.  If visual 
experience were transparent – that is, if introspection revealed only apparent features of 
the scene apparently revealed by visual experience – then a difference in phenomenology 
would imply a difference in content.   
However, the line of thought in the previous paragraph is no utility to the 
advocate of Searle’s position – who seeks a reason to think that counterparts share 
contents.  One could accept that experience is transparent, and thereby receive warrant 
for thinking that differences in phenomenology entail differences in content, but not 
thereby receive warrant for thinking that a sameness in phenomenology entails a 
sameness in content.  Consider (for an analogy) the claim that successfully listening to 
the oracle reveals only what Apollo is saying about Greece.  This implies that if 
successfully listening to the oracle yields different experiences in two situations, then 
Apollo has said something different about Greece in those two situations.  However, even 
if successfully listening to the oracle yields the same experiences in two situations, it is 
possible that Apollo has said something different about Greece in those two situations.  
Perhaps, though you hear only Apollo’s speech about Greece by listening to the oracle, 
you do not hear everything he says about Greece in a situation by listening to the oracle.  
Maybe, for example, the oracle transmits only those of his utterances about Greece that 
are interesting to you.  Similarly, transparency would provide some warrant for thinking 
that differences of phenomenology entail differences in contents, but, since it is possible 
that introspection doesn’t reveal all the content-involving facts, it is possible to accept 
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transparency and deny that sameness of phenomenology entails sameness in contents.  
Some of the content of visual experience may well be phenomenologically silent.65   
While an advocate of Searle’s account might affirm some variety of 
intentionalism (and thereby hope to find some warrant for Searle’s account), he might 
also discover that accepting Searle’s account is inconsistent with other aspects of the 
claim that the contents of visual experiences are a phenomenological matter.  In 
particular, Searle’s account might be found to conflict with substantive theses about the 
relation between phenomenology and content.  One of the standard complaints about 
Searle’s account is that the rich descriptive contents he postulates are not reflected in the 
phenomenology of visual experience.  In particular, critics have found Searle’s claim that 
perception-grounding relations are part of the contents of visual experiences to be 
implausible on phenomenological grounds.66 
The problem here is that transparency is also a threat to Searle’s account.  
Suppose that that the transparency thesis were true.  When I seek to attend to what it is 
like to open my eyes in the presence of light it seems to me as if the phenomenal 
character of my visual experience is constituted by the scene in front of my eyes.  This 
way of putting things is liable to misinterpretation.  The phenomenology of visual 
experience is silent on its own constitution.  It is not as if my eyes were telling me “your 
experience has such and such constitution” as they might tell me “that thing there is 
                                                 
65 The argument of this paragraph and the previous one is adapted from Speaks article, “Transparency, 
Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content”.  (Speaks 2007) 
66 See (Burge 1991) and (Armstrong 1991), for example.  The phenomenological worry is not the only one 
in the neighborhood.  For example, it can seem as if representing the dependence of visual appearances on 
objects of perception is beyond the representational capacities of the visual system.  Such experiences must 
represent themselves and the dependence between themselves and states of affairs in the environment.  
However, the objection goes, this is probably beyond the powers of visual system.  Soteriou puts the point 
in a rhetorical question: “What discriminatory abilities are left unexplained if one does not include the 
causal component in the content of visual experience?”  (Soteriou 2007: 183)  
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purple”.  Rather, if I were to explain to you what it is like to look around right now, I’d 
report something like this: it is like looking at a cluttered office, full of this and that.  I’d 
report on the visual appearance of the scene in front of me.  I’d report the felt character of 
my experience this way because in attempting to focus on my experience – in 
introspecting – I find myself attending to what appear to be distal objects and their 
features.  Experience, as such, doesn’t show up as an apparent constituent of my visual 
phenomenology.  When I open my eyes and look around, and simultaneously seek to 
attend to the phenomenology of my experience, I cannot single out something which 
appears to be an experience.67  By hypothesis, the same is true of all of us.  The problem 
for Searle is supposed to be this: since experience doesn’t show up as an apparent 
constituent of visual phenomenology, its causal dependence cannot show up as an 
apparent constituent of visual phenomenology. 
If you think that only what is an apparent constituent of visual phenomenology 
can be a constituent of content and you accept the transparency of experience, then you’ll 
have reason to reject Searle’s theory.  As is not surprising, Searle himself denies that 
perception-grounding relations need be reflected in the phenomenology of visual 
experience.68 (Searle 2004: 326) (Searle 1991: 236)  On Searle’s view, some of the 
content of a visual experience contributes to the phenomenology of being subject to it.  
Some of the content does not.  That aspect of the content of experience that determines 
                                                 
67 It is important to note that this is compatible with the claim that in fact when one introspects one’s 
experience and its features are in fact objects of introspective awareness.  However, if it is true that we are 
aware of our experience and its features, then we are not aware of them as our experience and its features.  
That is, it is possible that the transparency of experience is an illusion. 
68 There is, he claims, phenomenological support for the thesis that some non-visual experiences actually 
have such contents.  He reports that in cases of tactile perception, in cases of sensing an object’s contact 
with his body, for example, it seems to him as if there is a sensation and at the same time that the sensation 
is caused by something.  “I feel the object as causing me to have this sensation.”  Thus it is possible, he 
thinks, for sensuous awareness to reflect perception-grounding contents in its phenomenology.  (Searle 
1991: 236) 
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how things look contributes to the phenomenology of experience.  That aspect of the 
content of experience that represents the perception-grounding relations does not 
normally contribute to the phenomenology of experience.  Thus he is committed to 
denying the principle that the contents of visual experiences are limited to what is 
reflected in phenomenology. 
Some reason for suspecting that visual experiences represent what is reflected in 
their phenomenal character might be found in my earlier discussion of learning to taste a 
wine.  One discovers the appearance of a thing (how it is revealed in one’s experience) by 
introspection, by attending to its phenomenal character.  This procedure would not make 
sense unless the content of one’s experience was manifest in its phenomenal character.  
However, as should be clear from earlier argumentation, this doesn’t entail that all of the 
content of visual experience is manifest in its phenomenal character.  That is, it doesn’t 
support the hypothesis that visual experiences represent only what is reflected in their 
phenomenal character. 
However, it is not clear that we need to decide whether visual experiences must 
represent only what is reflected in their phenomenal character.  The reason is this: if 
Searle suffers from postulating elements of the content of a visual experience that are not 
reflected in visual phenomenology, then so does the externalist.  According to the 
externalism I favor, there can be experiences that share phenomenal character but differ 
with respect to their contents.  Some differences in content make no phenomenal 
difference on the externalist view.  Like Searle, the externalist is committed to affirming 
that there is more to the content of experience than is reflected in the phenomenology of 
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experience (on the assumption that being reflected in the phenomenology experience 
requires being a phenomenological difference-maker). 
 It is time, then, to take stock.  We have seen that there is some reason to think that 
the predicative contents of visual experiences supervene on phenomenology.  However, 
this would not establish that counterparts must share contents since counterparts might 
share predicative contents, while differing with respect to their bearing on particulars.  
We have seen that transparency might warrant only a weak version, according to which 
phenomenological differences entail differences in content.  What the friend of Searle 
would want here is a stronger thesis according to which phenomenological type-identity 
entails content-type identity.  Additionally, while a consideration of transparency, 
together with the thesis that visual experiences must represent only what is reflected in 
their phenomenal character, would cause trouble for Searle, it would cause similar trouble 
for the externalist. 
 It seems that phenomenology is neutral with respect to the comparative rationality 
of Searle’s account and my externalist account.  Thus the advocate of Searle’s account 
will find neither consolation nor discomfort by its consideration.  While it seemed at first 
glance that it was an advantage for Searle’s account over the externalist account that his 
account allows counterparts to share contents, it is not.  Contrary to Davies and McGinn, 
it does not seem that the notion of a visual content is a phenomenological notion.  
Phenomenology plays some role in a theory of visual content (by giving evidence about 
the predicative contents of visual experiences, for example), but there are evidently other 
constraints on the postulation of contents for visual experiences, other reasons to 
postulate visual contents.  
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 For example, as we have already seen in my assessment of the veridicality of 
MBD1, one function of visual contents is to account for our judgments of veridicality.  
Thus, we have intuitive reason to suppose that your experience in MBD1 was non-
veridical.  This constrains the contents of your experience.  It tells us that whatever the 
content of your experience is, in this case, it had better depend for its veridicality on the 
states of the seen objects.  Your experience must represent them.  Thus, either it 
represents them directly – as I urge – or it must represent them indirectly (by representing 
the obtaining of conditions which they in fact satisfy) – as Searle urges.  
  
2.2.2: ASSESSING SEARLE: VISUAL CONTENTS AND THE MENTAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Some constraints on the contents of visual experiences can be argued to come 
from the relations between visual experiences and other mental states.  Accordingly, we 
can expect to find reasons to reject or accept Searle’s account by looking into the 
relations between visual experiences and other mental states.  In this section, I’ll look at 
two such cases.  First, I’ll critique an argument Searle gives for his account that rests on 
the introspectibly available differences between visual experience and visual imagination.  
Second, I’ll present an argument that casts my externalism about visual contents in a 
better light than Searle’s account.  The argument will focus on a difference the obtaining 






2.2.2.1: THE MENTAL ENVIRONMENT: DIFFERENCES AMONG 
ATTITUDES/SENSORY MODALITIES 
 
Searle thinks that some warrant may be found for his theory in the 
phenomenological differences between exercises of the visual imagination and in 
exercises of our capacity to see:   
Suppose we had the capacity to form visual images as vivid as our present visual 
experiences.  Now imagine the difference between forming such an image of the 
front of one’ house as a voluntary action, and actually seeing one’s house.  In 
each case, the purely visual content is equally vivid, so what would account for 
the difference?  The voluntarily formed images we would experience as caused by 
us, the visual experience of the house we would experience as caused by 
something independent of us.  (Searle 1983: 124)  
 
As he puts it, substantially more strongly, in a later writing: 
  
…you can indirectly bring the causal conditions of satisfaction to consciousness. 
In the case of perception there is an experienced contrast between the voluntary 
character of visual imagination, where my intention causes the visual image, and 
my actual visual perception, where I experience the visual experience as caused 
by objects in the external world.  (Searle 2004: 326) 
 
The argument here is a kind of inference to the best explanation.69  Given that being in 
the kind of mental state that issues from acts of visual imagination differs 
phenomenologically from being in the kind of mental state that results from exercises of 
the capacity to see, how best to explain the difference?  Searle thinks that if exercises of 
the capacity for seeing issued in experiences that represent perception-grounding 
relations and the same is not true of exercises of the capacity for visual imagination, then 
we could make sense of the phenomenological difference between seeing and visually 
imagining.  The phenomenology of these mental states differs because perception-
                                                 
69 It is a bit troubling that in the first quotation Searle speaks of the “purely visual content” of a visual 
experience.  Does this suggest that Searle thinks that the causal condition is not part of the purely visual 
content of a visual experience?  What distinction does Searle have in mind in suggesting a difference 
between purely visual content and content that is not purely visual?  How would such a distinction affect 
the dialectical situation? 
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grounding relations are part of the contents of visual experiences, but not part of the 
contents of the states that issue from the exercise of the visual imagination.  
 However, as I will now argue, there is reason to doubt that the attitude or sensory 
mode of a mental state is contained in its contents.  If so, we should expect that our 
knowledge of the difference between exercises of the capacity for seeing and exercises of 
the capacity for visual imagination would not depend on differences in the contents of 
these mental states.  The problem comes out most clearly in the case of desires.  If, as 
seems plausible, the content of a desire is exactly what is desired (and therefore what 
structures the actions and plans motivated by the desire), then the fact that one is desirous 
cannot be supposed to be generally part of the content of a desire.  Consider, for an 
example, the desire that I have a sandwich for lunch.  If the fact that one is desirous were 
part of the content of the desire, then the desire would be perspicuously represented by 
something like the following:  
 
Desire ( I am desiring that I eat a pulled pork sandwich).   
 
 
But this would entail that those desires we took to be first-order desires are really second-
order desires – desires to desire.  If the attitude – desiring – were itself part of the content 
of a desire, then my desire for a sandwich would, in addition to inclining me to taking the 
steps required to eat a sandwich, would incline me to maintain my desire for the 
sandwich.  But it is clearly false that no desire is a first-order desire.  We can find 
ourselves alienated from our own desires.  For example, I can find myself desiring to eat 
a pulled pork sandwich, but, at the same time, wish I could be rid of my desire (e.g. out of 
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sympathy for the plight of pigs).  I might – consistent with my desiring to eat a pulled 
pork sandwich – not desire that I desire to eat a pulled pork sandwich.70 
It might be objected that desires are special, and that mental states with different 
directions of fit work differently.  However, consider hypothesizing, which has a belief-
like different direction of fit rather than a desire-like direction of fit.  You can ordinarily 
tell whether you are entertaining a proposition in a hypothesizing way rather than in a 
believing way.  It would be very strange if the fact that one is hypothesizing were part of 
the content of one’s hypothesis was what explained this.  Consider for example 
hypothesizing that visual experience is transparent.  If the fact one is hypothesizing were 
part of the content of one’s hypothesizing state, then it could be perspicuously 
represented as follows: 
 
Hypothesize (I am hypothesizing that visual experience is transparent) 
 
If this were an explicit (and true) representation of the content of a hypothesis that visual 
experience is transparent, then we’d have trouble.  For example, we use this kind of 
hypothesis to see what would be true if visual experience were transparent.  However, if 
the content of a hypothesis were that one hypothesizes such-and-such, then we could not 
use such a mental state to see what would happen if visual experience were transparent.  
For example, since one might hypothesize what is false, the hypothesis that one 
hypothesizes that p does not license the hypothetical conclusion that p. 
 We should expect that a person’s knowledge of what kind of mental state he is in 
can be explained by something other than the content of the mental state.  Thus, when 
Searle attempts to explain the introspectibly available difference between the exercise of 
                                                 
70 I expect there might be regress problems in the offing here as well. 
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the capacity for visual imagination and the exercise of the capacity for seeing by 
postulating differences in the contents of the mental states involved we should doubt him.  
We often enough know when we are desiring or hypothesizing – though our desiring is 
not part of the content of our desire and our hypothesizing is not part of the content of our 
hypothesizing.  And I don’t see any compelling reason to suppose that things work 
differently in the case of knowing we are seeing rather than visualizing.  
 
2.2.2.2: THE MENTAL ENVIRONMENT: PERCEPTION, THE PROPOSITIONAL 
ATTITUDES, AND MENTAL ANAPHORA 
 
In this section, I’ll present an argument that casts my externalism about visual 
contents in a better light than Searle’s account.  The argument will focus on a difference 
the obtaining of the seeing relation makes to the respects in which our actions are 
intentional.  There is some warrant for the conclusion that whether the seeing relation 
obtains makes a difference to the respects in which our actions are intentional.  The most 
elegant account of this difference-making holds that this difference-making begins with 
visual contents and spreads from there to the contents of our beliefs, desires, and 
decisions.  The problem for Searle is that his strategy for preventing the spread of proto-
semantic difference-making causes trouble for his internalism. 
I'd like to begin by thinking about a twin story taken from Sean Crawford's article, 
"In Defense of Object-Dependent Thoughts" – call this tale C1.  (Crawford 1998)  Like 
many such narratives, C1 gives us an opportunity to reflect on the similarities and 
differences between twins.  Consider, then, Ralph and Twin Ralph (TR henceforth):  
TR and Ralph live in the same world, share histories that are exactly intrinsically 
similar, share roughly the same propositional attitude psychology, each is a 
molecular duplicate of the other, etc.  Ralph and TR are located in exactly similar 
 140
rooms and in front of each there is a table and a glass of lemonade.  Ralph sees 
the glass of lemonade on the table.  But, TR is the victim of a veridical 
hallucination.  That is, TR is subject to experience just like Ralph’s (to the extent 
that this is compatible with not actually seeing what Ralph sees) and his 
environment is exactly similar to Ralph’s environment.   
 
Unlike Ralph, TR fails to see a glass of lemonade.  For some reason, TR’s 
experience has the kind of causal history that is insufficient to make it true that he 
sees the glass in front of him.  However, if there were any cases of veridical 
hallucination, TR’s would be suffering from one of them.  Just as with Ralph, 
things are as they look to TR.   
 
Both of them reach for their glasses of lemonade.  Or, more carefully, both of 
them stretch out their hands, grasping thus-and-so for egocentrically identical 
regions of space.  Their action is the upshot of a train of thought they might both 
express in the following terms: "I am thirsty for lemonade.  That is a glass of 
lemonade.  Grasping that is what I must do in order to satisfy my thirst.  OK: I 
shall grasp that and drink it."  
 
Obviously, TR and Ralph are rather similar psychologically.  They are, in some sense, 
behaving the same way.  They would use the same words to explain their behavior.  If TR 
and Ralph have ulcers, we could accuse each of being foolish (“As you well know: 
lemonade will make your ulcer worse!”)  Neither of them is in any position to distinguish 
his own state from his twin’s.  Etc.   
However, there is reason to suppose that Ralph and TR are interestingly different 
psychologically.  Crawford claims, on the authority of intuition, that Ralph and TR differ 
with respect to their agency. (Crawford 1998: 204)  Ralph’s action is intentionala with 
respect to which glass he reaches for.71  As I'll explain in a moment, that it is intentionala 
in this respect places constraints on the contents of Ralph’s mental states.  TR’s motion is 
not similarly intentionala: there is no glass on which TR intendsa to act – even though he 
                                                 
71 In this section, the reader might be confused by an ambiguity in the word ‘intentional’.  Until this point, 
I’ve been using ‘intentional’ as a term that refers to the aspects of content.  However, here we are interested 
in differences between Ralph and TR’s agency – difference with respect to their intentions.  Thus, for the 
duration of this section, I’ll subscript ‘intention’ (and words built on its stem) with an ‘a’ when I mean to 
talk about aspects of agency and I’ll subscript it (and words built on its stem) with a ‘c’, when I mean to 
talk about aspects of content.  
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grasps for the glass in front of him.  Thus, unlike TR, Ralph can and does act 
intentionallya on the glass in front of him – that it is the glass in front of him on which he 
acts is one respect in which his action is intentionala.  As Crawford puts it, “he [that is, 
TR] did not intend to pick up that glass.”  (Crawford 1998: 206)  The difference between 
them is a difference with respect to whether their actions are intentionala in relation to 
some particular object. 
Before I move on to a discussion of the way in which these postulated agential 
differences justify claiming that Ralph and TR differ in the contents of their thoughts, it is 
worth pausing to add some support to Crawford’s claim that Ralph and TR differ with 
respect to their agency.  Is it really true that Ralph does, while TR does not, act 
intentionallya on the glass in front of him?  My judgment shifts back and forth on this 
question.  Crawford calls TR, lucky Ralph.  Perhaps, given that TR is lucky, this justifies 
his claim that Ralph and TR differ with respect to their agency.   
How is TR lucky and could TR’s luckiness be an obstacle to the particularity of 
his action?72  My account of the perception relation would have the implication that TR is 
lucky, given that his experience is hallucinatory, should he succeed in grasping the cup.  
His experience is not controlled by the cup and its features.  Even if there were a reverse 
censor waiting offstage, the process by which TR came to have the experience he has 
(and consequently the propositional attitudes he forms) is not one that reliably produces 
                                                 
72 It is commonly supposed in discussions of moral responsibility and indeterminism that luck is a problem 
for one’s being morally responsible.  See Galen Strawson’s article, “The Impossibility of Moral 
Responsibility”, for an example of this.  (Strawson 1994)  For example, if you reach a decision by luck (as 
a result of random fluctuations in one’s neurons, say), then this plausibly undermines your moral 
responsibility for the resulting action.  However, we cannot model the case of TR on this kind of case.  For 
in a case in which your action is controlled by a decision (which was reached by luck), your action might 
nonetheless be intentional in every respect in which it would be were it the consequence of a decision that 
was not reached by luck.  This kind of luck would undermine moral responsibility without necessarily 
changing the intentionala facts. 
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accurate experiences.  There could have been, for some examples, a crucible of molten 
lead, a snarling pit bull, or nothing at all in front of him and he would still have made 
decisions like those he actually forms.  Thus, that TR decides to reach for the cup of 
lemonade when there is one in front of him is a lucky circumstance, given that he was 
hallucinating.  That TR’s decision is likely to result in his sipping lemonade is similarly 
lucky.  It is amazingly lucky that his hand is configured just so, and his arm will extend 
just enough (but not too far!) to grasp the glass of lemonade, given that he cannot see it.  
TR is lucky because his actions will lead to satisfaction, even given that he cannot see 
what would normally be required for success. 
Why would TR’s being lucky in this way undermine the claim that his action is 
intentionala with respect to its being that glass on which he acts?  Suppose that TR was 
sitting in front of many glasses and because the room in which he sits is in total darkness 
he can see none of them.  If he should reach out an grasp a glass (without knocking it or 
its neighbors over) his success would be lucky.  Moreover, it is clear that his reaching out 
and grasping that very glass would be lucky.  Accordingly, I think we would not say that, 
in this case, his action was intentionala with respect to its being that glass he picks.73  We 
must remind ourselves that the case of C1 is like this case.  In C1, TR might as well be 
sitting in a darkened room given that he cannot see the glass in front of him.  
Accordingly, he is lucky in whatever success he meets and, therefore, does not act 
intentionallya on that glass (the one in front of him). 
Why do the agential differences – supposing there are such – between Ralph and 
TR justify claiming that they differ psychologically?  Differences in their capacities for 
                                                 
73 Suppose that his reaching out and grasping was not proceeded by some clever bout of intellection by 
which he derived from first principles the layout of the darkened room. 
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the exercise of agency suggest that Ralph and TR are thinking thoughts with different 
kinds of content.  If Ralph intends to act on a particular glass of lemonade (rather than 
another similar glass or nothing at all), then there is probably something about the content 
of his intentiona that is sufficient to make it true that it is that particular glass of lemonade 
(rather than another similar glass or nothing at all) on which he acts.  It appears that due 
to differences in the perceptual facts, Ralph possesses intentionalc capacities TR lacks.  
Ralph's possession (and TR's lack) of that kind of intentionalityc is what explains their 
different capacities for intentionala action. 
This connection between the content of intentiona and the respects in which an 
action is intentionala is the one of the basic insights behind causal theories of intentionala 
action.  I might intenda to move my arm, and in doing so destroy Tokyo.  As it happens, 
the movement of my arm awakens Godzilla, who proceeds to level the city of Tokyo.  If 
someone were inclined to blame me for this unhappy event, I might protest that while it is 
true that I awoke the fearsome beast and thereby destroyed Tokyo, it is false that I did 
this intentionallya.  The assignment of blame is made problematic (though not necessarily 
defeated) by the fact that the content of my intentiona was simply that I move my arm.  In 
virtue of being caused by an intentiona with this content, my action was intentionala in 
respect to being an arm movement, but not in respect to being a destruction of Tokyo. 
If thoughts with the relevant contents are sufficient to make it true that Ralph's 
grasping of the glass is relevantly intentionala, then it had better be the case that TR is not 
thinking thoughts with similar content.  If TR were, then his action would also be 
intentionala in the relevant respects.  But, we’re supposing, his action is not intentionala in 
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the relevant respects, so it is likely that he is not thinking thoughts with contents like 
Ralph's.  
 It appears, then, that the perceptual facts make a difference to the contents of 
one’s intentionsa.  That Ralph is seeing and TR is not apparently makes a difference to 
the contents of those thoughts that determine the respects in which their actions are 
intentionala.  Thus, it would appear, the perceptual facts make a proto-semantic difference 
with respect to those thoughts that determine the respects in which their actions are 
intentionala.  The most elegant account of this difference-making holds that this 
difference-making begins with visual contents and spreads from there to the contents of 
our beliefs, desires, and decisions.  Call this view of the matter the Maximal View.  In 
order that the case of Ralph and TR support my externalism about the contents of visual 
experience, it had better support the Maximal View.  However, it would be possible for a 
theorist to accept more modest accounts – call them the Minimal View and the 
Intermediate View. 
 The Minimal View holds that the perceptual facts make a difference only to the 
contents of their decisions and intentions.  The Minimal View has the virtue of evidential 
parsimony.  It accepts no more than might be required in order to account for C1.  The 
Intermediate View holds that  the perceptual facts make a difference not only to the 
contents of decisions and intentions, but also to the contents of the propositional attitudes 
generally.  However, the perceptual facts make a difference only to the contents of the 
propositional attitudes and not to the contents of visual experiences.   
Though the Intermediate View is less evidentially parsimonious, it possesses 
compensating charms.  We should expect that the contents of our decisions and intentions 
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match the contents of our other propositional attitudes.  The reason is this: our intentionsa 
and decisions are characteristically related inferentially to our beliefs and desires.  
Decisions and intentions live in a deliberative environment in which they are arrived at 
via inferential connections to our beliefs and desires.  So for example, should I feel a 
desire to eat a pickle and judge that one is available in my refrigerator, I might decide (on 
that basis) that I shall get a pickle from my refrigerator and eat it.  One theoretical role for 
the contents of mental states is to make sense of these transitions by rationalizing them.  
These transitions are intelligible because there is an overlap between the contents of the 
transitioned-between states.  For this reason, it would be surprising if Ralph and TR’s 
decisions bore on particulars in one way, while their desires and beliefs (the ones to 
which their decisions are related in deliberation) bore on particulars in a different way.  
Thus we should expect that if the perceptual facts make a difference to the contents of 
their decisions and intentions, they also make a difference to the contents of their 
propositional attitudes generally.  
 The Maximal View holds that the perceptual facts make a difference all the way 
down.  They make a difference not only to the contents of their propositional attitudes (as 
required by the Intermediate View), but also to the contents of their visual experiences.  It 
is even less evidentially parsimonious than the Intermediate View, but is more elegant.  
We already have some reason to think that the contents of visual experiences depend on 
the perceptual facts and so those reasons – together with the reasoning that takes us from 
the Minimal View to the Intermediate View – would recommend the Maximal View.  
The externalist result of considering MBD1 coheres nicely with the externalist result of 
considering C1 – thus each borrows warrant from the other.   
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Additionally, if we affirm the Intermediate View and deny the Maximal View, 
then we have an awkward gap.  What I mean is this: on the Intermediate View, the 
contents of the propositional attitudes depend on the perceptual facts, but the contents of 
visual experiences do not.  This raises the question: why should it be this way?  We have 
already considered and rejected phenomenological considerations that might make it 
reasonable to deny that the contents of visual experiences depend on the perceptual facts.  
You might think that the non-conceptual character of visual experience would 
make this gap less awkward by making it predictable.  It is plausible that sensory 
experience represents the environment more fine-grainedly than human judgment.  This 
has been used to argue that sensory experiences possess what are called non-conceptual 
contents.74  Sensory experience is fine-grained, which means that “visual experiences 
represent the world with a determinacy of detail that goes beyond the concepts possessed 
by the subjects of those experiences.”  (Tye 2006: 519)  The usual example is the 
representation of color in visual experience.  My experience-producing system has the 
capacity to represents a great many shades.  Some information as to how many shades of 
color my experience can represent can be found in the number of shades computer 
designers design computers to display.  Photographic quality pictorial representations 
require the use of a format that allows for the representation of millions of colors (as with 
24-bit displays, for example).  However, it is plausible that I do not possess millions of 
distinct color concepts.  In forming non-demonstrative judgments about the colors of 
things, I can deploy only a small handful of color concepts.  Thus, it is plausible that 
visual experiences represent the world in a determinacy of detail that outruns the capacity 
                                                 
74 See Tye’s article, “Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain”, for a discussion of the 
issues. (Tye 2006) 
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of my judgment-forming system.  Evidently, the representational resources of the visual 
system differ from the representational resources of the cognitive system. 
However, there is no reason here to suppose that these differences in the 
representation resources of each system would mean that the contents of the propositional 
attitudes depend on the perceptual facts while the contents of visual experiences do not.  
The reasons for supposing that there experiences possess non-conceptual content are 
reasons concerning only the predicative contents of these states.  There is reason to 
believe that what explains the fittingness of states of the cognitive system for 
representing properties differs from what explains the fittingness of states of the visual 
system for representing properties.  Thus we have some reason for thinking that the 
predicative contents of states of the two systems might differ in their proto-semantics.  
However this does not provide reason for thinking that the bearing of states of one system 
on particulars might depend on the perceptual facts, while the bearing of the states of the 
other system does not. 
 The Maximal View affirms that the perceptual facts make a difference to the 
contents of visual states and the contents.  They do so proto-semantically – by fixing 
those contents.  What view might Searle take of the matter?  Searle is committed to 
thinking that Ralph and TR share intentions with the same contents.  Searle’s reason for 
thinking this stems from his generalized internalism – which in turn depends on his view 
of reference failure.   
Accepting Searle’s commitment to the idea that the contents of intentions do not 
differ just because the perceptual facts are different, explaining the fact that Ralph’s 
action is intentionala in ways that TR’s is not must not proceed by invoking a difference 
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in the contents of their intentionsa.75  How would such a explanation proceed?  Let’s 
imagine Searle agreeing that Ralph’s intentiona is a demonstrative intentiona.  If Ralph’s 
intentiona is demonstrative, then, on Searle’s account, so is TR’s. 
Here is Searle’s representation of the content expressed by an utterance of the 
sentence ‘That man is drunk’: 
((there is a man, x, there, and the fact that x is there is causing this visual 
experience) and x is the man visually experienced at the time of this utterance and 
x is drunk)  (Searle 1983: 227) 
 
Can we transpose this account of the content of a demonstrative statement to an account 
of the content of a demonstrative intentiona?  Let’s see. 
Consider, then, the intentiona that that man be drunk.  Suppose, for some scene 
setting, that I’m at a dinner and trying to leave a potential employer with a good feeling 
about me.  Perhaps it would be a good idea to keep the drinks flowing.  What, then, might 
a Searle-style analysis of the content of such an intentiona look like?  Begin with a 
preliminary statement of my intentiona: I will make it true that that man gets drunk.  
Searle’s account of how to deal with perceptual demonstratives is given by his 
representation of the content of ‘That man is drunk.’  Searle thinks that this statement 
has, as part of its satisfaction conditions, the obtaining of reflexive causal relations.  
Let’s, then, apply this same move to the case of the intention to make it true that that man 
gets drunk. 
I will make it true that: ((there is a man, x, there, and the fact that x is there is 
causing this visual experience) and x is the man visually experienced at the time 
of this intention and x is drunk)76 
                                                 
75 Remember that we have set aside differences that involve their being different people and being subject 
to different token mental states. 
76 There is some difficulty here about tense.  I have imagined forming the intentiona to get that man drunk 
at t1, while I’m looking at him.  The problem I am about to pose for Searle is one having to do with 
thinking that the identifying information is part of the content of the intentiona.  Evidence against thinking 
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Here we can start to see the problems with the Searle-style move.  The main difficulty is 
this: not every condition required by the proposed content of the intentiona is such that I 
intenda to make it true.  For example, I do not, in intendinga that that man gets drunk, 
thereby become inclined to take any steps to control the location of the potential 
employer.  All of my efforts, presumably, will focus on keeping his glass full of 
delicious, inebriating liquids.  It seems that my actions are not at all focused on making 
true propositions about my perception-grounding relations to the man I wish to inebriate.    
 We should defend Searle’s view by claiming that it is a mistake to include the 
reflexive causal conditions – i.e. those involving visual experiences and such – in the 
content of the intentiona.  Perhaps we should think the following: insofar as intentionsa 
bear on particulars they are accompanied by beliefs that represent the obtaining of 
Searle’s proposed reflexive causal conditions.  When I intenda that that man get drunk, I 
believe, let’s say, that there is a man there and he is the cause of my current experience 
and intenda of him that he become drunk.  My intentiona borrows its bearing on that man 
from the beliefs that accompany it.  The bearing of intentionsa on particulars is, so to 
speak, anaphoric on our belief-like states.77   
                                                                                                                                                 
this comes from the fact that none of the action or planning consequent to forming my intentiona would 
involve making it true that I bear perception-grounding relations to the man.  One difficulty for this 
argument is that later – as I am acting or planning – the identifying descriptive content will be most 
perspicuously expressed in past tense.  A defender of Searle might note that the explanation for why none 
of my action or planning focuses on making these things true is that they are already true and so beyond my 
capacity to make true.  This would explain my inaction with respect to the obtaining of identifying facts – 
and does so without denying that these facts are part of the content of the intention.  However, such a 
proposal runs afoul of the thesis that the content of intentionsa should be limited to what is to be made true.  
Intentionsa have, on Searle’s theory, a characteristic direction of fit.  If such-and-such state of affairs is not 
represented as being to be made true, then it is part of the content of an intentiona, but rather part of the 
content of a different kind of state. 
77 There is reason to believe that Searle himself would favor this analysis.  (Searle 1983: 216) 
 150
 It is worth mentioning that the dialectic of the previous two paragraphs will 
generalize for a wide variety of desire-like states involving existential commitment.  
Consider, for example, the wish that the people at my party leave.  This desire expresses 
an existential commitment to its being true that there are some people at my party.  
However, it would be a mistake to include this existential commitment in the content of 
my desire.  After all, it would not necessarily satisfy my wish if there were people at my 
party at the time of my wish and they subsequently left.  It is compatible with wishing 
that the people at my party leave that I also wish they had never arrived in the first place.  
Thus, on any account, it will often be the case that desires we ascribe by using 
existentially committed language in the clause specifying the content of the desire will 
have to be understood to be anaphoric on accompanying belief-like states.78   Descriptive 
desire-like states will have to be understood as anaphoric on accompanying belief-like 
states.  In Searle’s case, since he gives demonstratives a descriptive analysis, it will turn 
out that every demonstrative desire-like state is such that its bearing on a particular is 
anaphoric on accompanying beliefs.79 
 In the case of demonstrative intentions, the beliefs in question will presumably be 
demonstrative.  Since demonstrative beliefs get a descriptive analysis on Searle’s 
account, we can perspicuously represent Ralph and TR’s mental state (insofar as they 
intend demonstratively) as follows: 
Believe (something, x, is S and the fact that x is S is causing this visual 
experience and x is a glass of lemonade.)80 
                                                 
78 It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to give an account of the conditions under which we’ll have to 
postulate anaphoric dependence for desires. 
79 If there were reason to deny that demonstrative desires (and desire-like states) were anaphoric on 
accompanying beliefs, then we’d have reason to reject Searle’s account.  Such a case might proceed by 
showing that there are desire-like states that are not accompanied by the right kind of beliefs.  I cannot 
think of any such cases, however. 
80 ‘S’ expresses the predicative content of the experience. 
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 Intend (that I grasp it)81 
 
The bearing of the intention on the glass of lemonade picks up its reference from the 
belief represented above it.  Since the bearing of Ralph and TR’s intentions on particulars 
is anaphoric on the Searle-style beliefs that accompany them, the fact that TR’s belief is 
false has implications for the content of his intention.  It looks like we shall have to 
suppose that TR’s intention suffers from reference failure.  Since there is nothing that 
satisfies the condition (that there be something that is S and…) required by the content of 
TR’s belief, the content of his belief cannot supply reference for his intentiona.   
That TR’s intention suffers from reference failure is not a surprise.  I take it that 
this is common ground between the externalist and Searle.  Indeed, it is reference failure 
that probably accounts for the difference in agency between Ralph and TR.  TR’s action 
is not intentionala with respect to which glass he grasps for because his intention fails to 
refer to the glass.  Consequently, it is not part of the satisfaction conditions of his 
intention that he grasp that glass.  The problem for Searle is this: If TR’s desire suffers 
from reference failure, then even a Searle-style account cannot hold on to its affirmation 
that Ralph and TR’s intentions share the same contents.  Remember, Searle’s strategy for 
preserving sameness of content (despite reference failure) depends on postulating 
particularity-determining descriptive contents.  However, we have seen that desires do 
not really have particularity-determining descriptive contents.  That is, when we ascribe a 
desire-like state using a particularity-determining description in the content-specifying 
clause of the desire ascription, we are indicating a state of affairs in which a desire is 
                                                 
81 I use ‘it’ in preference to ‘x’, since the use of ‘x’ would suggest that the ‘that I grasp x’ is an open 
sentence or that ‘x’ is a variable bound by the quantifier in the representation of the belief.  I want to make 
no such suggestion. 
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accompanied by a descriptive belief and takes its reference from that belief.  Thus, Searle 
cannot apply the descriptivist strategy for dealing with reference-failure to the case of 
desire-like states.82 
But now, if we reject the claim that Ralph and TR share intentionsa, we have no 
reason to prefer Searle’s view over its externalist rival.  Whatever account he gives of the 
content of TR’s intention it needn’t be a descriptivist account (because it cannot be one).  
It must be possible to address the problem of reference failure without postulating 
descriptive contents.  I seen no reason expect a move that will work in the case of desire-




We have seen that there is no reason to be found in the connection between 
phenomenology and visual content to prefer Searle’s account over my externalist analysis 
of MBD1.  However, it seems that there is no reason to reject Searle’s account in light of 
the connections between phenomenology and visual content.  While Searle has the 
resources to account for the case of Ralph and his twin, h`e must hold that the Ralphs’ 
desire-like states are anaphoric on accompanying beliefs.  This has the consequence that 
TR’s intentions suffer from a failure of reference that cannot be accounted for using 
descriptivist resources.  Thus, one of the chief reasons for being attracted to Searle’s 
internalism is undermined by the anaphoric relation he must posit to account for the 
                                                 
82 What account should be given of the content of TR’s intention?  I will not give one here.  Since my 
present goal is to seek differences between my view and Searle’s that cast Searle’s view in worse light than 
my own, I need not give an account of the content of TR’s intention at this point.  Searle and I both stand in 
need of an account of the content of TR’s intention. 
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Ralphs.  Additionally, there is an elegant externalist account that would also account for 
the Ralphs.  At any rate, we have seen no reason to accept Searle’s account that would 
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